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Essence, Existence, and Necessity: Spinozaʼs Modal Metaphysics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“For with thee is the fountain of life: in thy light shall we see light.”1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Austen Haynes
                                                
1 Psalms 36:9. 
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Abstract 
 
“In thought, as in nature, there is no creation from absolute nothing.” I have taken 
on the daunting project of giving an account of Spinoza’s metaphysics, and laying 
out the reasoning behind his doctrines. In a letter written in December 1675, 
barely over a year before his death, Spinoza told Henry Oldenburg that the 
fatalistic necessity (which was disturbing readers of his philosophy) was in fact 
the “principal basis” of his Ethics. Since all of his metaphysical doctrines are 
entwined with this necessity, it is my task to piece this puzzle together. In this 
thesis, I will begin by discussing his definitions and axioms, and proceed to 
unfold his substance monism. I will then discuss his proofs of the existence of 
God, followed by his doctrine of God’s simplicity, causality, and eternality. I will 
then examine the relation of modes to substance, and the classifications of 
modes. From all of this I will conclude with an account of Spinoza’s 
necessitarianism. There are a number of objections that have been raised 
against Spinoza: that he arbitrarily defines his basic metaphysical terms, 
“stacking the deck” in favor of his system, that he assimilates the causal relation 
to the relation of logical implication, that there is a problem of divine attributes, 
that he does not adequately show that substance must produce modes, and that 
he does not show how the infinite mediate modes are deduced from the infinite 
immediate modes, or how motion follows from extension. In my discussion of 
Spinoza’s metaphysics, I will touch on all of these issues.2 
                                                
2 I would like to especially thank John Peterson for advising me in this project, and for enriching 
discussions on countless topics in metaphysics. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Giving an account of Spinozaʼs metaphysics is by nature similar to solving a 
puzzle. The definitions and axioms serve as the primary pieces, the building 
blocks which present us with a glimpse into the whole that is to be constructed, 
and is incomplete if any pieces are missing. It is a complex puzzle that requires 
the greatest care and attention to complete, as if this puzzle were intertwined with 
numerous other puzzle pieces that deceptively appear to belong to the same 
puzzle, but do not. The influence of Spinozaʼs philosophy has been monumental. 
Hegel famously said that one is either a Spinozist or not a philosopher at all. 
Nietzsche declared Spinoza to be his philosophical predecessor.3 Einstein 
referred to himself as a follower of Spinoza, responding in a telegram on his 
religious views that he believes in Spinozaʼs God, who reveals himself in the 
lawful harmony of the world. Despite this positive reception of Spinoza, there is 
also a vast amount of negative reception. Spinoza found himself facing the knife 
when an attempt to assassinate him failed.4 He was issued a cherem, a 
particularly severe form of excommunication from the Jewish community that 
involves shunning. In his own time, a leading French theologian called Spinoza 
“the most impious and dangerous man of the century.” A powerful bishop 
similarly declared that this “insane and evil man…deserves to be covered with 
chains and whipped with a rod.” Henry Oldenburg remarked on behalf of other 
readers of Spinoza that if his doctrine of necessitarianism is affirmed, then “the 
sinews of all law, all virtue and religion are severed.”5 This distaste for Spinozaʼs 
doctrine of necessity is still alive today. In his book on Spinoza, Jonathan Bennett 
refers to his necessitarianism as “that being the dangerously false thesis towards 
which his explanatory rationalism is pushing him.”6 As Samuel Newlands claims, 
“from Spinoza's contemporaries to our own, readers of the Ethics have 
denounced Spinoza's views on modality as metaphysically confused at best, 
ethically nihilistic at worst.”7 It is perhaps this same feeling that led a philosophy 
professor at my university to say of the relevance of Spinozaʼs thought today that 
“Spinoza is dead.”  
I have taken on the project of giving an account of Spinozaʼs metaphysics, 
and laying out the reasoning behind his doctrines. I will begin by discussing his 
definitions and axioms, and proceed to unfold his one substance doctrine. I will 
then discuss his proofs of the existence of God, followed by his doctrine of Godʼs 
simplicity, causality, and eternality. I will then examine the relation of modes to 
substance, and the classifications of modes. From all of this I will conclude with 
an account of Spinozaʼs necessitarianism. Spinoza describes his modal 
                                                
3 “Ich habe einen Vorganger, und was für einen!” From a letter to Overbeck, 30 July 1881. 
4 For an account of this incident, see Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, 110-111. 
5 Epistle LXXIV. CW, 944. 
6 Bennett, A Study of Spinozaʼs Ethics, 121. 
7 Newlands, Spinozaʼs Modal Metaphysics. 
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metaphysics as the “principle basis”8 of the Ethics, and since all of his 
metaphysical doctrines are entwined with this necessity, it is my task in this 
paper to piece this puzzle together. There are a number of objections that have 
been raised against Spinoza: that he arbitrarily defines his basic metaphysical 
terms, “stacking the deck” in favor of his system, that he assimilates the causal 
relation to the relation of logical implication, that there is a problem of divine 
attributes, that he does not adequately show that substance must produce 
modes, and that he does not show how the infinite mediate modes are deduced 
from the infinite immediate modes, or how motion follows from extension. In my 
discussion of Spinozaʼs metaphysics, I will touch on all of these issues.9 
 
 
 
II. The Definition and Relation of Substance and Mode 
 
The fundamental principles of Spinozaʼs ontology10 are not a radical departure 
from his predecessors.11 Valtteri Viljanen has argued that the relation of 
substance and mode, despite Spinozaʼs peculiar vocabulary, should be seen as 
both familiar and intelligible, and he demonstrates that Spinozaʼs understanding 
of these matters harks back to the traditional distinction of substance and 
accident, or thing and property.12 I follow Viljanenʼs explanation of substance and 
mode, and this view will be presented in what follows. Spinozaʼs definitions of 
substance and mode are given at the beginning of the Ethics: 
 
Definition III: By substance I understand what is in itself and is 
conceived through itself, i.e., that whose concept does not require 
the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed. 
 
Definition V: By mode I understand the affections of a substance, or 
that which is in another through which it is also conceived.13 
 
The fact that substances are in and conceived through themselves, whereas 
modes are in and conceived through another, implies that substance holds an 
ontological and epistemological priority over modes.14 A substance is in itself, 
                                                
8 Epistle LXXV. CW, 945. 
9 Since writing this thesis, my views on have changed on various issues. This may not always 
reflect my current interpretations. 
10 The study of the general nature of being, or the most basic features of what exists, as such. 
See, for example, Aristotleʼs discussion of ʻbeing as beingʼ in Metaphysics IV. 
11 A recent commentator, Valtteri Viljanen, has given a persuasive argument in favor of this, which 
has influenced my view on the topic. 
12 Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 56. In: Koistinen (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Spinozaʼs 
Ethics. 
13 Ethics, I, Definitions III and V. C I.408-409. 
14 Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 57. 
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while a mode is in another. To understand what this means it is useful to go back 
to Aristotleʼs classic distinction of substance and accident. Accidents are entities 
that cannot exist on their own, and require a substance to serve as a subject in 
which it exists. Accidents inhere in subjects, while substances are entities that 
subsist. While accidents depend upon the substances in which they inhere, 
substances are not similarly dependent on their accidents. Substances are 
individuated by the basic features of their essence, and not by their accidents. In 
the Metaphysics, Aristotle had defined substance as: 
 
That of which other things are predicated, while it is itself not 
predicated of anything else.15 
 
Consider the following passage in the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas 
Aquinas, which Spinozaʼs definitions strongly echo: “Those things subsist which 
exist in themselves, and not in another.”16 Aristotleʼs distinction between 
subsistence and inherence is reflected in Spinozaʼs being in itself and being in 
another.17 This same framework is explicitly evident in Descartes, particularly in 
his Principles of Philosophy, where he assigns a causal independence to 
substances: 
 
By substance we can understand nothing other than a thing which 
exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its 
existence.18 
 
Descartes identified God as the only being that can be understood to depend on 
no other thing whatsoever. However, Descartes also said that both mind and 
body are substances which “can exist only with the help of Godʼs concurrence.”19 
Descartes concludes this definition by stating: 
 
In the case of created things, some are of such a nature that they 
cannot exist without other things, while some need only the ordinary 
concurrence of God in order to exist. We make this distinction by 
calling the latter ʻsubstancesʼ and the former ʻqualitiesʼ or ʻattributesʼ 
of those substances.20 
 
Spinoza accepts the basic principle of the Cartesian definition of substance, but 
he doesnʼt follow Descartes by including mind and body as substances. When 
Spinoza says that substance does not require the conception of any other thing 
than itself, he rules out mind and body as substances, since their essence is 
                                                
15 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 3, 1029a1-2. 
16 Summa Theologiae, I, 29.2, resp. 
17 Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 58. 
18 Principles, I, 51. CSM I.210. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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predicated on something else, namely God.21 Substance has to be something 
which isnʼt constrained or defined by anything else. Substance canʼt be a quality 
or a relation, as these terms imply dependence on things distinct from 
themselves. All relations and qualities are secondary and predicated on 
substance.22 
It is evident, as Viljanen has argued, that Spinozaʼs definition that substances 
are in themselves, and modes are in another, is in accordance with the traditional 
way of conceiving things and their properties: “there are those things, namely 
substances, that do not exist in anything else but are ontologically self-
supporting; and there are those things, namely modes or modifications – 
Spinozaʼs gloss for accidents – that exist in, or inhere in, something, namely 
substances.”23 This is the meaning of the definitions of substance and mode, 
which are not arbitrary. There are no causal notions contained in these 
definitions.24 “Thus, Spinoza takes himself to be entitled to hold, without offering 
any further proof, that modes are affections of substance,25 and it is evident from 
this that substance is logically prior in nature to its affections, which constitutes 
the first proposition of the Ethics. Further, since it is an axiom that “whatever is, is 
either in itself or in another,”26 it can also be inferred that “outside the intellect 
there is nothing except substances and their affections.”27 The only entities in 
Spinozaʼs ontology classifiable as things are substances and modes.28 
What does it mean to be in something? And how is the axiom that whatever 
is, is either in itself or in another, self-evident? The simplicity and clarity of this 
axiom is apparent, for Spinoza is merely telling us that if a thing exists, it must fall 
within one of two categories: existence that is fully independent or existence that 
is dependent on something else. The former is a substance, whereas the latter is 
a mode or modification. There is no third category, for we canʼt say that 
something is in nothing. The second axiom, that “what cannot be conceived 
through another, must be conceived through itself”29 is complementary with the 
first axiom, and its self-evidence is the same. The first axiom dealt with the 
existential, or metaphysical, whereas the second axiom deals with the 
conceptual, or epistemological. When I conceive something, either I think of the 
thing through itself, or I employ a notion of a thing external to it to form my 
thought of the thing. Again, there are only two possible categories, and this is 
self-evidently known. Note that Spinoza has not said anything about the 
                                                
21 This idea of predication will come up again later on, esp. see Ethics, I, Proposition XVII, Schol. 
C I.424. 
22 Compare with inherence in Ethics, I, Propositions XV and XVIII. C I.420, 428. 
23 Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 59. 
24 Carriero, On the Relationship between Mode and Substance in Spinozaʼs Metaphysics, 261. 
Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 59. 
25 Viljanen, Ibid. 
26 Ethics, I, Axiom I. C I.410. 
27 Ethics, I, Proposition IV. C I.411. 
28 Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 59. 
29 Ethics, I, Axiom II. C I.410. 
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adequacy of the conceiving, and he will later say that any idea we form of any 
finite mode involves the concept of something else. 30 What it involves the 
concept of is the attribute that constitutes the essence of substance in which the 
mode inheres.31 
What Spinoza has said thus far is quite traditional, as Viljanen has pointed 
out: 
 
The way in which conceivability is treated in Definition III and 
Definition V reflects the definitional priority Aristotelians considered 
substances to have over accidents: a definition reveals the essence 
of the thing defined, and the definition of an accident must refer to 
something other than the accident, namely the subject in which the 
accident in question inheres, whereas a substance is definable 
without reference to anything external to the substance. So when 
Spinoza elucidates his claim that a substance is conceived through 
itself by saying that a substanceʼs ʻconcept does not require the 
concept of another thing, from which it must be formedʼ (Definition 
III), he can be regarded as proceeding broadly along traditional 
lines.32 
 
Further, as numerous scholars have noted,33 the influence of Descartes is 
evident in what Spinoza has said thus far. Consider the following passage: 
 
A substance may indeed be known through any attribute at all; but 
each substance has one principle property which constitutes its 
nature and essence, and to which all its other properties are 
referred. Thus extension in length, breadth and depth constitutes 
the nature of corporeal substance; and thought constitutes the 
nature of thinking substance. Everything else which can be 
attributed to body presupposes extension, and is merely a mode of 
an extended thing; and similarly, whatever we find in the mind is 
simply one of the various modes of thinking. For example, shape is 
unintelligible except in an extended thing; and motion is 
unintelligible except as motion in an extended space; while 
imagination, sensation and will are intelligible only in a thinking 
thing. By contrast, it is possible to understand extension without 
shape or movement, and thought without imagination or sensation, 
and so on; and this is quite clear to anyone who gives the matter 
his attention.34 
                                                
30 Ethics, II, Proposition XLV. C I.481. 
31 Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 60. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Carriero, On the Relation between Mode and Substance in Spinozaʼs Metaphysics, 250. 
Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 60. Gueroult, Spinoza, 60-63. 
34 Principles, I, 53. CSM I.210-211. 
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This simply means that to conceive any body, we must conceive extension, and 
to conceive any idea, we must conceive thought. Viljanen argues that Spinoza is 
treading on “well-established grounds” when he says that substances are 
conceived through themselves and modes are conceived through another. It is 
merely his own formulation of the “conceptual priority traditionally given to 
substances over properties.”35 It is thus well-founded to claim, as numerous other 
scholars have, that Spinozaʼs definitions of substance and mode contain nothing 
controversial.36 We can sum up what Spinoza has said as follows: “Whenever we 
think of something, we are thinking of some thing, (i.e., a substance), but that 
thing must always be a thing of some kind, it cannot be without some qualities, 
properties, or modes.”37 
 
 
 
III. Spinozaʼs Definition of Attribute 
 
The next subject of Spinozaʼs ontology is the attributes. Attributes are “what 
the intellect perceives of substance, as constituting its essence.”38 While 
substance is the most basic and essential being, and mode is a particular aspect 
of that being, attributes are ways of being. Descartes had similarly defined a 
principal attribute as that which constitutes a substanceʼs nature or essence.39 
We might ask, what does it mean to constitute somethingʼs essence? To 
constitute the essence of a substance is to possess essential properties such 
that if these properties were absent, it is impossible to conceive of the 
substance.40 This has given rise to an objection: If substance is conceived 
through itself, how can it not be conceived apart from an attribute? In the 
scholium to Proposition X Spinoza will state that each substance is conceived 
through itself and that “each being must be conceived under some attribute.”41 
Thus, substance must be conceived under some attribute. If this is the case, we 
are presented with yet another dilemma: does this not make attributes 
conceptually prior to substances? 
A popular solution to this problem is to identify substance with attributes.42 In 
fact, there is strong textual evidence to support this. Consider the following: 
                                                
35 Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 61. 
36 Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method, 11-12. Carriero, On the Relation between Mode and 
Substance in Spinozaʼs Metaphysics, 250. Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 61. Note that Wolfson 
has argued, to the contrary, that Spinoza offers a new way of understanding mode. Cf. Wolfson, I, 
61-78. 
37 Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 61. 
38 Ethics, I, Definition IV. C I.408. 
39 Principles, I, 53. CSM I.210. 
40 Ethics, II, Definition II. C I.447. 
41 Ethics, I, Proposition X, Schol. C I.416. 
42 Curley, Spinozaʼs Metaphysics, 16-18. Gueroult and Jarrett also argue in favor of this. 
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Whatever is, is either in itself or in another (by Axiom I), i.e., (by 
Definitions III and V), outside the intellect there is nothing except 
substances and their affections. Therefore, there is nothing outside 
the intellect through which a number of things can be distinguished 
from one another except substance, or what is the same (by 
Definition IV), their attributes, and their affections, q.e.d.43 
 
Further, in an epistle from 1661 the young Spinoza had originally defined 
attribute in the same way that he defines substance in the Ethics: 
 
By attribute I understand whatever is conceived through itself and is 
in itself, so that its concept does not involve the concept of another 
thing.44 
 
An epistle from 1663 also supports this interpretation, where Spinoza defines 
substance: 
 
By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived 
through itself, i.e., whose concept does not involve the concept of 
another thing. I understand the same by attribute, except that it is 
called attribute in relation to the intellect, which attributes such and 
such a definite nature to substance.45 
 
This interpretation still isnʼt without its own problems. In the scholium to 
Proposition X, Spinoza says:  
 
It is far from absurd to attribute many attributes to one substance. 
Indeed, nothing in nature is clearer than that each being must be 
conceived under some attribute, and the more reality, or being it 
has, the more it has attributes which express necessity, or eternity, 
and infinity. And consequently there is also nothing clearer than that 
a being absolutely infinite must be defined (as we taught in 
Definition VI) as a being that consists of infinite attributes, each of 
which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence.46 
 
The problem is that if substance and its attributes are identical, then how can one 
substance with many attributes still be one substance and not many substances? 
                                                
43 Ethics, I, Proposition IV, Dem. C I.411. Curley also points to Spinozaʼs definition of God as a 
substance consisting of infinite attributes. Consider also, Proposition XIX: “God is eternal, or all 
Godʼs attributes are eternal.” Proposition XX, Corol. II. “God, or all of Godʼs attributes, are 
immutable.” C I.427-428. 
44 Epistle II. C I.165. 
45 Epistle IX. C I.195. 
46 Ethics, I, Proposition X, Schol. C I.416. 
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It would seem that this objection leaves us in a sad state of affairs. Fortunately, 
Olli Koistinen has given a promising answer to this question. Viljanen 
summarizes Koistinenʼs view as follows: 
 
Koistinen accepts that the concept of substance and its attribute 
must be identical, but observes that somewhat surprisingly this 
does not entail, for Spinoza, that a substance would be identical 
with its attribute. This is so, Koistinen suggests, because ideas are 
active affirmations, that is, propositions that always predicate 
properties of something, and we can regard the idea of a certain 
substance whose essence is constituted by a certain attribute, let 
us say E, as a proposition that predicates E of the substance in 
question. Thus a proposition ʻSubstance is Eʼ – or, more exactly, 
ʻSomething is Eʼ – expresses the absolutely primitive ontological 
feature of Spinozaʼs system. That is, substances and attributes are 
as it were inextricably fused together: the above proposition is not 
only the concept of the substance in question but also the concept 
of the attribute in question, that is, of E. There can be no idea of a 
substance without an idea of an attribute, and the idea of an 
attribute always contains the idea of a substance. That the above-
mentioned complex proposition reveals the foundation of Spinozaʼs 
ontology explains how the concepts of substance and attribute can 
be identical while substance and attribute still remain distinct 
entities. And because the concepts of substance and attribute are 
identical, that it can be said that a substance is conceived both 
through itself and through its attribute poses no threat to the tenet 
that the concept of substance – and thus also of an attribute – does 
not refer to or involve any other concept, making it conceptually 
independent.47 
 
If this solves the problem of how a substance can be conceived both through 
itself and through its attribute, there is still the further difficulty of how one 
substance can have many attributes, each constituting its essence. This is known 
as the problem of attributes, and it is a problem I will look at more closely later on 
in this paper.48 I will only say here that there are two sides to this issue: 
subjectivism and objectivism. Subjectivists claim that Spinozaʼs definition of 
attribute supports the view that the attributes are only what our intellect perceives 
as if constituting the essence of substance, but do not really constitute its 
essence. The problem with this interpretation is threefold: it makes Spinoza too 
                                                
47 Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 63-64. From Koistinen, On the Metaphysics of Spinozaʼs Ethics, 
18-24. 
48 I discuss this issue more thoroughly in a separate Appendix devoted to the problem of 
attributes All further references to “Appendix” without referencing Spinozaʼs work are to this. I give 
an brief summary of this in the last three sections. 
  12 
much of an idealist, the definition of attribute does not actually support the claim 
that Spinoza is a subjectivist, and there are multiple propositions that directly 
conflict with the subjectivist reading. While subjectivism would seem to solve the 
problem of attributes, and thus has an appeal, it canʼt legitimately be accepted as 
a plausible interpretation. Spinoza speaks of attributes as something real and 
objective, not depending on an individual perceiver to exist. 
Attributes are really distinct, but Spinoza holds that it does not follow from this 
that each attribute must constitute a thing of its own. This view is expressed 
clearly by Michael Della Roccaʼs interpretation of a conceptual barrier between 
attributes: 
 
No attribute, say E, can offer grounds for a substance not to have 
some other attribute, say T, because then a fact about T – that it is 
not possessed by a certain substance – would be explained by E; 
but then something concerning T would be conceived through E, 
and this would go against Tʼs status as an attribute, that is, as 
something that is conceived solely through itself.49 
 
But what does it all mean? Spinoza does not see a problem in holding that just as 
human beings are mental and physical beings, a substance can also be mental 
and physical. As Viljanen says: “a substance can be conceived under many 
different aspects, can have several objective essential features, many basic ways 
of being.”50 Since each being must be conceived under some attributes, modes 
must also be conceived under some attribute. They are modes of an objective 
feature of substance. 
 
 
 
IV. Relations and Causality Between Substances 
 
Merely from the definitions and axioms already stated, Spinoza will derive 
Propositions II and IV. Spinoza states in Proposition II that “two substances 
having different attributes have nothing in common with one another.”51 Note that 
Spinozaʼs argument for one substance depends on three facts, the last of which 
depends on this proposition: 
 
1) That God exists. (This is independent of there being more than two 
attributes) (Proposition VII, Proposition XI) 
                                                
49 Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 66. From Della Rocca, Spinozaʼs Substance Monism, 18, 28-29. 
Cf. Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza, 9-17. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ethics, I, Proposition II. C I.410. 
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2) That God has all attributes. (This is satisfied as long as Godʼs having 
infinite attributes entails his having all attributes.) (Proposition VIII, 
Proposition IX) 
3) No two distinct substances can have an attribute in common. (Does not 
depend on any considerations of the number of attributes) (Proposition II-
V) 
 
This proposition is clearly targeted at a particular medieval view of the distinction 
between the essence of God and of the world. Maimonides says that the 
difference in their essences is so great, that no attribute can be predicated of 
them in any related sense: 
 
When they ascribe to God essential attributes, these so-called 
essential attributes should not have any similarity to the attributes of 
other things, and should not have any similarity to the attributes of 
other things, and should according to their own opinion not be 
included in one and the same definition, just as there is no similarity 
between the essence of God and that of other beings.52 
 
Wolfson interprets Spinoza as saying that: “When the same attributes, predicated 
of two substances, are homonymous terms, used in absolutely different and 
unrelated senses, the predication of these attributes does not imply any real 
relationship in the essence of the two substances.”53 This fits in well with what 
Spinoza held as an axiom in the Short Treatise: “Things that have different 
attributes, as well as those that belong to different attributes have nothing in 
themselves the one from the other.”54 Wolfson rightly advises us to think of 
Spinozaʼs usage of the term attribute here in the sense of predicates. This 
interpretation fits in well with what both Curley and Bennett say about the 
opening propositions.55 As Curley repeatedly emphasizes,56 an objection that 
was brought up by Leibniz may help us to understand the manner in which 
Spinoza is thinking about substances and shared-attributes. The objection Curley 
is referring to is that “two substances might have some attributes in common and 
others which were distinctive of each one (e.g., substance A has attributes C and 
D, substance B has attributes C and E).57  Curley points out that this objection 
rests on the assumption that a substance may have more than one attribute. This 
gives us reason to think that Spinoza is beginning by following the Cartesian 
conception of substance in which “To each substance there belongs one 
                                                
52 Moreh Nebukim, I, 56. Maimonides goes on to say: “this is a decisive proof that there is, in no 
way or sense, anything common to the attributes predicated of God, and those used in reference 
to ourselvesʼ they have only the same names, and nothing else is common to them.” 
53 Ibid. 
54 C 151. Axiom IV of the Appendix to the Short Treatise. 
55 See Ethics, I, Proposition V. 
56 C I.410 n. 8, also BGM, 15. Curley has repeatedly referred to this objection by Leibniz. 
57 Ibid. 
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principal attribute; in the case of mind, this is thought, and in the case of body it is 
extension”:  
 
A substance may indeed be known through any attribute at all; but 
each substance has one principal property which constitutes its 
nature and essence, and to which all its other properties are 
referred. Thus extension in length, breadth and depth constitutes 
the nature of corporeal substance; and thought constitutes the 
nature of thinking substance. Everything else which can be 
attributed to body presupposes extension, and is merely a mode of 
an extended thing; and similarly, whatever we find in the mind is 
simply one of the various modes of thinking.58 
 
Indeed, this line of interpretation seems to fit very well. Bennett also agrees that 
this fixes the apparent gap that Leibniz noticed, since Spinoza does not even 
speak of the possibility of a substance having more than one attribute until 
Proposition IX. Thus, Bennett says that, “until then he is speaking in terms of the 
concept of a one-attribute substance.”59 The language used by Spinoza in the 
demonstration of Proposition VIII as contrasted with Proposition IX justifies this 
interpretation. 
Spinoza next says in Proposition III that “if things have nothing in common 
with one another, one of them cannot be the cause of the other.”60 Spinoza draws 
this proposition out of Axioms IV and V. 
 
Axiom IV: The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, 
the knowledge of its cause. 
 
Axiom V: Things that have nothing in common with one another 
also cannot be understood through one another, or the concept of 
the one does not involve the concept of the other.61 
 
In light of these axioms, we might want to phrase this proposition as: “when 
things have nothing in common (i.e. things whose concepts cannot be 
understood through each other), one cannot be the cause of the other.” Surely 
this has to be what Spinoza means in this axiom from the Short Treatise: “What 
has nothing in itself from another thing can also not be the cause of the existence 
of such another thing.”62 H. A. Wolfson puts it best when he says of Axioms IV 
and V that: 
 
                                                
58 Principles, I, 53. CSM I.210. 
59 Bennett, A Study of Spinozaʼs Ethics, 69. 
60 Ethics, I, Proposition III. C I.410. 
61 C I.410. 
62 Axiom V of the Appendix to the Short Treatise. Note that I referred consecutively to Axiom IV 
for Proposition II and to Axiom V for Proposition III. C I.151. 
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Starting, therefore, with his own premise that God acts by 
necessity, he argues against the mediaevals63 that if Godʼs nature 
be essentially different from the nature of the world, He could not be 
the cause of the world.64 
 
Thus, Spinoza thinks that it is a contradiction to say that a divine nature that is 
homonymous with the nature of the world, and still bears any conceptual (and 
thus, causal) relation with it. This contradiction is evident from the fact that an 
overwhelmingly popular medieval view stated that divine nature and the nature of 
the world were absolutely different, yet the world was produced by a process of 
emanation from the divine nature. Spinoza was well aware of the extreme 
weakness of divine creation, noting the eagerness of medievals to impose 
immaterial intermediary causes between God and the world. 
 
 
 
V. The Identity of Indiscernibles 
 
Spinoza states in Proposition IV: “Two or more distinct things are distinguished 
from one another, either by a difference in the attributes of the substances or by 
a difference in their affections.”65 In this proposition he is giving his own version 
of the identity of indiscernibles. Two things are distinguished from one another 
either by what basic kind of thing they are, or in a relational sense that isnʼt basic. 
The concept of an extended thing on any basic level is only extension, and of a 
thinking thing, only thought. Thus, it is impossible to distinguish two things whose 
qualities are identical. His argument would look something like this: 
 
1. Everything in Nature is differentiated by a basic difference of attributes or 
by a non-basic and qualitative difference in modes. 
2. Therefore, the conceptual content of any two things, conceived under the 
same attribute, involves nothing but that attribute. (i.e. the conceptual 
content of an extended thing involves only extension) 
3. It follows that nothing could distinguish two things with exactly the same 
qualities (conceptually, via the attribute).66 
4. The two things are then really the same thing. 
5. Therefore, there exists only one thing. 
                                                
63 Note that when Wolfson refers to the medievals, he is not necessarily referring to all of 
medieval philosophy together. When he states that the medievals held a particular view, he is 
usually referring to widespread beliefs in Jewish and Islamic philosophy, likely championed by 
Maimonides, or Avicenna, or another popular figure from these two cultures whose philosophical 
views gained widespread acceptance. However, the scholastics are not always exempt from 
being included in this grouping, though they are not usually the primary target.  
64 Wolfson, I, 90. 
65 Ethics, I, Proposition IV. C I.411. 
66 For more on this, see A Study of Spinozaʼs Ethics, 67. 
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Spinoza thinks it obvious that nothing exists external to the intellect except 
substances and modes, and therefore there is nothing else by which they are 
distinguished from one another. It follows that nothing can be distinguished from 
God and still have something in common with Him. The two would have to be 
either absolutely different or absolutely identical. 
 
 
 
VI. The No-Shared Attribute Thesis 
 
Spinoza asserts in Proposition V that “in nature there cannot be two substances 
of the same nature or attribute.”67 Spinoza had formulated an earlier version of 
this proposition, in which he says that “there are no two equal substances”68 His 
proof runs as follows: “Every substance is perfect in its kind.69 For if there were 
two equal substances, then they would necessarily have to limit one another, and 
consequently, would not be infinite.”70 The demonstration of Proposition V is as 
follows: 
 
If there were two or more distinct substances, they would have to 
be distinguished from one another either by a difference in their 
attributes, or by a difference in their affections (by Proposition IV). If 
only by a difference in their attributes, then it will be conceded that 
there is only one of the same attribute. But if by a difference in their 
affections, then since a substance is prior in nature to its affections 
(by Proposition I), if the affections are put to one side and [the 
substance] is considered in itself, i.e. (by Definition III and Axiom 
VI), considered truly, one cannot be conceived to be distinguished 
from another, i.e. (by Proposition IV), there cannot be many, but 
only one [of the same nature or attribute], q.e.d.71 
 
The no-shared attribute thesis is based off of Spinozaʼs identity of indiscernibles, 
which we saw in the previous proposition. Two things are identical if there is no 
feature by which they differ. If two things are distinct, some feature must 
differentiate them. With regard to substances, attributes and modes are the only 
entities that could differentiate them. But what justification does Spinoza have for 
putting the affections to one side when considering substances? An appealing 
answer has been given by Viljanen: 
 
                                                
67 Ethics, I, Proposition V. C I.411 
68 KV, I, ii, 2. C I.66. Note: All references to KV are to the Short Treatise. 
69 See my explanation of Ethics, I Proposition VIII. 
70 KV, I, ii, 6. C I.67. 
71 Ethics, I, Proposition V, Dem. C I.411. 
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By remarking that ʻa substance is prior in nature to its affections,ʼ 
Spinoza is reminding us that distinguishing a substance by its 
modes would amount to a situation in which a substance is 
individuated by and conceived through something external to it (i.e., 
external to its essence); this would be at odds with the very 
definition of substance, which, as we have seen, characterizes a 
substance as a self-supporting entity, and one that does not require 
anything external to be conceived. Moreover, on this point Spinoza 
is in accordance with more or less the entire Western tradition.72 
 
Since modes canʼt distinguish two substances, the attributes are the only other 
possibility left. But the attributes fare no better at distinguishing substances 
either. If we take any attribute, and if two substances shared that attribute, then it 
cannot be that attribute that differentiates the two substances. Given the identity 
of indiscernibles, the two substances are in fact identical. The identity of 
attributes amounts to the identity of substances. 
 
 
 
VII. Leibnizʼs Objection 
 
In Leibnizʼs remarks on Spinozaʼs Ethics, he notes the following concerning the 
demonstration of Proposition V: 
 
I reply that a paralogism seems to lurk here. For two substances 
can be distinguished by attributes, and yet have some common 
attribute, provided they also have in addition some which are 
peculiar. For example, A and B; the attribute of the one being c d, 
and of the other, d e.73 
 
Leibniz is asking, why canʼt it be the case that two substances, A and B, have 
opposing attributes, c and e, but share the attribute d? If they can, then they are 
distinct entities. It is up to Spinoza to show that substances with multiple 
attributes canʼt share one of their attributes. This is a very powerful objection, and 
many have taken it as conclusive in refuting Proposition V, one of the most 
central doctrines in Spinozaʼs metaphysics. Indeed, if this objection holds, it 
would leave us in a sorry state of affairs. 
Viljanen has provided a useful interpretation of this issue. First of all, as 
countless scholars have noted, it might be the case that Spinoza overlooked the 
                                                
72 Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 67. Viljanen points to Carriero, who says: “as would have been 
obvious to a contemporaneous reader of the Ethics, to make a substance depend on its accidents 
for its individuation would be to make a substance depend on its accidents for its existence, a 
dependence that is incompatible with its status as a substance.” On the Relationship between 
Mode and Substance in Spinozaʼs Metaphysics, 251. 
73 The Philosophical Works of Leibnitz, 15. 
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possibility of this objection. This seems odd, since this objection is nearly a 
universal concern of his readers. This implies that we should consider what 
Spinoza was thinking when he wrote this proposition. Viljanen points to the fact 
that Spinoza holds that “essences are highly individual, unique to their 
possessors.”74 Consider Definition II of Part II of the Ethics: 
 
I say that to the essence of any thing belongs that which, being 
given, the thing is necessarily posited and which, being taken away, 
the thing is necessarily taken away; or that without which the thing 
can neither be nor be conceived, and which can neither be nor be 
conceived without the thing.75 
 
What is relevant for Proposition V is that Spinoza says that an essence cannot 
be nor be conceived without its possessor. This may explain the line of thought 
Spinoza had in Proposition V. Thus, Viljanen notes: 
 
Given it, there cannot be two distinct things of the same essence; 
and as attributes constitute essences, Spinoza is led to think that it 
is impossible for two substances to share an attribute, because 
whenever there is an attribute constituting an essence, we have a 
particular substance without which the attribute could not exist.76 
 
But, as Viljanen points out, Spinoza would have a hard time convincing 
Cartesians that an attribute could not be or be conceived without a certain 
substance. He suggests that Spinoza could rely on a widely accepted way of 
conceiving essences and the definitions that express essences during the 
seventeenth century. This conception is the view that “both attributes and 
definitions express essences, and definitions do not involve any number of 
individuals.”77 
Michael Della Rocca has also provided a useful response to Leibnizʼs 
objection.78 Spinoza accepts that “each attribute of a substance, independently of 
any other attribute of that substance, is sufficient for conceiving of that 
substance.”79 This follows when Spinozaʼs definition of attribute and his definition 
of essence are combined. Since this is the case, Leibnizʼs objection faces a 
                                                
74 Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 68. 
75 Ethics, II, Definition II. C I.447. 
76 Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 68. Olli Koistinen also writes: “Attributes for Spinoza are those 
properties that make individuation through itself possible and for that reason they must be non-
relational individuating properties which means that they cannot be shared by several 
substances: they are individual essences – rejected by all things except their bearer.” Individual 
Essences in Individuation, 149. 
77 Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 69-70. 
78 See Della Rocca, Spinozaʼs Substance Monism in Koistinen, Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes, 
17-22. 
79 Della Rocca, Spinozaʼs Substance Monism, 18. 
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serious problem. Leibniz had said, two substances, A and B, can have opposing 
attributes, c and e, but share an attribute, d. But this canʼt be right, for substance 
A could not be conceived solely through attribute d as the substance that has 
attribute d. This alone would not be enough to distinguish substance A from B.80 
Instead, as Viljanen also argues, substance A would have to be conceived as the 
substance with c and d, which would mean that the concept of a certain 
substance with attribute d would require not only the concept of attribute d, but 
also the concept of attribute c, and would thus be partly conceived through c.81 
The problem with this is that is violates the conceptual barrier between attributes. 
 
Conceiving a substance with a certain attribute would depend on 
conceiving some other attribute. Thus, the conceptual 
independence of attributes guarantees that the kind of situations 
depicted in the objection cannot occur. An argument put in 
epistemological terms thus seems to fare better than one based on 
the doctrine of individual essences.82 
 
 
 
VIII. Unity of Substance 
 
In Proposition VI, Spinoza states that “one substance cannot be produced by 
another substance.”83 In the Short Treatise, Spinoza sets out this proposition as 
one which he will prove in order to explain what God is.84 Spinoza challenges his 
opponents by saying: “If someone wishes to maintain the contrary, we ask 
whether the cause which would have to produce this substance has the same 
attributes as the one produced or not? Not the latter, for something cannot come 
from Nothing. Therefore, the former. And then we ask again whether, in that 
attribute which would be the cause of what is produced, there is as much 
perfection as in what is produced, or more, or less? We say there cannot be less, 
for the reasons already given. We also say there cannot be more, because then 
these two would be limited, which is contrary to what we have just proven. So 
there would have to be as much. Then there would be two equal substances, 
which is clearly contrary to our preceding proof.”85 Spinozaʼs challenge states 
that the proponent of the proposition that one substance can be produced by 
another substance must either accept that the two substances share attributes or 
do not share attributes. If the proponent of this view argues that the two 
substances do not share attributes, then his argument is inherently flawed, for he 
is proposing that nothing is the cause of the second substance. 
                                                
80 Cf. Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 70. 
81 This argument is taken from Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 70. 
82 Ibid., 70-71. 
83 Ethics, I, Proposition VI. C I.411 
84 KV, I, ii, 2. C I.66 
85 KV, I, ii, 7-8. C I.67 The preceding proof is that there are not two equal substances. 
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Since it cannot be the case that the two substances do not share attributes, 
the proponent of this view is left with one option: that the two substances do 
share attributes. However, this argument dissolves when we consider Spinozaʼs 
identity of indiscernibles.86 Spinoza has already shown that nothing could 
distinguish two things with exactly the same qualities. If two substances share an 
attribute, then there is no quality within that attribute that differentiates the two. 
This is why Spinoza objects that if one substance is said to produce another 
substance, and the two share attributes, then we must ask whether the attribute 
in question contains as much perfection as the one produced, or more, or less? 
Spinoza denies that it can contain less, for every substance is infinitely perfect in 
its kind.87 This is evident when we consider the second definition: “That thing is 
said to be finite in its own kind that can be limited by another of the same nature.” 
He also denies that it can contain more, as the two would be limited. Again, the 
proponent of this view is left with one option: that the two substances have as 
much perfection in their shared attribute(s). This would mean that the two 
substances are equal, which has already been shown to be absurd (by 
Proposition V). Spinoza also rejects the possibility of one substance producing 
another by showing that it leads to an infinite regress. 88 
Spinozaʼs first proof from the Ethics that one substance cannot be produced 
by another substance simply argues that since two substances with different 
attributes have nothing in common (Proposition II) and if things have nothing in 
common, one cannot be the cause of the other (Proposition III), one substance 
cannot produce another substance that has different attributes. And since it has 
already been shown that there cannot be two or more substances that share an 
attribute (Proposition V), one substance cannot be produced by another 
substance. In the corollary, Spinoza states that it follows from this argument that 
a substance cannot be produced by anything else. Indeed, using the proof 
Spinoza just gave that one substance cannot be produced by another substance, 
along with the first axiom, that “whatever is, is either in itself or in another,” we 
can conclude that substance is not in another. This conclusion will serve as the 
basis for Spinozaʼs proposition that it pertains to the nature of a substance to 
exist. I have given the argument in a deductive proof below: 
 
1. In nature there is nothing except substances and their affections. (Axiom I, 
Definition III, Definition V) 
2. Substance is prior in nature to its affections. (Proposition I) 
3. Substance cannot be produced by another substance. (Proposition VI) 
4. Therefore, substance cannot be produced by anything else. 
 
 
                                                
86 Found in Ethics, I, Proposition IV. 
87 See Ethics, I, Proposition VIII. 
88 KV, I, ii, 10. C I.68. 
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To give even more strength to the corollary above, Spinoza presents an 
alternative proof in his favorite style: ex absurdo contradictorio.89 
 
1. The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its 
cause. (Axiom IV) 
2. A substance is conceived through itself, and its concept does not require 
the concept of any other thing, from which it must be formed. (Definition 
III) 
3. If a substance could be produced by something else, the knowledge of it 
would depend on the knowledge of its cause. (by 1) 
4. Therefore, it would not be a substance. (by 2 and 3) 
 
 
 
IX. Essence and Existence90 
 
Spinoza now turns to the existence of substance, and states in Proposition VII 
that ”it pertains to the nature of a substance to exist.”91 In the Tractatus de 
Intellectus Emendatione, Spinoza says: 
 
If the thing is in itself, or, as is commonly said, is the cause of itself, 
then it must be understood through its essence alone; but if it is not 
                                                
89 Proof by the absurdity of its contradictory. The proof from the original Latin is: “Demonstratur 
hoc etiam facilius ex absurdo contradictorio. Nam si substantia ab alio posset produci, ejus 
cognitio a cognitione suæ causæ deberet pendere (per axioma 4) adeoque (per definitionem 3) 
non esset substantia.” 
90 Note that Spinoza was influenced by Avicenna's conception of modality (necessity, possibility, 
impossibility). Avicenna's famous essence-existence distinction states: if you consider the 
essence of something, i.e., a computer, the essence of your computer does not tell you that the 
computer must exist. You can throw your computer out of the window, and it will then cease to 
exist. However, it can exist, because it is working right now. This tells you that its essence is 
neutral with respect to existence. In other words, it does not deserve to exist on its own merits, 
but it is possible. Conversely, if you consider something like a square-circle or a triangle with four 
sides, its essence guarantees that it doesn't exist, since simply by looking at its definition, you will 
see, i.e., that a square-circle must be both square and round, which can not be the case. This is 
what Avicenna calls impossibility. Necessity is explained in a similar manner. The essence of 
something necessary is an essence, or definition, which guarantees that a thing exists. The point 
of this essence-existence distinction is to show that there is such a Being that is a necessary 
being, and this is what he calls God. Now, to explain the move from possibility to necessity: If we 
look at the computer again, the computer is a possible existent, which means that its essence 
doesn't guarantee that it exists or doesn't exist. The computer does, however, exist. To explain its 
existence we need a cause, which must be something outside of the computer. Now, those who 
made the computer (computer technicians) are not any better for us. We end up with a chain of 
causes, and each member of the chain is merely possible or contingent. The question becomes: 
could there be a world where everything in the world was caused by something else and that 
other thing was merely contingent? Avicenna's answer is no! This example is one given by Peter 
Adamson. 
91 Ethics, I, Proposition VII. C I.412 
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in itself, but requires a cause to exist, then it must be understood 
through its proximate cause. For really, knowledge of the effect is 
nothing but acquiring a more perfect knowledge of its cause.92 
 
Since Spinoza has already shown that substance is not produced by anything 
else, he states that the essence of substance must involve existence. In the 
Ethics, the proposition that the essence of substance involves existence is 
stunningly brief, as its proof is given in a single sentence, yet it is central in his 
argument that one substance (God) necessarily exists. 
The proof he gives in the Ethics is so simple that it can be deceiving. The 
argument he gives there, with its logical dependencies given, runs as follows: 
 
1. Whatever is, is either in itself or in another. (Axiom I) 
2. Substance is not in another, for substance cannot be produced by 
anything else. (Proposition VI, Corol.) 
3. Therefore, substance must the cause of itself. 
4. That which is the cause of itself is that whose essence involves existence. 
(Definition I) 
5. Therefore, it pertains to the nature of substance to exist. (Proposition VII)  
 
In the Short Treatise Spinoza shows that anyone who holds that one substance 
can produce another (contrary to the previous proposition) will end up in an 
infinite regress: “If we wish to seek the cause of that substance which is the 
principle of the things which proceed from its attribute, then we shall have to seek 
in turn the cause of that cause, and then again, the cause of that cause, and so 
on to infinity; so if we must stop somewhere (as we must), we must stop with this 
unique substance.” 93 In both the TdIE and PPC, Spinoza clarifies the definition of 
unique. In the TdIE he says: “For this entity is unique and infinite, that is, it is total 
being, beyond which there is no being.”94 Then in the PPC, he gives a similar 
description: “It should be noted here that it follows necessarily from the mere fact 
that some thing involves necessary existence from itself (as God does) that it is 
unique.”95 
Taken together, these two passages bring out an important link between 
Spinozaʼs refutation of the proposition that one substance can produce another 
and his justification of the proposition that it pertains to the nature of substance to 
exist, that is, the essence of substance involves existence. This further supports 
the interpretation given by Wolfson that Spinoza utilizes the principle of the 
identity of essence and existence in substance as an argument for the main 
contention of the second chapter of the Short Treatise, which is to refute the view 
                                                
92 TdIE § 92. C I.38-39. All references to the TdIE are to Spinozaʼs Tractatus de Intellectus 
Emendatione. 
93 KV, I, ii, 10. C I.68. 
94 TdIE § 76. This is Shirleyʼs translation. Curleyʼs translation reads: “For it is a unique and infinite 
being, beyond which there is no being.” C I.34. 
95 PPC, I, Proposition XI, Dem. C I.255. 
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held by some medievals that there are two substances, God and the world, the 
latter of which has no existence involved in its essence, inasmuch as it must 
acquire existence through an act of creation or emanation.96 
There is a parallel proposition in the first ʻAppendixʼ97 of the Short Treatise, in 
which Spinoza says: “Existence belongs, by nature, to the essence of every 
substance, so much so that it is impossible to posit in an infinite intellect the idea 
of the essence of a substance which does not exist in Nature.”98 
 
 
 
X. The Infinity of Substance 
 
When Spinoza says that substance is infinite99 he means that it is unique100 and 
thus not limited. This uniqueness and infinitude means that it cannot be given 
positive description, as a description implies a limitation, determinatio negatio 
est.101 Wolfson has pointed out that “to call a substance infinite in this sense is 
like calling voice colorless.”102 To call a voice colorless does not imply any 
negation of a property which it is expected to have, but rather an absolute 
exclusion of voice from the world of color. In the same way, Wolfson tells us 
“when substance is described as infinite in this sense, it means its absolute 
                                                
96 Wolfson, I, 130-131. Creation and emanation are not synonymous. 
97 The appendix is likely an early draft in the geometrical method of what would become the first 
part of the Ethics, not intended to serve as an addition to the KV. 
98 KV, Appendix, I, Proposition IV. C I.151. 
99 Ethics, I, Proposition VIII: “Every substance is necessarily infinite.” C I.414. Infinite in, and by, 
its essence. 
100 Its essence involves existence, i.e. it is self-sufficient such that it depends upon nothing other 
than its own nature for its existence, and hence limited neither by itself nor by anything else. In 
CM, II, ii, Spinoza demonstrates that God is unique by showing him to be a supremely perfect 
being, that is, a “being that has all its perfections from itself and not from another.” C I.319. 
101 Determination is negation. Spinozaʼs argument for this is found in Epistle L: “A thing can be 
called one or single only in respect of its existence, not of its essence. For we do not conceive 
things under the category of numbers unless they are included in a common class. For example, 
he who holds in his hand a penny and a dollar will not think of the number two unless he can 
apply a common name to this penny and dollar, that is, pieces of money or coins. For then he can 
say that he has two pieces of money or two coins, because he calls both the penny and the dollar 
a piece of money or a coin. Hence it is clear that a thing can not be called one or single unless 
another thing has been conceived which, as I have said, agrees with it. Now since the existence 
of God is his very essence, and since we can form no universal idea of his essence, it is certain 
that he who calls God one or single has no true idea of God, or is speaking of him very 
improperly. With regard to the statement that figure is a negation and not anything positive, it is 
obvious that matter in its totality, considered without limitation, can have no figure, and that figure 
applies only to finite and determinable bodies. For he who says that he apprehends a figure, 
thereby means to indicate simply this, that he apprehends a determinate thing and the manner of 
its determination. This determination therefore does not pertain to the thing in regard to its being; 
on the contrary, it is its non-being. So since figure is nothing but determination, and determination 
is negation, figure can be nothing other than negation.” CW, 892. 
102 Wolfson, I, 134. 
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exclusion from any form of finitude, limitation, and description.”103 To call a 
substance finite implies that it is comparable. A comparison can be made only 
between like things, and thus a finite thing is included within a class of like things. 
Consider what Maimonides says in the following passage: 
 
Similarity is based on a certain relation between two things; if 
between two things no relation can be found, there can be no 
similarity between them, and there is no relation between two things 
that have no similarity to each other; e.g., we do not say this heat is 
similar to that colour, or this voice is similar to that sweetness…You 
must know that two things of the same kind—i.e., whose essential 
properties are the same, distinguished from each other by 
greatness or smallness, strength and weakness, etc.—are 
necessarily similar.104 
 
Spinoza clearly picks up on this when he is defining that which is “finite in its own 
kind” (Definition II). By this definition a thing is finite because it suffers from 
description. What this means is that a thing can only be described in terms that 
necessarily limit it. Finite things share a similarity, as described by Maimonides, 
to other things of the same kind by which they are compared. Hence, Spinoza 
says in his definition: 
 
That thing is said to be finite in its own kind that can be limited by 
another of the same nature. For example, a body is called finite 
because we always conceive another that is greater. Thus a 
                                                
103 Ibid. Wolfson has linked this “negation of finitude” to what the medieval Jewish logicians 
referred to as “absolute negation,” contrasted with “particular negation.” The difference between 
these two senses of negation is expressed in the distinction between “A is not-B” and “A is not B.” 
An example of particular negation would be: “Balaam does not see,” and of absolute negation: 
“The wall does not see.” Wolfson has linked absolute negation to Spinozaʼs usage of the term 
“negation” (negatio), and particular negation to Spinozaʼs term “privation” (privatio). This is 
supported by what Spinoza says in Epistle XXI: “Privation is nothing but denying something of a 
thing which we judge to pertain to its nature, and Negation nothing but denying something of a 
thing because it does not pertain to its nature.” Spinoza further elaborates on privation: “I say, 
therefore, that Privation is, not the act of depriving, but only the pure and simple lack, which in 
itself is nothing. Indeed, it is only a Being of reason, or mode of thinking, which we form when we 
compare things with one another. We say, for example, that a blind man is deprived of sight 
because we easily imagine him as seeing, whether this imagination arises from the fact that we 
compare him with others who see, or his present state with his past, when he used to see. And 
when we consider this man in this way, by comparing his nature with that of others or with his 
own past nature, then we affirm that seeing pertains to his nature, and for that reason we say that 
he is deprived of it. But when we consider Godʼs decree, and his nature, we can no more affirm of 
that man than of a Stone, that he is deprived of vision. For at that time vision no more pertains to 
that man without contradiction than it does to the stone, since nothing more pertains to that man, 
and is his, than what the Divine intellect and will attribute to him. Hence, God is no more the 
cause of his not seeing than of the stoneʼs not seeing, which is a pure Negation.” C I.377. 
104 Moreh Nebukim, I, 56. 
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thought is limited by another thought. But a body is not limited by a 
thought nor a thought by a body.105 
 
As opposed to being finite in its kind, Spinoza also mentions that which is infinite 
in its kind. A thing that is infinite in its kind has the highest degree of the shared 
essential property of its kind, as opposed to being unique and having 
incomparable qualities. Being infinite in its kind is essentially inferior to being 
absolutely infinite. Thus, Spinoza says: “If something is only infinite in its own 
kind, we can deny infinite attributes of it.”106 
Absolute infinitude is unique and incomparable such that there is no kind to 
which an absolutely infinite thing belongs. In other words, it is its own kind. 
Spinoza, in describing in what respect God is unique or sui generis,107 says: 
“Insofar as we conceive that there cannot be more than one of the same nature, 
he is unique.”108 That which is absolutely infinite is its own genus, rather than 
being the highest degree of a genus. Hence, Spinoza says: “If something is 
absolutely infinite, whatever expresses essence and involves no negation 
pertains to its essence.”109 Since there is no such negation, Spinoza concludes: 
“Between the finite and the infinite there is no relation, so that the difference 
between God and the greatest and most excellent created thing is no other than 
that between God and the least created thing.”110 
In the Short Treatise, Spinoza sets out to demonstrate: “That there is no 
limited substance, but that every substance must be infinitely perfect in its kind, 
viz. that in Godʼs infinite intellect no substance can be more perfect than that 
which already exists in Nature.”111 Spinoza again gives a challenge, this time to 
the proponent of the view that there can be a limited substance, and asks 
whether this substance is limited through itself, or through its cause. Spinoza 
objects that it canʼt be the case that a substance, which is necessarily that which 
is in itself, is able to limit itself: “It did not limit itself, for being unlimited it would 
have had to change its whole essence.”112 In other words, that which is causa sui 
could not possibly change its nature and become less powerful or less infinite. In 
the first set of objections to the Meditations of Descartes, Johannes Caterus 
quotes a strikingly similar argument given by Suarez: 
 
Every limitation proceeds from some cause; therefore if something 
is limited and finite this is because its cause was either unable or 
unwilling to endow it with more greatness or perfection; and hence 
                                                
105 Ethics, I, Definition II. C I.408. 
106 Ethics, I, Definition VI, Exp. C I.409. 
107 Its own genus or kind. 
108 CM, I, vi, 2. C I.325. 
109 Definition 6, explanation. 
110 Epistle LIV. CW, 899. Note that by “created thing” Spinoza means “that which presupposes 
nothing except God in order to exist.” Cf. CM, II, x. C I.333. 
111 KV, I, ii, 2. C I.66. 
112 Ibid. note 2. 
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if something derives its existence from itself, and not from some 
cause, it is indeed unlimited and infinite.113 
 
In Spinozaʼs challenge, he uses the exact same words when addressing the 
proponent of limited substances who accepts that a substance is limited through 
its cause, which is necessarily God: “If it is limited through its cause, that must be 
either because its cause could not or would not give more.”114 Spinoza rejects 
both of these possibilities, for to say “that he could not have given more is 
contrary to his omnipotence.115 That he could have, but would not, smacks of 
envy, which is not in any way in God, who is all goodness and fullness.”116 The 
reason Spinoza doesnʼt reproduce this argument in the Ethics is that it depends 
upon his proof of the existence of God, which doesnʼt occur until Proposition XI, 
whereas in the Short Treatise Spinoza has already demonstrated in the previous 
chapter “That God Is.” 
Spinozaʼs proof in the Ethics that substance is infinite is by ex absurdo 
contradictorio. We know from Spinozaʼs definitions and demonstrations that there 
cannot be more than one substance having the same attribute (Proposition V) 
and that existence belongs to the essence of substance (Proposition VII). Since 
this is the case, Spinoza argues, then the existence that pertains to the essence 
of substance must either be finite or infinite existence. The existence of 
substance cannot be finite, for that which is finite in its kind “can be limited by 
another of the same nature.” If it were the case that substance existed as finite, it 
would have to be limited by another substance of the same nature or essence, 
whose essence also involves existence. But this would mean that there would 
exist two substances of the same attribute, which is an absurdity by Proposition 
V. It follows from Spinozaʼs proof that substance cannot exist as finite, along with 
his proof that the essence of substance involves existence, that it exists as 
infinite. In the first scholium that follows this proof, Spinoza says that it follows 
from the proof that existence pertains to the nature of substance alone that 
substance is infinite. This is due to the fact that being infinite is an absolute 
affirmation of the existence of some nature, whereas being finite is in part a 
negation. Assuming a finite substance in part denies existence to the nature of 
substance, which by Proposition VII is an absurdity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
113 CSM II.95. 
114 KV, I, ii, 5. C I.67. 
115 Cf. CM, II, ix. 
116 KV, I, ii, 5. C I.67. 
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XI. Misconceptions of Substance 
 
Spinoza gives a long scholium to account for misconceptions people may have 
by this first unit of propositions.117 These misconceptions are largely due to the 
fact that people judge things confusedly, especially by not being accustomed to 
knowing things through their first causes.118 This error arises when one does not 
distinguish between the modifications of substance and substance itself. In this 
case, one does not truly understand how a thing is produced, and this is the 
reason why they ascribe characteristics to substance that do not properly belong 
to it. This false connection is due to an obscured kind of knowledge. Later in the 
Ethics, Spinoza will link this to the imagination, which takes vague instances and 
random experience (experientia vaga) acquired through the senses. This 
ʻknowledgeʼ from singular things represented through the senses is “mutilated, 
confused, and without order for the intellect.”119 This kind of knowledge is what 
Spinoza refers to as “the only cause of falsity,”120 and when this inadequate 
knowledge reigns alone there is a reversal of causes.121 This is why Spinoza 
says: “So it happens that they fictitiously ascribe to substances the beginning 
which they see that natural things have; for those who do not know the true 
causes of things confuse everything and without any conflict of mind feign that 
both trees and men speak, imagine that men are formed both from stones and 
from seed, and that any form whatever is changed into any other.”122 Although 
Spinozaʼs full discussion on this topic appears later in the Ethics, this statement 
should be taken as an early note of caution not to obscure the order of causes by 
letting the imagination rule the intellect. Although we can form ideas of certain 
things which do not really exist outside of the intellect, for example, unicorns, the 
essences of such things are ultimately contained in God, an infinite substance 
that does exist. However, the truth of the existence of substance is contained 
within its essence alone, and thus cannot be conceived except as existing. The 
truth of Proposition VII is so clear, says Spinoza, that it shouldnʼt be necessary to 
give a proof of it, for “if men would attend to the nature of substance, they would 
have no doubt at all of the truth of Proposition VII. Indeed, this proposition would 
be an axiom to everyone, and would be numbered among the common 
notions.”123 Thus, if one has a clear and distinct idea of substance, yet doubts 
whether it exists, this is the same as saying that one has a true idea, yet doubts 
                                                
117 Curley: “Because this scholium relates more to Proposition VII than to Proposition VIII, some 
scholars have thought it a marginal note misplaced by the original editors. But both the NS and 
the OP put it here, and as Gebhardt notes, it is subsequently referred to by Spinoza as the 
second scholium to Proposition VIII. Probably the reason for its placement here is that Spinoza 
conceives the first eight propositions to form a natural unit, and this scholium touches on a 
number of the themes of that unit.” C 412-413, n. 
118 This point will be elaborated on in a later set of propositions, beginning with Proposition XVI. 
119 Ethics, II Proposition XL, Schol. II. C I.477. 
120 Ethics, II, Proposition XLI. C I.478. 
121 Causes appear to us as effects, and effects appear to us as causes. 
122 Ethics, I, Proposition VIII, Schol. II. C I.413. 
123 Ibid. 
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whether it is false. Alternatively, if one holds that substance is created, this is the 
same as holding that a false idea has become true. To clarify why this is the 
case, if it is the case that substance is created, then there was a time in the past 
that substance had no existence. If substance had no existence, then the idea of 
it was a false idea until substance was created, which means that a false idea 
became a true idea. While it is not an absurdity to think this way about finite 
things that have an essence which is neutral with respect to their existence, it is 
an absurdity to think this way about an eternal and infinite substance whose 
essence necessarily involves existence. This is precisely the error that results 
from the reversal of causes. Nothing more absurd can be conceived than 
doubting a clear and distinct idea or substance or maintaining that substance is 
created, and thus existence of substance (like its essence) is an eternal truth. 
 
 
 
XII. Relation of Substance and Attribute 
 
Spinoza now moves to the relation between substance and attribute. Recall that 
Definition IV states that an attribute is “what the intellect perceives of a 
substance, as constituting its essence.”124 Spinoza says that it follows from this 
definition alone that “the more reality or being each thing has, the more attributes 
belong to it.”125 This proof only holds if we can use the terms essence and reality 
interchangeably. This is clearly the case for Spinoza, as in the Preface to the 
Fourth Part of the Ethics, he states: “By perfection in general I shall, as I have 
said, understand reality, i.e., the essence of each thing insofar as it exists and 
produces an effect, having no regard to its duration.”126 Spinoza also states: “By 
reality and perfection I understand the same thing.”127 Thus, he is saying that the 
more essence each thing has, the more attributes belong to it. In the Short 
Treatise, Spinoza similarly says: 
 
For of a being which has some essence, [some] attributes must be 
predicated, and the more essence one ascribes to it, the more 
attributes one must also ascribe to it. So if a being is infinite, its 
attributes must also be infinite, and that is precisely what we call a 
perfect being.128 
 
Wolfson rightly notes that the proposition as it stands is incomplete, as only the 
major premise is given.129 However, Spinoza reproduces this proposition in both 
                                                
124 Ethics, I, Definition IV. C I.408. 
125 Ethics, I, Proposition IX. C I.416. 
126 C I.546. 
127 Ethics II, Def. VI. 
128 KV, I, ii. C I.70. 
129 Wolfson, I, 139. 
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Epistle IX130 and the scholium to Proposition X,131 adding the minor premise and 
conclusion. The full argument runs as follows: 
 
1. The more reality or being each thing has, the more attributes 
belong to it (Definition IV). 
2. Substance possesses infinite reality or being (Proposition VIII). 
3. Therefore, substance has infinite attributes (Proposition X, 
Scholium).132 
 
Here, the very complicated interpretive issue arises in Spinoza, namely what to 
make of his statement that there are infinite attributes. The issue itself is too large 
and complicated to give a detailed account of here, as that discussion is not the 
purpose of this paper. However, the issue is important enough not to pass by 
without comment. There is certainly a large division among scholars of how to 
interpret the issue. 
Abraham Wolf has provided an excellent discussion of the topic.133 According 
to Wolf, the doctrine of an infinite number of attributes has been misconstrued by 
commentators and expositors. It is true that Spinoza speaks of God or substance 
and consisting of infinite attributes, and this ʻinfiniteʼ refers to the number of 
attributes. However, Wolf states: “It is a sheer blunder to translate Spinozaʼs 
infinite by innumerable. And it is this mistranslation that is at the root of the 
trouble. By infinite Spinoza means complete or all.”134 Wolfʼs evidence for this 
view is Spinozaʼs repeated positive use of the term infinite and his usage of the 
term perfect (i.e., complete) or all as the equivalent of infinite. For instance, in the 
Short Treatise, Spinoza says: “Nature is a being of which all attributes are 
predicated.”135 Wolf argues that nobody could think of describing two attributes 
as innumerable attributes, though they may well be all the attributes. In his 
interpretation, Spinoza does not posit innumerable attributes at all: “He only knew 
of two attributes, and as a cautious thinker, he had, of course, to allow for the 
                                                
130 “Nothing is more evident to us than that we conceive each being under some attribute, and 
that the more reality or being a being has the more attributes must be attributed to it.” C I.195. 
131 “Nothing in nature is clearer than that each being must be conceived under some attribute, and 
the more reality, or being it has, the more it has attributes which express necessity, or eternity, 
and infinity.” 
132 In the Short Treatise, a parallel argument is given: “Because we have already found previously 
that there must be an infinite and perfect being, by which nothing else can be understood but a 
being of which all in all must be predicated. For of a being which has some essence, [some] 
attributes must be predicated, and the more essence one ascribes to it, the more attributes one 
must also ascribe to it. So if a being is infinite, its attributes also must be infinite, and that is 
precisely what we call a perfect being.” KV, I, ii, 17. 
133 Spinozaʼs Conception of the Attributes of Substance. in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, New Series, Vol. 27 (1926 - 1927), pp. 177-192. An address delivered to the meeting of 
the Aristotelian Society on February 21, 1927, to commemorate the 250th anniversary of the death 
of Spinoza. 
134 Ibid., 190. 
135 KV, I, ii, 27.  
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possibility of other attributes unknown to man, since Spinoza did not regard man 
as the measure of all things. He accordingly posited ʻinfinite or all the attributes,ʼ 
in the sense of ʻcertainly two, possibly more.ʼ”136 That Spinoza is thinking in this 
manner is further reinforced by what he says in the third part of the Ethics: “The 
Body cannot determine the Mind to thinking, and the Mind cannot determine the 
Body to motion, to rest or to anything else (if there is anything else).”137 
That when Spinoza says substance or God has infinite attributes he means all 
attributes is further supported by the way in which he uses the term infinite in the 
Ethics.138 For example, in Proposition XVI Spinoza says: “infinitely many things… 
(i.e., everything which can fall under an infinite intellect).”139 Also, in the scholium 
to Proposition XVII, he says: “infinitely many things…i.e., all things.”140 Also, in 
the second part of the Ethics, Spinoza equates the statement that “God can think 
infinitely many things” with “all things.”141 It is quite clear, then, that Spinoza uses 
the term infinite to mean all or everything.142 
Next, Spinoza states that “each attribute of a substance must be conceived 
through itself.”143 Since an attribute is what the intellect perceives of substance 
as constituting its essence (Definition IV), it must (by Definition III) be conceived 
through itself. In the Short Treatise, Spinoza says: 
 
Of attributes, which are of a self-existing being; these require no 
genus, or anything else through which they are better understood or 
explained; for since they, as attributes of a being existing through 
itself, exist through themselves, they are also known through 
themselves.144 
 
A difficulty arises from Spinozaʼs scholium to Proposition X, where he says: 
 
It is evident that although two attributes may be conceived to be 
really distinct (i.e., one may be conceived without the aid of the 
                                                
136 Spinozaʼs Conception of the Attributes of Substance, 190. 
137 Ethics, III, Proposition II. C I.494. 
138 Bennettʼs discussion of this topic is quite helpful. See: A Study of Spinozaʼs Ethics, 75-79. 
139 C I.424. 
140 C I.426. 
141 Ethics II, Proposition III, Dem. C I.449. Joachim has suggested that Spinoza was somewhat 
reluctant to say that God subsists ʻof all Attributes,ʼ since ʻallʼ could be taken to imply a sum and 
therefore finiteness. See Joachimʼs A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, 41. 
142 For further discussion on his issue, see: Curley, BGM, 19-30, Bennett, A Study of Spinozaʼs 
Ethics, 75-79, Della Rocca, Spinoza, 51, Aaron Garrett, Meaning in Spinozaʼs Method, 63, 
Wolfson, I, 134, 225-226; II, 341-345. 
143 Ethics, I, Proposition X. C I.416. 
144 KV I, vii, 10. Earlier in the same passage Spinoza says: “We have already seen that the 
attributes (or as others call them substances) are things, or, to put it better and more properly a 
being existing through itself; and that this being therefore makes itself known through itself. We 
see that other things are only modes of those attributes, and without them can neither exist nor be 
understood.” 
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other), we still can not infer from that that they constitute two 
beings, or two different substances. For it is of the nature of a 
substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself, 
since all the attributes it has have always been in it together, and 
one could not be produced by another, but each expresses the 
reality, or being of substance.145 
 
The difficulty is how we can say that there are many attributes and only one 
substance? The simple solution to this problem might be to say that substance is 
identical with the many attributes. But this only creates a more menacing 
problem, namely that doing so is to treat substance as an aggregate, which goes 
against the indivisibility of substance.146 The problem we are left to solve is 
stated by Edwin Curley as follows: 
 
How can we remain true to Spinozaʼs language, which regularly 
speaks of substance as a complex, in which each of the attributes 
is an element, without suggesting that substance could somehow 
be decomposed into various elements, or that some of these 
elements might exist apart from the others?147 
 
 
 
XIII. Spinozaʼs Proofs of the Existence of God 
 
Wolfson has categorized these first ten propositions of the Ethics as a challenge 
to medieval philosophers.148 According to Wolfson, Spinozaʼs starting point in this 
challenge was his definition of God at the beginning of the Ethics as a 
reproduction of a definition found in a standard work of a popular medieval 
Jewish philosopher.149 
                                                
145 Ethics, I, Proposition X. Schol. C I.416. 
146 Proposition XIII. Spinoza argues that it involves a contradiction to say that substance is an 
aggregate. 
147 BGM 29-30. Cf. Appendix. 
148 Wolfson I, 158. 
149 Wolfson refers to Crescasʼs student, Joseph Albo. In his 15th century work, Ikkarim, he gives 
an exposition of the principles of Judaism prevalent in his medieval time. “God, blessed be He, 
must be free of imperfections.” (Ikkarim, I, 15) “He must possess power and will and the other 
attributes without which He could not be thought of as perfect.” (Ikkarim, I, 15) “All the attributes of 
perfection that are predicated of God or are conceived to exist in Him are predicated of Him and 
are conceived to exist in Him only in the sense in which they imply perfection but in none of the 
senses in which they would imply imperfection.” (Ikkarim, II, 21) The attributes of God must be 
infinite in number: “It must be understood that the perfections which exist in God are infinite in 
number,” and infinite in time and perfection: “When we ascribe to God any of the attributes by 
which He may be described, whether negative or positive, that attribute must be taken to be 
infinite in two respects, infinite in time and infinite in perfection or importance.” (Ikkarim, II, 25) 
Wolfson states that “here, infinite as applied to God means that He possesses an infinite number 
of attributes each of which is eternal and infinitely perfect.” To quote Albo: “It is with reference to 
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At this point, in order to give both a summary of the first ten propositions and 
the purpose they serve for Spinozaʼs proof of the existence of God, I will provide 
a long quotation from Wolfson describing Spinozaʼs method in his challenge. 
According to Wolfson, Spinoza addresses his opponents as follows: 
 
All you medievals,150 to whatever school of thought you may 
belong, have builded your philosophies on the conception of a God 
epitomized by you in a formal definition which contains four 
characteristic expressions. You say that God is (1) an ens in the 
highest sense of the term, by which you mean that He is a being 
who exists necessarily. You also say that He is (2) ʻabsolutely 
infinite,ʼ by which you mean that He is (3) ʻa substance consisting of 
infinite attributes,ʼ (4) ʻeach of which expresses eternal and infinite 
essenceʼ (Def. VI). God so defined you call absolute substance; you 
differentiate Him from the world which you call conditional 
substance, and then you declare that the relation between the 
absolute substance and the conditional substance is like that of 
creator to created. In opposition to you, I deny at the very outset the 
existence of a God outside the world and of His relation to the world 
as creator. Still, unaccustomed to dispute about mere names, I 
shall retain your own term substance as a philosophic surrogate to 
the pious name God, and in your own terms I am going to unfold a 
new conception of the nature of God and of His relation to the 
world…To begin with, I shall abandon your distinction between 
absolute substance and conditional substance, but shall use the 
term substance in that restrictive sense in which you use the 
expression absolute substance. Then, what you call conditional 
substance,151 or the world, I shall call mode. Furthermore, unlike 
                                                                                                                                            
this that the Cabalists designated God by the term Infinite (En Sof), to indicate that the 
perfections which are to be found in Him are infinite in the three senses in which we have 
mentioned.” (Ikkarim, II, 25) God is defined as infinite in the number of attributes, and each 
attribute is infinite in time and perfection. The full exposition of this view in relation to Spinoza can 
be found in Wolfson, I, 116-119. 
150 Note that Wolfson is referring to the philosophical beliefs of the Jewish medieval philosophers, 
and the universal acceptance amongst these philosophers of the belief that God and the world 
are absolutely separate and homonymous. There are, of course, parallels between the beliefs of 
Jewish medieval philosophers and other medievals, including the Scholastics. 
151 Wolfson has explained what is meant by conditional substance: “Mediaeval dualism considers 
God as something essentially different from the world. God is pure form; the world is material. As 
a corollary of this, the world is conceived to have all the imperfections of which God as pure spirit 
is free. The world is furthermore the creation of God; the world is thus called conditional being 
whereas God is absolute being. Since creation is assumed to be in time, the world is still further 
contrasted with God as the created substance with the uncreated substance or as the temporal 
with the eternal. The creation of the world was not by a single act but rather by a process of 
emanation. Matter did not come directly from God; it has made its appearance at a certain stage 
in the devolution of the issue of divine thought. God is pure thought, and His only activity is 
thinking. But as His thinking is a creative power, it becomes objectified in a thought, known as 
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you, I shall not describe the relation of substance to mode as that of 
creator to created, but rather as that of whole to part, or, to be more 
exact, as that of universal to particular (Defs. II and V; Axioms I and 
II; Prop. I). The reason for my disagreeing with you on the question 
of the causal relation between God and the world is that I find your 
doctrine of creation, however you may try to explain it, an untenable 
hypothesis (Props. II-VI). Barring this difference between us, a 
difference which, I must confess, is fundamental and far-reaching in 
its effect, I am going to describe my substance in all those terms 
which you make use of in describing your God. Like your God, my 
substance is (1) the highest ens, for existence appertains to its 
nature (Prop. VII). (2) It is also absolutely infinite (Prop. VIII). (3) 
Furthermore, it consists of infinite attributes (Prop. IX). (4) Finally, 
each of its attributes expresses eternal and infinite essence (Prop. 
X). I have thus described my substance in all those terms which 
you use in your formal definition of God. Consequently, as I am now 
to reproduce your proofs of the existence of God to prove the 
existence of my substance, I shall bracket together the terms God 
and substance and say: ʻGod, or substance consisting of infinite 
attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, 
necessarily existsʼ (Prop. XI). Having made it clear by this time what 
I mean by the term God, I am no longer afraid of being 
misunderstood. Hereafter I shall drop the term substance and use 
in its stead the term God. And so he does.152 
 
Spinoza asserts that: “God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each 
of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.”153 In the 
Fifth Meditation, Descartes says: “Since I have been accustomed to distinguish 
between essence and existence in everything else, I find it easy to persuade 
myself that existence can also be separated from the essence of God, and hence 
that God can be thought of as not existing.”154 However, in the First Set of 
Replies, Descartes removes the difficulty by demonstrating that it is through 
                                                                                                                                            
Intelligence, which, while immaterial like God himself, according to one of the prevailing views, is 
of a less perfect order, inasmuch as by its nature it is only a possible being, having a cause for its 
existence. The thought of this Intelligence, which is said to possess a dual nature, objectifies itself 
in another Intelligence and a sphere. So the process goes on until at a certain stage crass matter 
appears which is the basis of the sublunar world. The world thus possesses imperfections which 
are not found in the original thinking essence of God. In the language of Spinoza these mediaeval 
contrasts between God and the world are expressed in the phrases ʻinfinite substanceʼ and ʻfinite 
substance.ʼ It is Spinoza's purpose in his discussion of ʻWhat God Isʼ to abolish this dualism 
between the thinking essence of God and the material, or extended, essence of the world, to 
identify God with the wholeness of nature, and to conclude ʻthat we posit extension as an attribute 
of God.ʼ" Wolfson, I, 96-97. 
152 Wolfson, I, 158-160. 
153 Ethics, I, Proposition XI. C I.417. 
154 CSM II.46. 
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Godʼs necessary existence as opposed to his possible existence that his 
essence is not distinguished from existence: “Possible existence is contained in 
the concept or idea of everything we clearly and distinctly understand; but in no 
case is necessary existence contained, except in the case of the idea of God.”155 
Spinoza adopts the same method as Descartes in the Cogitata Metaphysica, 
where he defines Being as: “Whatever, when it is clearly and distinctly perceived, 
we find to exist necessarily, or at least to be able to exist.”156 He goes on to say 
that from this definition, or description, “it is easy to see that being should be 
divided into being which exists necessarily by its own nature, or whose essence 
involves existence, and being whose essence involves only possible 
existence.”157 It is the necessary existence as he classified in the Cogitata 
Metaphysica that Spinoza holds to belong to God. 
The idea behind all of Spinozaʼs proofs of the existence of God158 is that if it is 
granted that anything is actual, then it must be granted that God is of necessity 
actual. In Epistle XII, Spinoza clarifies that the force of this argument lies not in 
the impossibility of an infinite regress of causes, “but only in the supposition that 
things which do not exist necessarily by their own nature are not determined to 
exist by a thing which does exist necessarily by its own nature.”159 Indeed, 
Spinozaʼs first proof is ex absurdo contradictorio. 
 
 
 
XIV. First Proof 
 
The first proof tells us that God is substance, and since his existence is self-
determined, he necessarily exists. What is unexpressed is the postulate that 
there is something, a modal being, which exists and implies a self-determined 
substance.160 That Spinoza did not include this in his proof in the Ethics is due to 
the fact that it goes without saying that by denying the existence of anything, you 
are asserting that you exist.161 And by asserting your existence as a modal being 
                                                
155 Ibid. II.83. 
156 CM, I, i. 
157 Ibid. 
158 The first, second, and fourth proofs are ontological, while the third proof is cosmological. 
159 Epistle XII: “The more recent Peripatetics have, as I think, misunderstood the demonstration 
by which the Ancients tried to prove Godʼs existence. For as I find in a certain Jew, called Rab 
Chasdai (Crescas), it runs as follows: if there is an infinite regress of causes, then all things that 
are will also have been caused; but it does not pertain to anything which has been caused, to 
exist necessarily by the force of its own nature; therefore, there is nothing in Nature to whose 
essence it pertains to exist necessarilyʼ but the latter is absurd; therefore, the former is also. 
Hence, the force of this argument does not lie in the impossibility of there being an actual infinite 
or an infinite regress of causes, but only in the supposition that things which do not exist 
necessarily by their own nature are not determined to exist by a thing which does exist 
necessarily by its own nature.” C I.205. 
160 See Joachim, A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, 52. 
161 This Cartesian notion would be familiar to any contemporary philosopher of Spinoza. 
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you are implying the existence of substance. Spinoza holds that everyone admits 
that something is real, for even if one doubts the existence of everything 
including oneʼs own existence, one must exist in order to doubt oneʼs own 
existence. Since this is the case, it follows that God has necessary existence. 
If we were to take any existing thing from experience, and think out all that its 
being involves, its reality will either expand, and force itself into being, or it will 
dissolve until you are forced to conceive the whole nature of things, realizing that 
the experience that was a starting point is only a fragment within the whole.162 
The finite starting point vanishes and in its place is the necessity, complete, and 
infinite whole that is Spinozaʼs God. That God is not one amongst other self-
conditioned things gives Spinozaʼs argument weight, as the whole is implied by 
each and every piece of modal existence. Thus, Spinoza says that unless the 
whole is, nothing can be nor be conceived.163 Thus, as Joachim points out, 
because there is nothing real except God on which his being could depend, he is 
causa sui, and therefore not contingent. Further, his existence must be 
conditioned by himself or identical with his essence. To deny his existence is to 
deny that anything has existence. 
According to Joachim, the ontological argument understood in this way avoids 
Kantʼs criticism.164 
 
If you apply the ontological argument to anything except the whole 
and unique system of experience, Kantʼs criticism is unanswerable. 
If existence is necessarily included in the idea of God, then ʻGod 
must existʼ is an analytical judgment. It is contradictory to think the 
subject without the predicate: but—as Kant pointed out—it is not in 
the least contradictory to think neither subject nor predicate. You 
cannot conceive God without conceiving him to exist, if existence is 
included in the content of his idea: but you need not conceive God 
at all. But the cogency of this reasoning disappears the moment 
that God stands for the whole Reality. Then you cannot get rid of 
the subject of your analytical judgment without removing that which 
all and any experience involves: you cannot refuse to conceive God 
without ceasing to think or doubt or feel, in short, without ceasing to 
be. Hence, there is obviously a fundamental connexion between the 
uniqueness and the self-determined existence of God.165 
 
 
 
 
                                                
162 This analogy is from Joachim, A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, 53. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Kant. The Critique of Pure Reason. A598/B626. Joachim, A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, 
54. 
165 Ibid. 54-55. 
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XV. Second Proof 
 
The second proof makes use of the principle of sufficient reason. Spinoza clearly 
defines the principle of sufficient reason in the PPC, the eleventh axiom states: 
“Nothing exists of which it cannot be asked, what is the cause, or reason, why it 
exists.”166 The note to this axiom says: 
 
Since existing is something positive, we cannot say that it has 
nothing as its cause (by Axiom VII).167 Therefore, we must assign 
some positive cause, or reason, why [a thing] exists—either an 
eternal one, i.e., one outside the thing itself, or an internal one, i.e., 
one comprehended in the nature and definition of the existing thing 
itself.168 
 
This is the same reasoning that underlies the second axiom in the Ethics: “What 
cannot be conceived through another, must be conceived through itself.”169 The 
principle of sufficient reason is also given by Spinoza at the beginning of his 
second proof, where he says: 
 
For each thing there must be assigned a cause, or reason, as much 
for its existence as for its nonexistence. For example, if a triangle 
exists, there must be a reason or cause why it exists; but if it does 
not exist, there must also be a reason or cause which prevents it 
from existing, or which takes its existence away.170 
 
Spinozaʼs application of the principle of sufficient reason in the Ethics is more 
radical than his axiom in the PPC, where it had only been all existing things that 
require a reason or cause for there existence, whereas in the Ethics both existing 
and non-existing things require a reason or cause that explain why it is that they 
exist or do not. Further, Spinoza implies that non-existing things are prevented by 
a cause or reason from existing.171 
A thingʼs existence must either be: 1) logically impossible, 2) logically 
possible, or 3) logically necessary. A thingʼs existence is logically impossible 
when a cause or reason prevents it from existing. For example, a ʻsquare circleʼ 
is logically impossible, since it contains an inherent contradiction. Thus, the 
reason or cause that prevent them from existing is internal rather than external. 
Things which have an essence that contains no contradiction, or, in other words, 
                                                
166 PPC, I, Axiom XI. C I.246. 
167 Axiom VII states: “No actually existing thing and no actually existing perfection of a thing can 
have nothing, or a thing not existing, as the cause of its existence.” C I.244. 
168 C I.246. 
169 Ethics I, Axiom II. C I.410. 
170 Ethics I, Proposition XI, Dem. II. C I.417. 
171 Spinoza had discussed the nature of Chimeras in CM, I, i. Chimeras are verbal ideas, which 
exist neither in the intellect nor in the imagination. 
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are logically possible, exist as long as there is no external cause that prevent 
them from existing. This contains all of the ordinary objects, or modes, of our 
everyday experience. One might object that since there are so many competing 
essences that contain no internal contradiction, why isnʼt it the case that they are 
all actually existing. The answer is that since their existence depends on external 
causes, i.e. the order of things external, they are only actualized if the order of 
things opens up a spot for them. The reason for their existence or nonexistence 
is in the order of things rather than in their essence. Finally, a thingʼs existence is 
logically necessary if there isnʼt a reason or cause which prevents it from 
existing. The difference between logically necessary existents and logically 
possible ones is that while it is the case that a certain logically possible thing 
exists of necessity, this existence only applies to a certain ʻslotʼ where things 
external allow for it to exist. While it exists of necessity now, its existence does 
not follow from its essence, but from the order of causes outside its existence. It 
does not have the same necessary existence as that which is logically 
necessary, since it is dependent upon things other than itself to exist. 
Hence, Spinoza says: “The reason why a circle or triangle exists, or why it 
does not exist, does not follow from the nature of these things, but from the order 
of the whole of corporeal Nature. For from this [order] it must follow either that the 
triangle necessarily exists now or that it is impossible for it to exist now.”172 
While the essence of a logically impossible thing prevents it from existing, the 
essence of a logically necessary thing involves existence. Since this is the case, 
Spinoza argues, God must necessarily exist if there is no reason or cause 
preventing his existence. 
Such a cause or reason preventing Godʼs existence would have to either be in 
Godʼs essence or outside of it. If the cause or reason is external, it is either a 
substance of a different nature or the same nature. However, if it were of the 
same nature, that would prove that God exists, since there is nothing distinct 
from God to prevent his existence. We have already shown that in nature there 
cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute (Proposition 
V). If the substance is of a different nature, then it would have nothing in common 
with God, as two substances having different attributes have nothing in common 
with one another (Proposition II). Further, two substances that have nothing in 
common cannot be understood through one another (by Axiom V), and thus the 
other substance isnʼt capable of preventing God from existing. Thus, since the 
cause or reason isnʼt external to God, then if God doesnʼt exist, it must be 
internal. But it is an absurdity to affirm that a Being absolutely infinite and 
supremely perfect has an essence which involves a contradiction. Therefore, 
there is no reason or cause which takes Godʼs existence away, and hence God 
necessarily exists. 
 
 
 
                                                
172 Ethics I, Proposition XI, Dem. II. C I.417. 
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XVI. Third Proof 
 
Spinozaʼs next demonstration reflects Descartesʼ cosmological proof from the 
Third Meditation. In that proof, Descartes reasons from effect to cause, or, from 
our consciousness of our own existence to the existence of God.173 His argument 
begins with the inquiry of whether I, who have an idea of a being more perfect 
than myself, could exist if such a being didnʼt exist. He then presents the 
question: “From whom, in that case, would I derive my existence? From myself, 
presumably, or from my parents, or from some other being less perfect than 
God?”174 Descartesʼ conclusion is that my existence must derive from God. With 
this principle of God as the source of our beginning to exist, there is also the 
principle of preservation, or conservation. This addition allows the proponent of a 
cosmological argument to respond to the objection that the universe itself is 
eternal and has no beginning. Thus, Descartes states: “It is clear enough that an 
infinite regress is impossible here, especially since I am dealing not just with the 
cause that has produced me in the past, but also and more importantly with the 
cause that preserves me at the present moment.”175 A traditional cosmological 
argument would run as follows:176 
 
1) Everything that begins to exist into existence has a cause. 
2) The universe began to exist. 
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause. 
 
In the Third Meditation, Descartes holds that effects must contain as much reality 
as their causes, and since we have an idea of God, we cannot be the cause of 
this idea. Further, only an infinitely perfect being could be the cause of this idea. 
Spinoza utilizes Descartesʼ reasoning in his third proof. We have an idea of our 
own existence as finite beings and an idea of Godʼs existence as an infinite 
being. Now, there are three possibilities as to the truth of these ideas: 
 
1) They are both false, and thus nothing exists. 
2) Only the idea of our own existence is true, which entails that “what now 
necessarily exists are only finite beings.” 
3) They are both true, and thus “an absolutely infinite Being exists.” 
                                                
173 Descartesʼ cosmological proof is anthropological, reasoning from manʼs existence to the 
existence of God, unlike Platoʼs proof in the Timaeus, which reasons from the existence of the 
world to the existence of its cause. The argument in Timaeus 28a-c is as follows: “Everything that 
comes to be must of necessity come to be by the agency of some cause, for it is impossible for 
anything to come to be without a cause…Now as to the whole universe or world order 
[kosmos]…there is a question we need to consider first…Has it always existed? Was there no 
origin from which it came to be? Or did it come to be and to take its start from some origin? It has 
come to be…Further, we maintain that, necessarily, that which comes to be must come to be by 
agency of some cause.” 
174 CSM II.33. 
175 CSM II.34 
176 Cf. Platoʼs Timaeus 28a-c, above. 
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The first possibility is rejected, since we exist. The second possibility is also 
rejected, because “if what now necessarily exists are only finite beings, then finite 
beings are more powerful than an absolutely infinite Being. But this, as is known 
through itself is absurd.” The importance of Descartesʼ argument becomes 
evident: 
 
If I derived my existence from myself [and were independent of 
every other being], then I should neither doubt nor want, nor lack 
anything at all; for I should have given myself all the perfections of 
which I have any idea, and thus I should myself be God. I must not 
suppose that the items I lack would be more difficult to acquire than 
those I now have. On the contrary, it is clear that, since I am a 
thinking thing…it would have been far more difficult for me to 
emerge out of nothing than merely to acquire knowledge of which I 
am ignorant…If I had derived my existence from myself, which is a 
greater achievement, I should certainly not have denied myself the 
knowledge in question, which is something much easier to acquire, 
or indeed any of the attributes which I perceive to be contained in 
the idea of God; for none of them seem any harder to achieve. And 
if any of them were harder to achieve, they would certainly appear 
so to me, if I had indeed got all my other attributes from myself, 
since I should experience a limitation of my power in this respect.177 
 
Spinoza gives this same argument in his favorite style, ex absurdo contradictorio. 
For if we exist and God doesnʼt exist, then we have existence through ourselves, 
as Descartes says: “I derived my existence from myself.” If this is the case, then 
the idea which we have of our own existence is more powerful than the idea we 
have of Godʼs existence, since “to be able not to exist is to lack power, and 
conversely, to be able to exist is to have power.”178 But we have an idea of 
ourselves as finite beings and God as an infinite being. Thus, the possibility that 
only the idea of our own existence is true is contradictory. Since the first two 
possibilities have been shown to be false, the last one must be true, namely that 
God, a being absolutely infinite, necessarily exists.179 
 
 
 
XVII. Fourth Proof 
 
Spinozaʼs fourth proof is more interesting than his third, for he tells us: “I wanted 
to show Godʼs existence a posteriori, so that the demonstration would be 
                                                
177 CSM II.33. 
178 Ethics I, Proposition XI, Dem. III. C I.418. 
179 For a more detailed discussion, see Wolfson, I, ch. vi. 
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perceived more easily—but not because Godʼs existence does not follow a priori 
form the same foundation.”180 The purpose of the third proof is to give a simple 
demonstration of a proof that can alternatively, and preferably, be arrived at a 
priori. 
 
Spinoza gives a simple outline of this ontological proof: 
 
1) To be able to exist is power. 
2) The more reality a thing has, the more power it has to exist. 
3) Therefore, God, an absolutely infinite being, has, of himself, an absolutely 
infinite power of existing. 
4) From this it follows that God exists absolutely.181 
 
At first sight, this proof seems quite obscure and unclear. For what, exactly, is the 
definition of power? Spinoza answers this question for us in the Cogitata 
Metaphysica, where he states that Godʼs power is not distinguished from his 
essence: 
 
Some claim that Godʼs Immensity is threefold: immensity of 
essence, of power, and of presence;182 but that is foolish, for they 
seem to distinguish between Godʼs essence and his power. But 
others have also asserted the same thing more openly, when they 
say that God is everywhere through his power, but not through his 
essence183—as if the power of God were distinguished from all his 
attributes, or his infinite essence. Nevertheless it cannot be 
anything else. For if it were something else, it would be either some 
creature or something accidental to the divine essence, which the 
divine essence could be conceived to lack. But both alternatives are 
absurd. For if it were a creature, it would require the power of God 
in order to be conserved, and so there would be an infinite regress. 
And if it were something accidental, God would not be a most 
simple being, contrary to what we have demonstrated above.184 
 
                                                
180 Ethics I, Proposition XI, Schol. C I.418. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, 8, 3. 
183 Cf. Ibid. I, 25, 5. 
184 CM, II, iii. The demonstration that God is a simple being that Spinoza refers to is from PPC, I, 
Prop. XVII: “If God were composed of parts, the parts would have to be at least prior in nature to 
God (as everyone will easily concede). But that is absurd (for God is prior in causality to the 
essence and to the existence of things). Therefore, he is an entirely simple being.” In that work it 
is argued that God is prior in causality to the essence and existence of things because (as stated 
in the third proof) whatever exists is preserved by the power of God alone, and thus God is the 
cause of things with respect to their essences. C I.260, 320-321. 
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From this it is evident how Spinozaʼs proof is ontological, for it argues from the 
essence of God, or, what is the same, his power, and concludes that he 
necessarily exists. There is a similar argument found in Descartesʼ First Set of 
Replies to Caterus: 
 
When we attend to the immense power of this being, we shall be 
unable to think of its existence as possible without also recognizing 
that it can exist by its own power; and we shall infer from this that 
this being does really exist and has existed from eternity, since it is 
quite evident by the natural light that what can exist by its own 
power always exists. So we shall come to understand that 
necessary existence is contained in the idea of a supremely 
powerful being, not by any fiction of the intellect, but because it 
belongs to the true and immutable nature of such a being that it 
exists.185 
 
Spinoza notes that “there may be many who will not easily be able to see how 
evident this demonstration is, because they have been accustomed to 
contemplate only those things that flow from external causes.”186 In other words, 
they contemplate things from effect to cause, rather than from cause to effect, 
which is the nature of this proof. Such people see that things which quickly come 
to be, or which are easily able to exist, also quickly perish. Likewise, they 
conceive that things which are more complex do not exist as easily. 
Spinoza says that this objection can be answered by noting that he is not 
speaking of things which come to be from external causes, but rather of 
substances that can be produced by no external cause. The objection only 
applies to things which owe their existence to an external cause. Spinozaʼs 
statement, “for things that come to be from external causes—whether they 
consist of many parts or of few—owe all the perfection or reality they have to the 
power of the external cause,” reflects what Descartes says in the Third 
Meditation: “There must be at least as much [reality] in the cause as in the 
effect.”187 Thus, the existence of things that come from an external cause arises 
only from the perfection of that cause, and not from their own perfection. Any 
perfection substance has is not owed to an external cause, and so its existence 
must follow from its own essence. Spinoza concludes: “Hence its existence is 
nothing but its essence.”188 
The objection washes away because perfection assets the existence of a 
thing, rather than limiting it, while imperfection does take it away. In fact, there is 
nothing whose existence we can be more certain of than the existence of an 
absolutely infinite, or perfect, Being, which Spinoza calls God. This proof “will be 
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clear even to those who are only moderately attentive,” and since Godʼs essence 
excludes all imperfection, and involves absolute perfection, all reasons of 
doubting Godʼs existence will be removed. 
 
 
 
XVIII. The Indivisibility of Substance 
 
Spinoza now attends to the indivisibility of substance. In the Short Treatise, 
Spinoza devotes the first chapter to the subject, ʻThat God Is,ʼ and the second 
chapter to the subject, ʻWhat God Is.ʼ Similarly, now that he has demonstrated 
that God exists in Proposition XI of the Ethics, the following propositions discuss 
what God is, or, more specifically, what the nature of God is.189 Spinoza states in 
Proposition XII: “No attribute of a substance can be truly conceived from which it 
follows that the substance can be divided.”190 Proposition XII doesnʼt tell us that 
an attribute canʼt be divided, since I can conceive of distinct modes of extension, 
not just extension as a whole. Likewise, I can distinguish concepts of thought 
from each other, and donʼt need to conceive of all thoughts as a whole. In the 
Short Treatise, Spinoza states: “A thing composed of different parts must be such 
that each singular part can be conceived and understood without the others.” 191 
In the same passage Spinoza provides an illustration: “For example, in a clock 
that is composed of many different wheels, cords, etc., I say that each wheel, 
cord, etc., can be conceived and understood separately, without needing [the 
understanding of] the whole as a whole.”192 
However, while I can conceive of the attributes as divisible in this way, this 
division doesnʼt imply that substance itself is divided. For example, when an 
extended body is broken in two, substance itself is not broken in two, suffering 
division. Spinoza is not an atomist,193 and the notion that substance, or the 
whole, is the sum total of a finite number of divisible points is absolutely rejected 
by him. This is evident from his statement in the Short Treatise: 
 
Division, then, or being acted on, always happens in the mode, as 
when we say that a man perishes, or is destroyed, that is only 
understood of the man insofar as he is a composite being and 
                                                
189 The structure of the opening chapters of the Short Treatise reflects, albeit a rough reflection, 
the structure of the Ethics. The chapter following ʻWhat God Isʼ will be ʻHow God is a Cause of All 
Things,ʼ which will correspond to Propositions XV-XVIII in the Ethics. Following that chapter is a 
discussion ʻOf Godʼs Necessary Actions,ʼ which corresponds to Propositions XXIX and XXXIII of 
the Ethics. 
190 Ethics, I, Proposition XII. C I.419. 
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192 Ibid. 
193 Ethics, II, Proposition XIII, Lemma VII: “The whole of nature is one Individual, whose parts, i.e., 
all bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change to the whole Individual.”  Spinoza offers a 
long proof of the proposition: “There are no atoms.” C I.268-269. Cf. Descartes Principles, II, 20. 
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mode of substance, and not the substance itself on which he 
depends.194 
 
The problem Spinoza is addressing is the continuum problem. This problem 
states that since extension, space, or matter are continuous quantities, it follows 
that however small the amount of space you divide, you can always divide it 
again to reach a smaller amount. This process goes on to infinity, such that we 
never arrive at a smallest point. If it is the case that there is no smallest point, 
then no amount of points, however many, can satisfy a complete unit or whole. In 
the Short Treatise, Spinoza states why the whole canʼt merely be the sum of its 
parts: “If it did consist of parts, it would not be infinite through its nature…But it is 
impossible that parts could be conceived in an infinite Nature, for all parts are, by 
their nature, finite.”195 As Spinoza says in the first proposition of the Ethics, 
“Substantia prior est natura suis affectionibus,” in other words, the whole is prior 
to its parts. Space as a whole, for example, is a single and uniform thing, and it is 
only within space that we specify divisions.196 But it isnʼt the parts that construct 
space, but the space that constructs the parts. Just as in the first proposition, 
space is logically prior to a part of space. Without space, there are no parts of 
space. 
In the Cogitata Metaphysica, Spinoza provides a full chapter on Godʼs 
simplicity. He gives a proof that God is not something composite, from which it 
follows that he is simple: 
 
Since it is clear through itself that component parts are prior in 
nature at least to the thing composed, those substances by whose 
coalition and union God is composed will necessarily be prior in 
nature to God himself, and each one will be able to be conceived 
through itself, although it is not attributed to God. Then, since they 
must be really distinguished from one another, each one will also 
necessarily be able to exist through itself without the aid of the 
others; and so, as we have just said, there could be as many gods 
as there are substances from which God would be supposed to be 
composed. For since each one is able to exist through itself, it will 
have to exist of itself, and therefore will also have the power of 
giving itself all the perfections which we have shown to be in 
God…But since nothing more absurd than this can be said, we 
conclude that God is not composed of a coalition and union of 
substances.197 
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It might be objected that Spinoza is making contradictory statements when he 
says that God is infinite and that God is simple. This objection is the same issue 
the medieval philosophers faced who asserted that God is absolutely infinite and 
absolutely simply. According to Wolfson, what was meant by simplicity is 
threefold:  the denial of the existence in God of accidental qualities, the denial of 
essential attributes, i.e., the metaphysical or logical distinction of genus and 
species in the divine nature, and the denial of the distinction of essence and 
existence in the divine nature.198 Whether Spinozaʼs conception is the same as 
this medieval view of simplicity cannot be said for sure, but Spinoza makes 
strikingly similar statements. In the Short Treatise, Spinoza says that “God is not 
a species of any genus,”199 i.e., in God there is no distinction of genus and 
species. This passage not only echoes Maimonides,200 but, as Edwin Curley also 
notes, it echoes Aquinas.201 We know that Spinoza also agrees that there is no 
distinction of essence and existence in the divine nature. Wolfson points to the 
second scholium of Proposition VIII to show that Spinoza also agrees that 
accidental qualities inhere in substance.202 Almost in the words of Maimonides, 
Spinoza says that those who attribute accidental qualities to substance do so 
“because they do not distinguish between the modifications of substances and 
the substances themselves.”203 Spinoza does hold that God is infinite and simple, 
but it is clear that Spinoza agrees with a medieval thesis that God is simple in the 
sense that he is not an aggregate of parts, nor is he composed of an inner 
plurality in his essence.204 
His proof of Proposition XII in the Ethics is similar to his statement in the 
Cogitata Metaphysica. He argues that if it were the case that a substance could 
be divided, the parts into which it would be divided would either retain the nature 
of the substance or would not. If the parts retain the nature of substance, then it 
follows from Proposition VIII that each part is infinite, and also from Proposition 
VII that each part is also its own cause. Further, by Proposition V each part has 
to consist of a different attribute, for two or more substances canʼt share an 
attribute. From all this it follows that many substances are formed from the 
division of one substance, which has already been shown to be an absurdity by 
Proposition VI, namely that one substance canʼt be produced by another 
substance. Also, it has been shown in Proposition II that two substances having 
different attributes have nothing in common with one another. This means that 
the parts would have nothing in common with their whole, and by Definition IV 
and Proposition X, it follows that the whole could be and be conceived without its 
parts, quod absurdum esse nemo dubitare poterit.205 
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Now that Spinoza has demonstrated that the parts canʼt retain the nature of 
the whole [substance], he moves to the second possibility if substance could be 
divided, namely that the parts will not retain the nature of substance. If this is 
asserted, he says, “then since the whole substance would be divided into equal 
parts,206 it would lose the nature of substance, and would cease to be.”207 This is 
absurd by Proposition VII, for it pertains to the nature of substance to exist. 
Whereas in Proposition XII where Spinoza establishes that no attribute can be 
conceived from which it follows that the substance can be divided, Proposition 
XIII attempts to establish that an absolutely infinite substance is indivisible. His 
proof is similar to the previous proposition. He argues that if an absolutely infinite 
substance were divisible, the parts would either retain the nature of the 
absolutely infinite substance or they would not. If it were the case that they 
retained the nature of the absolutely infinite substance, then there would be more 
than one substance of the same nature, which is absurd by Proposition V. If they 
do not retain its nature, then an absolutely infinite substance would not exist. But 
it has already been shown that an absolutely infinite substance, namely God, 
does exist by Proposition XI. Therefore, God is indivisible. 
The corollary he provides tells us that it follows from these propositions that 
no substance, nor attribute of a substance, i.e. the corporeal conception of 
substance, is divisible. While we can conceive of matter as divisible in certain 
respects, “insofar as it is a substance,”208 that is, as an attribute of substance, it 
is not divisible. The nature of substance canʼt be conceived except as infinite. 
Thus, “by a part of substance nothing can be understood except a finite 
substance,”209 which is a contradiction since it has already been shown that 
substance is necessarily infinite by Proposition VIII. 
 
 
 
XIX. The Conceptual Priority of God 
 
Spinoza now sets out to clarify the ontological status of God as a substance. He 
says: “Except God, no substance can be or be conceived.”210 God is not only the 
only substance that exists, but is also the only substance that can be conceived. 
From Proposition V it has been shown that in nature there cannot be two or more 
substances of the same nature or attribute, and from Proposition XI that God, a 
substance with infinite attributes, necessarily exists. Since God has infinite, or all 
possible, attributes, his existence makes it impossible for any other substance to 
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exist, for if another substance existed, it would have to share an attribute with 
God, which is a violation of Proposition V. This is Spinozaʼs full argument for 
monism, the view that there is only one substance that exists, or can exist. His 
argument can be formulated as follows: 
 
1) God, a substance with every possible attribute, must necessarily exist. 
(Proposition XI) 
2) There cannot exist two substances that share an attribute. (Proposition V) 
3) Therefore, there is only one substance, namely God. (Proposition XIV) 
 
It follows from this that God is unique, as we have previously explained. And here 
Spinoza declares that Godʼs uniqueness follows from the fact that “in Nature 
there is only one substance, and that it is absolutely infinite.”211 In the second 
corollary, Spinoza says that it also follows “that an extended thing and a thinking 
thing are either attributes of God, or212 affections of Godʼs attributes.”213 This 
statement isnʼt as clear as what Spinoza will say in the first two propositions of 
Part Two of the Ethics, that “Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking 
thing,”214 and “Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.”215 
Spinoza includes a description of our understanding of Godʼs attributes in the 
Short Treatise:  
 
After the preceding reflections on Nature we have not yet been able 
to find in it more than two attributes that belong to this all-perfect 
being. And these give us nothing by which we can satisfy ourselves 
that these would be the only ones of which this perfect being would 
consist. On the contrary, we find in ourselves something which 
openly indicates to us not only that there are more, but also that 
there are infinite perfect attributes which must pertain to this being 
before it can be called perfect. And where does this Idea of 
perfection come from? It cannot come from these two, for two gives 
only two, not infinitely many. From where, then? Certainly not from 
me, for then I would have had to be able to five what I did not have. 
From where else, then, than from the infinite attributes themselves, 
which tell us that they are, though they so far do not tell us what 
they are. For only of two do we know what they are.216 
 
Our idea of God is explained by Spinoza as clear, because man “understands his 
ʻattributes,ʼ which he could not produce because he is imperfect.”217 
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In the Short Treatise, Spinoza lists three reasons why he holds that all the 
attributes in Nature are only one, single being: 
 
1. Because we have already found previously that there must be an 
infinite and perfect being, by which nothing else can be understood 
but a being of which all in all must be predicated. For of a being 
which has some essence, [some] attributes must be predicated, 
and the more essence one ascribes to it, the more attributes one 
must also ascribe to it. So if a being is infinite, its attributes must 
also be infinite, and that is precisely what we call a perfect being. 
 
2. Because of the unity which we see everywhere in Nature; if there 
were different beings in Nature, the one could not possibly unite 
with the other. 
 
3. Because, as we have already seen, one substance cannot 
produce another, and if a substance does not exist, it is impossible 
for it to begin to exist. We seem however, that in no substance 
(which we nonetheless know to exist in Nature) is there, so long as 
it is conceived separately, any necessity of existing. Since no 
existence pertains to its particular essence, it must necessarily 
follow that Nature, which comes from no cause, and which we 
nevertheless know to exist, must necessarily be a perfect being, 
existence belongs.218 
 
Yet although extension and thought are attributes of God, they “do not exhaust 
Godʼs nature,” for “The Absolute is more than Thought and Extension, though our 
intelligence apprehends only them.”219 
 
 
 
XX. The Impossibility of a Vacuum and the Infinity of Extension 
 
Spinoza states in Proposition XV that “whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be 
or be conceived without God.”220 Since it is the case that except for God, no 
substance can be, or be conceived (by Proposition XIV), and also that modes 
cannot be conceived without substance (by Definition V), it follows that all 
existent modes can only be, or be conceived, in the divine nature. And since it is 
the case that except for substances and modes there is nothing (by Axiom I), 
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everything is in God and nothing can be conceived without God.221 This means 
that everything, not excluding matter, is in God.222 
Spinoza now turns to an important concern that had also troubled him in his 
early writings. This concern is the rejection of extension as an attribute of God. 
According to Spinoza, “everyone who has to any extent contemplated the divine 
nature denies that God is corporeal.”223 This reflects the complete medieval 
denial of God as a material cause. Spinoza says that this denial arises from their 
defining body as “any quantity, with length, breadth, and depth, limited by some 
certain figure.”224 If this is in fact what body is, then it would be an absurdity to 
say that an absolutely infinite being, God, has such a limited nature. It does not 
seem possible to maintain that extension is an attribute of God, “for since 
extension is divisible, the perfect being would consist of parts.”225 
Spinoza presents a refutation of this denial of extension as an attribute of 
God, showing that extension isnʼt necessarily divisible and composed of parts. 
Just as he had previously done in his demonstration of Propositions XII and XIII, 
Spinoza distinguishes between extension as an attribute and a mode, the former 
being simple and the latter being divisible. In the Short Treatise, Spinoza gives a 
detailed account of this distinction: 
 
Concerning the parts in Nature, we say (as we said before) that 
division never occurs in the substance, but always and only in the 
modes of substance. So if I want to divide water, I divide only the 
mode of the substance, not the substance itself; the substance is 
always the same, [though] now [it is the substance] of water, now 
[the substance] of something else. Division, then, or being acted on, 
always happens in the mode, as when we say that a man perishes, 
or is destroyed, that is only understood of the man insofar as he is a 
composite being and mode of substance, and not the substance 
itself on which he depends.226 
 
Spinoza argues that if extension is not an attribute of God, that is, if extension is 
not contained within the divine nature, then God would have had to create it as a 
substance distinct from himself, which is absurd, for “if things have nothing in 
common with one another, one of them cannot be the cause of the other,”227 and 
“a substance cannot be produced by anything else.”228 Thus, Spinoza says: “By 
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what divine power could it be created? They are completely ignorant of that. And 
this shows clearly that they do not understand what they themselves say.”229 
The first argument that Spinoza attributes to his opponents deals with is the 
claim that since matter consists of parts, it cannot be infinite and thus cannot 
pertain to God. They argue, for example, that if matter is infinite, and we divide it 
in two parts, each part will either be finite or infinite. If they are said to be finite, 
then two finite parts compose an infinite, which is absurd. If they are said to be 
infinite, then there is one infinite twice as large as another, which is also absurd, 
for one infinite canʼt be greater than another infinite. They also argue that if an 
infinite quantity is measured by parts that are each equal to a foot, then it will 
consist of infinitely many parts each equal to a foot. If it is measured by parts that 
are each equal to an inch, then it will consist of infinitely many parts each equal 
to an inch. Therefore, one infinite number is twelve times the size as the other, 
which is absurd. From these three arguments, they conclude that matter is finite, 
and cannot belong to Godʼs essence. 
The second argument of Spinozaʼs opponent states that since God is a 
supremely perfect being, he canʼt be acted upon. Matter, however, is divisible, 
and thus can be acted upon. From this, it follows that matter cannot belong to 
Godʼs essence. It is likely Descartes that is the voice of Spinozaʼs opponent here, 
for he says in the Principles: 
 
There are many things such that, although we recognize some 
perfection in them, we also find in them some imperfection or 
limitation, and these therefore cannot belong to God. For example, 
the nature of body includes divisibility along with extension in 
space, and since being divisible is an imperfection, it is certain that 
God is not a body.230 
 
According to Descartes, being divisible into parts is a way of being acted upon. 
Thus, if all matter is divisible, it is passive, and cannot belong to Godʼs essence. 
To refute these arguments, Spinoza begins by stating that the absurdities 
from which his opponents infer that extended substance, or matter, is finite follow 
“from the fact that they suppose an infinite quantity to be measurable and 
composed of finite parts.”231 Rather than showing that corporeal substance is 
finite, their arguments only show that infinite quantity is not measurable, and that 
it is not composed of parts. Since Spinoza holds that infinite quantity is neither 
measurable nor composed of parts, “so the weapon they aim at us, they really 
turn against themselves.”232 Spinoza asks: “If corporeal substance could be so 
divided that its parts were really distinct, why, then, could one part not be 
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annihilated, the rest remaining connected with one another as before?”233 If one 
part can be annihilated, then it would either leave a vacuum or the other parts 
would have to fill its place. 
To understand how Spinoza formulates his response, we must look to what 
Descartes says about a vacuum. Descartes had argued that there is no real 
difference between space and corporeal substance [extension]. To recognize that 
there is no difference between them, he asks us to attend to the idea of some 
body, i.e. a stone, and remove all that is non-essential to the nature of body from 
it. Hardness must be excluded, “since if the stone is melted or pulverized it will 
lose its hardness without thereby ceasing to be a body.”234 Color is excluded, 
“since we have often seen stones so transparent as to lack color.”235 Heaviness 
is also excluded, “since although fire is extremely light it is still thought of as 
being corporeal.”236 Lastly, cold and heat and all other such qualities are 
excluded, “either because they are not thought of as being in the stone, or 
because if they change, the stone is not on that account reckoned to have lost its 
bodily nature.”237 With all of these non-essential qualities removed, Descartes 
concludes that there is nothing left in our idea of the stone except that it is 
something extended in length, breadth, and depth. And this idea is what 
comprises the idea of space.238 
Spinoza is clearly following Descartes, as he produces a similar argument for 
the proposition that “the nature of body, or matter, consists in extension alone.”239 
Spinoza justifies this claim by the fact that “the nature of the body is not taken 
away when the sensible qualities are taken away,”240 that is, “even though the 
hardness, weight, and rest of the sensible qualities are separated from a body, 
the nature of the body will still remain whole,”241 as Descartes explains above. It 
follows from this proposition, says Spinoza, that “space and body do not really 
differ,”242 because space and extension do not really differ. 
What follows from this is Spinozaʼs rejection of a vacuum, which is the basis 
for his argument that matter is not divisible into distinct parts. In the Ethics, he 
says that “there is no vacuum in nature (a subject I discuss elsewhere),”243 which 
must refer to what he says in his Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, as he does 
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not mention the topic again in the Ethics.244 Spinoza is certainly referring to what 
he says of the proposition that “it involves a contradiction that there should be a 
vacuum.”245 Since the definition of a vacuum is “extension without corporeal 
substance,”246 it follows from what has already been said that this means body 
without body, which is absurd. That is, bodies between which nothing lies must 
touch one another. Spinoza holds it as an axiom that “nothing has no properties,” 
or, as Descartes says, “nothingness possesses no attributes or qualities.”247 
Spinoza references a fuller explanation of this in Descartesʼ Principles.248 The 
inclination to suppose that a vacuum can exist is formed by a prejudice we have 
formed. Descartes tells us that when we ordinarily use the term empty, we are 
not referring to a place or space in which there is absolutely nothing, but to a 
place in which there is none of the things that we think ought to be there. For 
example, we say that a pitcher that we use to hold water is empty when it is full of 
air, or when a fishpond is full of water, we still call it empty if it has no fish in it. 
However, we call space empty if it contains nothing perceivable by the senses, 
although it is full of self-subsistent matter. We fall into error because normally the 
only things we attend to in our thoughts are those which are detected by our 
senses. Thus, when we are not attentive in our understanding of the terms 
ʻemptyʼ and ʻnothing,ʼ says Descartes, “we may suppose that a space we call 
empty contains not just nothing perceivable by the senses but nothing 
whatsoever.”249 And this is just as fallacious as thinking that the air in a jug isnʼt a 
subsistent thing because we usually think of it as empty when it contains nothing 
but air. Descartes says: 
 
When there is nothing between two bodies they must necessarily 
touch each other. And it is a manifest contradiction for them to be 
apart, or to have a distance between them, when the distance in 
question is nothing; for every distance is a mode of extension, and 
therefore cannot exist without an extended substance.250 
 
Jonathan Bennett clarifies what underlies the reasoning of Spinoza and 
Descartes: 
 
If we pump all the air out of a jar, what is left in it? There cannot be 
literally nothing left, for if there were nothing between the two sides 
they would be contiguous. We might try to get out of allowing that 
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there is something in the jar by saying that there is a distance 
between its sides. But Descartes has a good reply to this. Distance, 
he says, is a mode—a property or quality or measure—and there 
must be something it is of: you can have a mile of road, or a yard of 
fabric, but you cannot have a sheer mile or a naked yard. The moral 
is that the jar must still contain something extended: it may lack 
mass, solidity, impenetrability, etc., but it must be something with 
size and shape—not a nothing with size and shape, a case of size 
and shape which arenʼt of anything.251 
 
 
 
XXI. Psychological Explanation of Dividing Quantity 
 
Spinoza now turns to a psychological explanation of the human inclination to 
divide quantity. He distinguishes between conceiving through the imagination and 
conceiving through the intellect. The conception we have of quantity as it is in the 
imagination is finite, divisible, and composed of parts, while the conception we 
have of quantity as it is in the intellect is infinite, unique, and indivisible. Spinoza 
says that this is sufficiently plain to everyone who knows how to distinguish 
between the intellect and the imagination.252 
Descartes provides an example in the Third Meditation of such a distinction:  
 
There are two different ideas of the sun which I find within me. One 
of them, which is acquired as it were from the senses and which is 
a prime example of an idea which I reckon to come from an 
external source, makes the sun appear very small. The other idea 
is based on astronomical reasoning, that is, it is derived from 
certain notions which are innate in me (or else it is constructed by 
me in some other way), and this idea shows the sun to be several 
times larger than the earth. Obviously both these ideas cannot 
resemble the sun which exists outside me; and reason persuades 
me that the idea which seems to have emanated most directly from 
the sun itself has in fact no resemblance to it at all.253 
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Spinoza inherits a deep criticism of the imagination from Descartes, who 
describes it as “the deceptive judgment” that “botches things together.”254 Thus, 
Spinoza later tells us that an imagining (imaginatio) “is an idea by which the Mind 
considers a thing as present, which nevertheless indicates the constitution of the 
human Body more than the nature of the external thing.”255 
While the senses tell us that we can separate the physical world into distinct 
objects, i.e., we can chop things in half and we can grind things into powder, the 
whole of extension is a single whole. This is why Spinoza says that it follows from 
the distinction of the imagination and the intellect that “matter is everywhere the 
same” and “parts are distinguished in it only insofar as we conceive matter to be 
affected in different ways, so that its parts are only distinguished modally, but not 
really.”256 
This distinction isnʼt thoroughly explained in the Ethics, and is derived again 
from Descartes.257 Consider what Spinoza says in the Cogitata Metaphysica: 
 
The modal distinction is shown to be twofold: there is that between 
a mode of a substance and the substance itself, and that between 
two modes of one and the same substance. We know the latter 
from the fact that, although either mode may be conceived without 
the aid of the other, nevertheless neither may be conceived without 
the aid of the substance whose modes they are. The former is 
known from the fact that, although the substance can be conceived 
without its mode, nevertheless, the mode cannot be conceived 
without the substance.258 
 
The parts canʼt be distinguished really because they are not distinct things, since 
they are both parts that are extended. As Descartes says, “strictly speaking, a 
real distinction exists only between two or more substances.”259 For two things to 
be really distinct, it must be the case that one can be understood without the aid 
of the other.260 The distinction of parts of matter is modal, and Spinozaʼs example 
in the Ethics clarifies this point. He says: 
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We conceive that water is divided and its parts separated from one 
another—insofar as it is water, but not insofar as it is corporeal 
substance. For insofar as it is substance, it is neither separated nor 
divided. Again, water, insofar as it is water, is generated and 
corrupted, but insofar as it is substance, it is neither generated nor 
corrupted.261 
 
The distinction is between particular modes of matter or corporeal substance and 
the general corporeal substance itself. The point of this example is that while it is 
the case that we conceive water to be divided and its parts separated (via the 
imagination), that is, particular instances of water are present at different times, 
water itself considered as H2O does not come in or out of being, but its 
components have always existed as modes of extension. Hence, Spinoza says in 
a letter to Henry Oldenburg: “Men are not created, but only generated, and that 
their bodies already existed before, though formed differently. It may, indeed, be 
inferred, as I cheerfully acknowledge, that if one part of matter were annihilated, 
the whole of Extension would also vanish at the same time.”262 
His point is presented more clearly in the Short Treatise, where he says: 
 
Concerning the parts in Nature, we say (as we said before) that 
division never occurs in the substance, but always and only in the 
modes of substance. So if I want to divide water, I divide only the 
mode of the substance, not the substance itself; the substance is 
always the same, [though] now [it is the substance] of water, now 
[the substance] of something else. Division, then, or being acted on, 
always happens in the mode, as when we say that a man perishes, 
or is destroyed, that is only understood of the man insofar as he is a 
composite being and mode of substance, and not the substance 
itself on which he depends.263 
 
To conclude, Spinoza has already refuted the first argument, that extension 
cannot be infinite because matter is composed of parts, and an infinite cannot be 
measured by parts. He did this by showing that his opponentsʼ arguments do not 
show that corporeal substance is finite, but rather than an infinite quantity cannot 
be measured and is not composed of parts. Our perceived distinction of the parts 
is a modal distinction, and not a real distinction. There are no gaps in the attribute 
of extension, since it has been shown that a vacuum is impossible. The second 
argument, that extension cannot belong to Godʼs nature as a supremely perfect 
being, since matter is divisible and thus passive, is also refuted first on the same 
grounds that it is based on the supposition that matter is divisible into real parts 
that are distinct. However, Spinoza says, this divisibility (if it existed) would not 
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necessarily entail that extension is unworthy of the divine nature. He has already 
shown by Proposition XIV that apart from God there can be no substance by 
which the divine nature would be acted on. All things are in God, and all things 
that happen, happen only through the laws of Godʼs infinite nature, following from 
the necessity of his essence. Since this is the case, “it cannot be said in any way 
that God is acted on by another, or that extended substance is unworthy of the 
divine nature, even if it is supposed to be divisible, so long as it is granted to be 
eternal and infinite.”264 God is unique and essentially active, and since extension 
cannot be said to act upon God, it cannot be said to detract from the divine 
nature or essence. 
 
 
 
XXII. The Eight-fold Classification of God as Cause 
 
In the Short Treatise, Spinoza devotes a chapter to the subject: How God is a 
Cause of All Things. His classification of God as cause in the Ethics from 
Propositions XVI-XVIII (and XXVIII, Schol.) correlates to his eight-fold 
classification in the Short Treatise, which is presented as follows: 
 
 
Ethics, I     Short Treatise, I, iii 
Prop. XVI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7. Universal265 cause, general cause 
Prop. XVI, Corol. I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Emanative, productive, active,  
    efficient cause 
Prop. XVI, Corol. II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. Cause through himself (essential) 
Prop. XVI, Corol. III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. First, initial cause 
Prop. XVII, Corol. I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. Principal cause 
Prop. XVII, Corol. II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Free cause 
Prop. XVIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Immanent cause 
Prop. XXVIII, Schol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8. Proximate266 cause267 
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As I have already noted, Wolfson has interpreted the first fifteen propositions of 
Book I of the Ethics as a criticism of the immateriality of God, which culminates in 
Proposition XVʼs statement that whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be 
conceived without God, meaning that everything, including matter, is in God. He 
interprets the remaining propositions of Book I as a criticism of the conceptions of 
the causality of God.268 There is a bridge between these two issues by which the 
assertion that God is immaterial by his nature, which was universally accepted in 
medieval philosophy, led the medievals to deny that God was a material cause. 
For example, in Maimonidesʼ discussion that God is the Primal Cause,269 he 
states: 
 
It has been shown in the science of physics that everything, except 
the First Cause, owes its origin to the following four causes:—the 
material, the formal, the efficient, and the final. These are 
sometimes proximate, sometimes remote, but each by itself is 
called a cause. They also believe—and I do not differ from their 
belief—that God, blessed be He, is the efficient, the formal, and 
final cause.270 
 
Thus, since Maimonides rejects that the essence of God can be material, he 
rejects that God can be a material cause, and asserts that God is the efficient, 
formal, and final cause. On the other hand, since Spinoza asserts that the 
attribute of extension is in Godʼs essence, he holds that God is the material 
cause. Unlike Maimonides, Spinoza will end up removing the classification of 
God as the final cause.271 For Spinoza, then, God is the efficient, formal, and 
material cause. If we accept Wolfsonʼs interpretation of Spinozaʼs criticism, then 
the second point of critique in Spinozaʼs first book of the Ethics is a direct result 
of the first. That is, Spinoza holds that the medievals err in rejecting that 
extension can belong to Godʼs nature, which culminates in Proposition XV and its 
Scholium, and it is this false conception of Godʼs nature that gives rise to a false 
conception of the causality of God in medieval philosophy. 
In the Cogitata Metaphysica, Spinoza tells us that creation is “an activity in 
which no causes concur except the efficient” and that a created thing is “that 
which presupposes nothing except God in order to exist.”272 Maimonides had 
previously identified the three causes in his statement: “Aristotle has already 
explained that in Nature the efficient cause of a thing, its form, and its final cause 
are identical.”273 Spinoza is making the same identification, but with the efficient, 
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formal, and material cause, and not the final cause. Spinoza therefore holds that 
the most applicable term for God is the efficient cause. Wolfson says this is so 
because “even as a material and formal cause, it is only through the active 
properties of extension and thought that God is conceived as cause” and God is 
“efficient in the most general sense of active and as the sum of all conditions that 
make for causality.”274 
In the beginning of his chapter on Godʼs causality in the Short Treatise 
Spinoza says that since one substance cannot produce another, and God is a 
being of which all attributes are predicated, it follows “that all other things cannot 
in any way exist or be understood without or outside him. So we have every 
reason to say that God is a cause of all things.”275 
 
 
 
XXIII. Universal Cause (1) 
 
Spinoza first treats God as a universal or general cause. In Burgersdijck, the 
efficient cause is divided into universal and particular. The “Universal is that 
which concurrs with other Causes, with the Same Efficiency, to the producing of 
many Effects,” and “a Particular only which by its Efficiency produces but one 
Effect.”276 Similarly, Spinoza says of the universal cause in the Short Treatise: 
“God is also a general [universal] cause, but only in the respect that he produces 
different things. Otherwise, such a thing can never be said of him. For he does 
not need anyone to produce effects.”277 I believe that Spinoza moved the order of 
causes to place the universal cause first in order to show a further inconsistency 
from the medieval denial of extension as an attribute of God that results in a false 
conception of Godʼs causality. If God is pure simple form, and “a simple element 
can only produce one simple thing,”278 then that which emanates from God can 
only be one simple Intelligence and it must be the case that matter emerges 
somewhere else later on in the emanative process. If this is the case, then 
Wolfson is right that while God can be considered the indirect cause of ʻmany 
effects,ʼ he is the direct cause of only one simple thing.279 Thus, according to the 
classification above of universal and particular cause, this conception of God is 
that of a particular cause and not a universal cause. Hence those who agree 
with, for example, Aquinas, are mistaken when they say: “nothing can be among 
beings, unless it is from God, Who is the universal cause of all being. Hence it is 
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necessary to say that God brings things into being from nothing.”280 Spinozaʼs 
God, on the other hand, is a universal cause, for he is the direct cause of 
extended and thinking modes. Further, while medieval philosophers agreed that 
God was infinite, they held that God did not, or ever will, create the infinite things 
which he has in his mind. For Spinoza, this is clearly not the case. God produces 
everything in the scope of his infinite intellect, and the world is thus as infinite as 
God, consisting of an infinite number of modes. God is a universal cause 
because the world is the full expression of his being.281 If the world were finite, 
then Spinozaʼs God would be a particular cause. Thus, Spinoza tells us in 
Proposition XVI: “From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow 
infinitely many things in infinitely many modes, (i.e., everything which can fall 
under an infinite intellect.)”282 
 
 
 
XXIV. Efficient Cause (2) 
 
Efficient causation is the agency producing the result, or, as Burgersdijck says: 
“An Efficient is an External Cause from which a thing proceeds by a true 
Causality.” 283In the Short Treatise, when Spinoza classifies God as an efficient 
cause, he says that “God is an emanative or productive cause of his actions, and 
in respect to the actionʼs occurring, an active or efficient cause. We treat this as 
one thing, because they involve each other.”284 Whereas in Maimonides, the 
modes follow from God by an efficient causation that specifically involves 
emanation from the action of an immaterial being upon material objects,285 in 
Spinoza this distinction of incorporeal and corporeal agency does not exist. Thus, 
Spinoza concludes in the First Corollary of Proposition XVI that “God is the 
efficient cause of all things which can fall under an infinite intellect.”286 As is said 
in the Book of Psalms: “For with thee is the fountain of life: in thy light shall we 
see light.”287 
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XXV. Cause through himself (3) 
 
God as an efficient cause is divided into cause per se288 and cause per 
accidens.289 In the Short Treatise, Spinoza merely tells us that this will become 
more evident in a later discussion. Turning to Burgersdijck, he defines a cause by 
itself as “that which as it is such, produces an Effect of its own Council, and 
agreeable to its Natural Disposition,” and a cause by accident as that “which not 
as such, or else besides its own Council or Natural Propension.” 290 What this 
means is that an essential cause, or cause by itself, is that which produces 
something of its own kind. An accidental cause, on the other hand, is that which 
produces something that is not of its own kind. Therefore, from the medieval 
conception of God as immaterial and the world as material, that is, not of his own 
kind, it follows that God is an accidental cause. However, since for Spinoza the 
world is not of a different kind than God, he says in the Second Corollary of 
Proposition XVI: “It follows…that God is a cause through himself and not an 
accidental cause.”291 
 
 
 
XXVI. First Cause (4) 
 
In the Third, and last, Corollary to Proposition XVI in the Ethics, Spinoza says 
that “it follows” that God is the absolute causam primam, that is, “absolutely the 
first cause.”292 In the Short Treatise, the first cause is also called the “initiating 
cause.”293 Spinoza again shows his minimalism by saying nothing else on the 
topic. Jonathan Bennett is right when he says of Spinoza that “his minimalism 
often leads him to underexpress his thought.”294 However, by looking into 
Burgersdijckʼs logic, we can clarify exactly what Spinoza means. Burgersdijck 
tells us that an efficient cause is divided into First and Second. “The First is that 
which depends upon none” and “the Second, which depends upon the First.” 295 
Further, there are two ways in which a cause is First: 1) absolutely, or 2) in its 
own Genus.296 That which is absolutely the first cause is that “on which all things 
depend; both when they are Made, Exist, and Operate…The Cause absolutely 
First is only One, to wit, God. For all things depend on God, both as to their 
Making, Being and Operating.”297 What Saint Paul says about our relation to God 
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can be said for all beings: “for in him we live, and move, and have our being.”298 
Yet, the proponents of the view that matter is not within Godʼs essence cannot 
rightly say that God is the first cause. For if it is said that the material world was 
created by God, but that God could not produce matter but only through his 
subsequent emanations, it follows that God is dependent upon his emanations.299 
And since this is the case, then the God that is not the material cause cannot be 
a first cause, for the first is that which depends upon none, as Burgersdijck has 
said. Therefore, it is Spinozaʼs God, and not the medievalsʼ God, who is an 
absolutely first cause, for he produces everything, including matter, by the 
necessity of his divine nature, depending on nothing else. 
 
 
 
XXVII. Principal Cause (5) 
 
In the Ethics, the next set of classifications of God as cause follows from his 
demonstration of Proposition XVII: “God acts from the laws of his nature alone, 
and is compelled by no one.”300 Since it is the case that from the necessity of the 
divine nature alone, absolutely infinite things follow (Proposition XVI), and 
nothing can be or be conceived without God (Proposition XV), there can be 
nothing outside of God that determines him to action. It follows from this that God 
acts from the laws of his nature alone, compelled by no one.301 The First 
Corollary of Proposition XVII tells us that it follows from this demonstration that 
“there is no cause, either extrinsically, or intrinsically, which prompts God to 
action, except the perfection of his nature.”302 This parallels Spinozaʼs statement 
in the Short Treatise that “God is a principal cause of the effects he has created 
immediately, such as motion in matter, etc., where there can be no place for the 
subsidiary cause, which is confined to particular things (as when God makes the 
sea dry by a strong wind,303 and similarly in all particular things in Nature).304 
Burgersdijck divided the efficient cause into the Principal and the less Principal. 
He describes a Principal as “that which produces the Effect by its own Virtue” 
and a Less Principal as that “which inserves the Principal towards its producing 
the Effect.” 305 A Principal Cause is said to be either equal to or nobler than the 
effect, but never more, whereas the less principal, insofar as it causes, is always 
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inferior to the effect. Thus, Burgersdijck says: “When we compare the Effect with 
the Cause we are to consider the Cause as it is such; that is, according to that 
Virtue by which it causes, when the Virtue of the Cause is such as that it contains 
in it, whatever is in the Effect, it is said to be a principal Cause.” 306 Since Godʼs 
action flows from his own nature, and is compelled by no cause, extrinsically, or 
intrinsically, it can be said that God is a principal cause. 
 
 
 
XXVIII. Free Cause (6) 
 
Spinozaʼs next classification of God as cause returns to his definitions of free and 
necessary, from which he now classifies God as a free cause. Definition VII 
states: “That thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its nature 
alone, and is determined to act by itself alone. But a thing is called necessary, or 
rather compelled, which is determined by another to exist and to produce an 
effect in a certain and determinate manner.”307 Wolfson has pointed out that the 
problem of freedom in medieval philosophy is sometimes alternatively called the 
problem of possibility.308 For example, the discussion of freedom in Crescas is 
stated as: “An exposition of the view of him who believes that the nature of 
possibility exists,” and, “An exposition of the view of him who believes that the 
nature of possibility does not exist.”309 Wolfson links this same way of addressing 
the problem in the Short Treatise, where Spinoza asks the question: “Whether 
there are any contingent things in Nature, viz. whether there are any things that 
can happen and also can not happen.”310 In the Cogitata Metaphysica, Spinoza 
distinguishes between possibility and contingency. He says that “a thing is called 
possible, then, when we understand its efficient cause, but do not know whether 
the cause is determined. So we can regard it as possible, but neither as 
necessary or as impossible.”311 On the other hand, “if…we attend to the essence 
of the thing alone, and not to its cause, we shall call it contingent.”312 He clarifies 
this by saying: “We shall consider it as midway between God and a chimaera, so 
to speak, because we find in it, on the part of its essence, neither any necessity 
of existing (as we do in the divine essence) nor any impossibility or inconsistency 
(as we do in a chimaera).”313 A thing is possible, then, when it is made necessary 
by a cause, and a thing is contingent when it is possible in consideration of its 
own essence, that is, its essence does not necessitate its existence nor does it 
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involve a contradiction.314 However, Spinoza does not think much about the 
distinction between these two terms, and says of those who would equate the 
two, that he “shall not contend with him…For I am not accustomed to dispute 
about words. It will suffice if he grants us that these two are nothing but a defect 
in our perception, and not anything real.”315 Thus, Wolfson is right when he says 
that Spinoza wishes to eliminate the idea that anything in nature is possible per 
se, for “everything which is possible per se is necessary in consideration of its 
cause.” 316 The term possible per se is merely a logical distinction, which 
represents no actual thing in nature. Hence, Spinoza says: “If he attends to 
nature and how it depends on God, he will find that there is nothing contingent in 
things, that is, nothing which, on the part of the thing, can either exist or not exist, 
or as is commonly said, be a real contingent.”317 Since this is the case, there are 
only two divisions of existing things: 1) that which is necessary by its cause, and 
2) that which is necessary by its own nature. Spinozaʼs definition of freedom, 
then, involves this distinction. Put simply, that which is necessary by its own 
nature is free and that which is necessary by its cause is compelled, or merely 
called necessary. This is why Spinoza says in the Short Treatise: “True freedom 
is nothing but [being] the first cause, which is not in any way constrained or 
necessitated by anything else, and only through its perfection is the cause of all 
perfection.”318 
According to Wolfson, there is a deeper criticism behind Spinozaʼs God as a 
free cause than what I have already said.319 This lies in the medieval conception 
of Godʼs causality as an act of will, power, or intelligence, typically used in 
connection with creation, which is found in Saadia, Maimonides, and Judah ha-
Levi. Maimonides holds that all three are identical in God.320 Maimonides admits 
that God cannot do the logically impossible, i.e., “produce a square with a 
diagonal equal to one of its sides, or a solid angle that includes four right 
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angles.”321 Further, he says, “it is impossible that God should produce a being 
like Himself, or annihilate, corporify, or change Himself,” and “the power of God is 
not assumed to extend to any of these impossibilities.”322 Yet, when the question 
is raised that “to say of God that He can produce a thing from nothing or reduce a 
thing to nothing is…the same as if we were to say that He could…produce a 
square the diagonal of which be equal to its side, or similar impossibilities,”323 
Maimonides answers the question of Creation by saying: “He willed it so; or His 
wisdom decided so.”324 Maimonides holds that “He…produced from nothing all 
existing things such as they are by His will and desire.”325 
In the previous Corollary to Proposition XVII, Spinoza had said “there is no 
cause, either extrinsically or intrinsically, which prompts God to action, except the 
perfection of his nature.” Spinoza is attempting to remove the notion of will and 
design from Godʼs causality, placing creation ex nihilo next to the other logical 
impossibilities. Maimonides holds that God is “perfect, incorporeal…above all 
kinds of deficiency.”326 Thus, God canʼt be said to have any kind of imperfection 
in his nature, including deficiencies in his will or intellect. Hence, Spinoza 
responds: “I know there are many who think they can demonstrate that a 
supreme intellect and free will belong to Godʼs nature. For they say they know 
nothing they can ascribe to God more perfect than what is the highest perfection 
in us.”327 
There is, however, a deeper criticism in Spinozaʼs scholium to Proposition 
XVII. Wolfson links Spinozaʼs criticism to the view held by Abraham Herrera, who 
had said that God as the first cause acts not from the necessity of His nature but 
by the counsel of His intellect and the choice of His free will. In the Kabbalah, the 
question had been raised whether God could create the infinite number of things 
in his intellect or whether his power of creation was limited to that which he has 
created?328 In response to this, Herrera makes the following two remarks: “If God 
had acted from His own nature and by necessity, He would have inevitably 
produced everything that is in His power, which would be infinite,” and “since God 
has created by will and design, He has purposely created only a part of that 
which is in His intellect, in order to be able to create other and more perfect 
things.”329 Herrera tells us that an infinite number of things have not been brought 
into existence because God does not act by the necessity of his infinite nature. 
Instead, it is because “He acts only by the freedom of His will and purpose…that 
He has brought into existence and created finite things” and “for every one of the 
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created things, however excellent it may be, He is able to produce something 
more excellent.”330 Spinoza certainly appears to be directly attacking this view 
when he says: 
 
Moreover, even if they conceive God to actually understand in the 
highest degree, they still do not believe that he can bring it about 
that all the things he actually understands exist. For they think that 
in that way they would destroy Godʼs power. If he had created all 
the things in his intellect (they say), then he would have been able 
to create nothing more, which they believe to be incompatible with 
Godʼs omnipotence. So they preferred to maintain that God is 
indifferent to all things, not creating anything except what he has 
decreed to create by some absolute will…Therefore to maintain that 
God is perfect, they are driven to maintain at the same time that he 
cannot bring about everything to which his power extends. I do not 
see what could be feigned which would be more absurd than this or 
more contrary to Godʼs omnipotence.331 
 
There is an explicit criticism of his opponents ascribing will and intellect to God as 
homonymous terms. Again, we find in Maimonides that there is only a 
resemblance between Godʼs knowledge and our knowledge in name, for his 
“essence is in no way like our essence” and people are misled by this 
homonymity because “only the words are the same, but the things designated by 
them are different; and therefore they came to the absurd conclusion that that 
which is required for our knowledge is also required for Godʼs knowledge.”332 Of 
Godʼs will, Maimonides also says: “The term ʻwillʼ is homonymously used of 
manʼs will and of the will of God, there being no comparison whatever between 
Godʼs will and that of man.”333 Spinoza characterizes what follows from this 
common view: 
 
If intellect and will do pertain to the eternal essence of God,334 we 
must of course understand by each of these attributes something 
different from what men commonly understand. For the intellect and 
will which would constitute Godʼs essence would have to differ 
entirely from out intellect and will, and could not agree with them in 
anything except in name. They would not agree with one another 
any more than do the dog that is a heavenly constellation and the 
dog that is a barking animal.335 
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As Wolfson notes, Spinoza likely means to convey “that since intellect and will 
are applied to God only homonymously, they are meaningless terms, and 
consequently Godʼs activity might as well be described as following form the 
necessity of His nature.”336 This is justified by Spinozaʼs statement on the same 
topic in his letter to Hugo Boxel: 
 
Since…it is commonly and unanimously admitted that Godʼs will is 
eternal and has never been indifferent, and therefore they must 
also necessarily grant (note this well) that the world is the 
necessary effect of the divine nature. Let them call it will, intellect, 
or any name they please, they will still in the end come to realise 
that they are expressing one and the same thing by different 
names. For if you ask them whether the divine will does not differ 
from the human will, they will reply that the former has nothing in 
common with the latter but the name; and furthermore they will 
mostly admit that Godʼs will, intellect, and essence or nature are 
one and the same thing.337 
 
In the Moreh Nebukim, Maimonides places both chance and necessity in 
opposition to creation as an act of Godʼs will. Those who follow Epicurus, says 
Maimonides, “believe that the existing state of things is the result of accidental 
combination and separation of the elements and that the Universe has no Ruler 
or Governor.”338 Hence, chance denies the existence of any cause in creation, for 
“there is none that rules or determines the order of the existing things.”339 
Maimonides places necessity in opposition to creation as an act of Godʼs will 
because he believes that God could have refrained from creating the world, or he 
could have designed it differently. It is still a common religious belief today that 
our existence is a gift of Godʼs will in a benevolent act of creation. However, 
Spinoza attempts to differentiate between chance and necessity, and in doing so, 
demonstrate that “if God is assumed to act by a will whose laws are unknown to 
us, His activity really amounts to chance.”340 In the same epistle to Hugo Boxel, 
Spinoza gives an account of his view on the question as to whether the world 
was made by chance:  
 
My answer is that, as it is certain that chance and necessity are two 
contrary terms, so it is also clear that he who affirms that the world 
is the necessary effect of the divine nature is also denying that the 
world was made by chance, whereas he who affirms that God could 
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have refrained from creating the world is declaring in an indirect 
way that it was made by chance, since it proceeded from an act of 
will which might not have been.341 
 
It might be objected, though, that Spinoza is making an equivocation and 
introducing some other definition of chance. However, the view that Spinoza is 
attacking can be located. Wolfson outlines three views from the Middle Ages that 
existed in regard to the relation of God to the world and Godʼs knowledge of the 
world.342 The first view is strikingly similar to the position Spinoza is attacking in 
the above passage, namely that God is the arbitrary creator of the world who, 
having created it, is the arbitrary ruler of it. Both the creation and governance of 
the world are considered as the exercise of two faculties in God, that is, his free 
will and power. These faculties are conceived after the manner of free will and 
power in man, though they are infinitely superior to those of man and absolutely 
arbitrary, as God is independent of any external conditions or circumstances. 
This view is described by Wolfson as “primarily the uncritical opinion of the 
common masses of believers.”343 He notes that this was presented as a 
philosophical system by a branch of the Moses Kalam, which is restated in 
Maimonides.344 
 
According to this view, Godʼs will and power are conceived as 
absolute, unlimited, and unchecked by any rule. Creation, as a free 
exercise of will and power, is furthermore a continuous act, and 
every event is a direct creation of God. Existence is a succession of 
specially created events. It is analogous to the theory of divine 
concurrence alluded to elsewhere by Spinoza,345 though, I must 
say, the two views are not necessarily identical, for the Kalam 
denies not only natural causality but also uniformity of action in 
nature, inasmuch as it assumes Godʼs will to be absolutely 
arbitrary, whereas divine concurrence does not necessarily assume 
Godʼs will to be absolutely arbitrary; it is rather an intelligent will; 
and hence, barring the possibility of miracles, divine concurrence 
does not deny uniformity of action in nature. Spinoza characterizes 
ass such views as views which make everything dependent upon 
chance, and deny natural causality altogether.346 
 
It is only fitting that Wolfson refers to Spinozaʼs epistle to Hugo Boxel at the end 
of this passage. In the second part of the Ethics, Spinoza also says: “By Godʼs 
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power ordinary people understand Godʼs free will and his right over all things 
which are, things which on that account are commonly considered to be 
contingent.”347 
Spinoza holds that the attribution of will to the essence of God is no different 
than explaining things by chance, which likewise implies a denial of causality. 
Hence, his statement: “Tell me, pray, whether you have seen or read any 
philosophers who have maintained that the world was made by chance, taking 
chance in the sense you give it, that God had a set aim in creating the world and 
yet departed from his resolve.”348 
 
 
 
XXIX. Immanent Cause (7) 
 
In the Short Treatise, Spinozaʼs acceptance of the principle of sufficient reason 
leads him to ask: “Whether there is any thing in Nature of which one cannot ask 
why it exists?”349 Spinoza mentions that in asking this we are also indicating 
through what cause a thing exists. Spinoza defines a cause as that which if it “did 
not exist, it would be impossible for this something to exist.”350 Note that Spinoza 
isnʼt imposing any arbitrary definition of a cause as his own. Consider Crescasʼ 
definition of cause: 
 
For by a cause is meant that the existence of which implies the 
existence of an effect and should the cause be conceived not to 
exist the effect could not be conceived to exist.351 
 
Spinozaʼs third and fourth axioms certainly echo this.352 That being said, Spinoza 
proceeds to discuss the nature of the cause: 
 
We must seek this cause, then, either in the thing or outside it. But 
if someone asks what rule we should follow in this investigation, we 
say it does not seem that any at all is necessary. For if existence 
belongs to the nature of the thing, then certainly we must not seek 
the cause outside it. But if existence does not belong to the nature 
of the thing, then we must always seek the cause outside it. And 
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since the former is only true of God, this shows (as we have already 
proven before) that God alone is the first cause of everything.353 
 
Spinoza states in Proposition XVIII: “God is the immanent,354 not the transitive,355 
cause of all things.”356 Burgersdijck divides the efficient cause into immanent and 
transient cause. He describes the immanent as “that which produces the Effect in 
its self,” 357 and the transient, “out of it self.” 358 In the Short Treatise, Spinoza 
says that God “is an immanent and not a transitive cause, since he does 
everything in himself, and not outside himself (because outside him there is 
nothing).”359 This is precisely how Spinoza demonstrates that God is the 
immanent cause of all things in the Ethics. For since it is the case that everything 
that is, is in God, and must be conceived through God (by Proposition XV), God 
must be the cause of all things which are in him (by Proposition XVI, Corol. I). 
That is, God is the efficient cause of all things which can fall under an infinite 
intellect. Further, there can be no substance, or thing in itself, which is outside 
God (by Proposition XIV). It follows, says Spinoza, that God “is the immanent, not 
the transitive cause of all things.”360 
Since this is the only time Spinoza uses the term immanent in the Ethics, it is 
necessary to look into Spinozaʼs other writings to give a thorough explanation of 
what it means to be an immanent cause. In a late epistle to Henry Oldenburg, 
Spinoza describes his conception of God as “far different from that which modern 
Christians are wont to uphold. For I maintain that God is the immanent cause, as 
the phrase is, of all things, and not the transitive cause.”361 He describes this 
view as the affirmation that all things “are in God and move in God.”362 More 
important is his reference in the Short Treatise to “an immanent or internal cause 
(which is all one, according to me)”363 Note that transcendent is not the same as 
transient, for Spinoza uses the term transcendens to mean logically greater or 
more general. 364 Thus, it is not a contradiction to say that God is a transcendent 
immanent cause. It is evident from all that has been said up to now that when 
Spinoza denies that God is a transitive cause of all things, he is denying that God 
is an external cause that is spatially separate from the world or that he is an 
immaterial cause separate from the world. When Spinoza says that God is an 
immanent cause, he is denying that God is an external and separable, hence 
immaterial, cause from the world. As Spinoza says in the Short Treatise, “the 
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effect of an internal cause remains united with its cause in such a way that it 
makes a whole with it.”365 
The meaning of Godʼs immanence, and his unity with all things, does not 
mean that God is in things as the soul is traditionally conceived to be in the body, 
but instead, as Wolfson interprets Spinoza, “all things are in God as the less 
universal is in the more universal or, to use Spinozaʼs own expression, as the 
parts are in the whole.”366 Although the universal does not exist separately from 
the particulars, it is not identical with them either. Hence, Wolfson says of God: 
“Being thus the immanent cause of all things in the sense that He is inseparable 
from them but still logically distinct from them, God may also be said to transcend 
them according to the old meaning of the term ʻtranscendence,ʼ namely, that of 
being logically distinct and more general.”367 
 
 
 
XXX. Proximate Cause (8) 
 
In the Short Treatise, Spinoza says: “God is the proximate cause of those things 
that are infinite and immutable, and which we say that he has created 
immediately; but he is, in a sense, the remote cause of all particular things.”368 
This corresponds to a passage in the Ethics, which is found in the Scholium of 
Proposition XXVIII: “God is absolutely the proximate cause of the things 
produced immediately by him, and not [a proximate cause] in his own kind, as 
they say. For Godʼs effects can neither be nor be conceived without their 
cause.”369 Spinoza says that this follows from Proposition XV. Burgersdijck had 
divided the efficient cause into the proxima (next) and the remote. The next, says 
Burgersdijck, “is that which produces the Effect immediately.” 370 The remote, on 
the other hand, is that “which produces the Effect by means of some more 
neighbouring Cause.”371 This is very obscure, and it is necessary to point out yet 
another passage in Spinoza to understand what he means by a proximate cause. 
In the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, Spinoza discusses the causal 
relations between singular, changeable things, and the fixed and eternal things. 
He points out that the essences of singular, changeable things are not derived 
from their series, that is, their order of existing, because this order is composed 
only of extrinsic denominations. This order is only circumstance, which tells us 
nothing of the “inmost essence of things.” This essence is to be found only in the 
fixed and eternal things, and the laws inscribed in them, which Spinoza calls their 
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“true codes,” from which singular things derive their order and coming to be. He 
continues:  
 
Indeed these singular, changeable things depend so intimately, and 
(so to speak) essentially, on the fixed things that they can neither 
be nor be conceived without them. So although these fixed and 
eternal things are singular, nevertheless, because of their presence 
everywhere, and most extensive power, they will be to us like 
universals, or genera of the definitions of singular, changeable 
things, and the proximate causes of all things.372 
 
Through a close reading of this passage, we can uncover what Spinoza means 
by classifying God as a proximate cause. It is obvious that when Spinoza says 
that the “singular, changeable things depend…essentially, on the fixed and 
eternal things” he means that the modes cannot be nor be conceived without 
God as the efficient cause, whose essence and existence are one and the same. 
When he says that the fixed and eternal things are the “genera of the definitions 
of singular, changeable things, and the proximate cause of all things” because of 
their “presence everywhere” and “extensive power,” he means that substance 
under one of its infinite attributes provides the first cause and universal genus for 
all finite things. The definition of a finite thing, then, gives us the proximate cause, 
which is the first cause as modified in a certain way in one of the attributes of 
substance. In the demonstration of Proposition XVI, Spinoza refers to an attribute 
of substance as a kind of genus: “Since the divine nature has absolutely infinite 
attributes, each of which also expresses an essence infinite in its own kind 
[genus], from its necessity there must follow infinitely many things in infinite 
modes.”373 Wolfson makes a controversial claim that substance has the 
character of a summum genus, and concludes that “Spinozaʼs substance is 
inconceivable, and its essence indefinable and hence unknowable.”374 This view 
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is clearly false, for Spinoza states in Proposition XLVII of the second part of the 
Ethics that we can have knowledge of Godʼs essence: “The human mind has an 
adequate knowledge of Godʼs eternal and infinite essence.”375 John Carriero 
criticizes Wolfson, and states that “what has the character of summa genera in 
Spinozaʼs metaphysics are the attributes of substance, and while it follows that 
attributes are undefinable (because they are not conceived through anything 
else), he does not regard them as unknowable.”376 This view is much more 
plausible, and fits in with Spinozaʼs reference to the attributes as infinite in their 
own genus. 
God is absolutely the proximate cause of things which are produced 
immediately by him, that is, the infinite modes that are the totality of modes within 
a certain attribute. These are infinite and immutable, unlike finite modes. It is only 
as a first cause that God is a proximate cause, for God depends on none, and 
embraces all possible genera, that is, his attributes. The unchanging laws cannot 
be conceived without their cause, which is God, and the finite modes which 
depend on these laws cannot be conceived without them. God is the proximate 
cause by immediately being the cause of these laws, or infinite and eternal 
modes. In a very loose sense, God is also a remote cause. For the effects of the 
infinite and eternal modes are finite modes, and hence God causes the finite 
modes through the “neighbouring cause” of the infinite modes. However, since 
everything is in God, he is not separate from his effects. What Spinoza means by 
infinite and finite modes will be explained in the section below on modes. 
 
 
 
XXXI. Duration and Time 
 
Spinoza describes duration as “an attribute under which we conceive the 
existence of created things insofar as they persevere in their actuality.”377 
Similarly, Descartes says: “We should regard the duration of a thing simply as a 
mode under which we conceive the thing in so far as it continues to exist.”378 
There are, however, three differences between Descartesʼ and Spinozaʼs 
definitions: 1) Descartes calls duration a mode, and Spinoza calls it an attribute. 
2) Descartes only says in so far as it perseveres to exist, whereas Spinoza uses 
first the term existence like Descartes, but then adds the term actuality in the 
                                                                                                                                            
which is the universe—(not necessarily excluding its being immanent, too). And yet, contrariwise, 
Spinoza maintained, differing from both Descartes and Maimonides, that ʻthe human mind 
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statement insofar as they persevere in their actuality. 3) Descartes simply says 
thing, whereas Spinoza speaks of created things. 
Wolfson argues that Spinozaʼs move to holding that duration is an attribute, 
rather than a mode, was at the suggestion of Descartes himself, even though in 
Descartesʼ formal definition, he refers to duration as a mode. Descartes says: 
“And even in the case of created things, that which always remains unmodified—
for example existence or duration in a thing which exists and endures—should be 
called not a quality or mode but an attribute.”379 Spinoza uses the term attribute 
here in a loose sense of thinking in a general way of what is in a substance. 
There is great importance in the term existence used here. Spinozaʼs addition 
of the term actuality in his explanation of existence emphasizes that it is 
existence rather than motion that is required for the conception of duration. 
Again, Descartes says: “For the duration which we understand to be involved in 
movement is certainly no different from the duration involved in things which do 
not move.”380 It also emphasizes that there is no duration in beings which have 
no existence (fictitious beings, beings of reason). To be clear in his statement, 
when Spinoza adds existence “insofar as they persevere in their actuality,” this 
means that existence must be an actual existence and not one which is only in 
thought. 
Spinoza again pushes this idea that duration requires an actually existent 
object when he says that: “Duration is an affection of existence, not of the 
essence of things.”381 By essence, Spinoza is referring to the concept of a thing 
which may or may not have existence outside of our mind, i.e., chimeras. Later, 
when Spinoza discusses creation, the point that duration depends upon actually 
existent things is expressed more clearly: “We can imagine neither time nor 
duration before creation, but these latter have begun with things…Wherefore, 
duration presupposes, or at least, supposes created things.”382 As Spinoza 
clearly points out, his usage of the term creation is not the traditional coming into 
being out of nothing that we are still so familiar with. Spinozaʼs idea of the 
existence of created things only means that things conceived as having duration 
must have their existence dependent upon a cause, and whether they had a 
beginning in time or not makes no difference. Spinoza has already said that 
duration is to be attributed to things only in so far as their “essence is conceived 
clearly without any existence.”383 
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Wolfson raises the question whether existence and duration are identical. He 
points out that the scholastics held three different positions in answering this 
question: 1) duration and existence differ from each other in re and realiter, 
meaning that they are separable and each can be conceived without the other. 2) 
the difference between them is a modal difference, like that which exists between 
a substance and a mode or between two modes (Bonaventure, Bañez, and other 
Thomists), 3) duration and existence are inseparable though distinct, with the 
distinction being one of reason (Ockham, Scotus, Biel, Suarez). Descartes also 
describes these three distinctions in his Principles of Philosophy.384 Spinoza 
clearly accepts the third position. Descartesʼ definition of a conceptual distinction 
(a distinction of reason) is: “a distinction between a substance and some attribute 
of that substance without which the substance is unintelligible.”385 Descartes 
goes on to say that: “since a substance cannot cease to endure without also 
ceasing to be, the distinction between a substance and its duration is merely a 
conceptual one.”386 Spinozaʼs reasoning seems to strikingly similar, when he 
says: “It clearly follows that duration is only distinguished by reason from the 
whole existence of a thing. For as you take duration away from the thing, you 
take away just as much of its existence.”387 
Next Spinoza says that we can take the duration of a thing, “but to determine 
this duration, we compare it to the duration of other things which have a certain 
and determinate motion. This comparison is called time.”388 Spinoza gives a 
similar definition of time in the Ethics: “Nobody doubts that time, too, is a product 
of the imagination, and arises from the fact that we see some bodies move more 
slowly than others, or more quickly, or with equal speed.”389 This is again found in 
Descartes, where in the Principles he states: “But in order to measure the 
duration of all things, we compare their duration with the duration of the greatest 
and most regular motions which give rise to years and days, and we call this 
duration ʻtime.ʼ”390 Spinoza thus ends up drawing the same conclusion as 
Descartes, that time adds nothing to duration, but is a being of reason: “Yet 
nothing is thereby added to duration, taken in its general sense, except for a 
mode of thought,”391 and “Time, therefore, is not an affection of things, but only a 
mere mode of thinking, or, as we have already said, a being of reason. For it is a 
mode of thinking that serves to explain duration.”392 Duration is a mode of 
existence, and time is a mode of duration. 
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The same account of time that is found in the Cogitata Metaphysica is also 
found in Epistle XII, though Spinoza uses the term modes as equivalent to 
created things. These terms refer to those things whose essence does not 
necessarily involve existence.393 He thus describes duration as that by means of 
which we can only explain the existence of modes. From the fact that we can 
ʻdetermineʼ duration, time arises for the purpose of doing so. To Spinoza, time is 
merely a mode of thinking, but it is specifically a mode of imagining.394 The point 
of these statements is to emphasize that time is not something in the things 
outside of us, but it is only existent in the imagination, which is not a real 
existence. 
To sum up Spinozaʼs account of duration, there are two characteristics he 
gives it: 
 
1) The existence of an object conceived under the attribute of duration must 
be only a possible existence, which depends on God as an efficient 
cause.395 This differentiates duration from eternity. 
2) Duration is to be conceived as unlimited, unmeasured, and undetermined. 
This differentiates duration from time. 
 
As a final point on duration, he defines it as the “indefinite continuance of 
existing.”396 His description of duration as indefinite fits perfectly with the twofold 
characteristics of duration outlined above. 
Next, to sum up his account of time, we note that it has no essential 
difference from duration, though it is merely a limited portion of duration. We saw 
that Spinoza speaks of duration as indefinite time, whereas he will later contrast 
this with definite time.397 He also refers to time as “determinable duration”398 and 
thus he sometimes says “duration or time”399 as if the two terms mean the same 
to Spinoza. 
 
 
 
XXXII. Eternity 
 
Moving on to the definition of eternity, it should be noted that the notion of 
eternity had a special role throughout the entire medieval period, as God was 
always considered under some aspect of eternity.400 The duality of meanings for 
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eternity are simply: 1) exclusion of time, and 2) infinite time. In the medieval 
Jewish philosophy that Spinoza was brought up under, the passage in the book 
of Isaiah 44:6 was of specific importance in relation to Godʼs eternity, and was a 
popular passage for interpretation. This passage reads that God is the first and 
the last. Maimonides said that this is simply a negation of Godʼs having been 
created, and Crescas follows him in this.401 Judah ha-Levi said that this is a 
negation of Godʼs having been preceded by anything (first), and of His ever 
coming to an end (last). Similarly, this has a specific relation to the idea of 
eternity being identified with immovability and immutability. God was immovable, 
is immovable, and will be immutable. Joseph Albo said that these terms simply 
mean that God has absolute independence of any temporal relations, and 
eternity as applies to God excludes duration (and time). Spinoza was familiar with 
all of these views, and it is noticeable that he placed specific attention on Alboʼs 
conclusion that God alone has necessary existence by his own nature, as 
compared with all other things, which have only possible existence. 
The conclusion reached by Albo is of importance to us because this simply 
means that in God his essence and his existence are identical, which is 
Spinozaʼs basis for Godʼs existence.402 From this basis, Albo then says that 
eternity is to be defined as identity, uniformity, and immutability. So a notion of 
eternity in this sense must involve necessary existence, but what else? Eternity is 
a permanence (the ever-fixed) while time is a constant change or motion (the 
never-fixed). Thus, time, even if conceived as an infinite time is of a different 
meaning than eternity, since even an infinite time is not a permanence. We can 
conclude from this that for Spinoza eternity can not simply be taken to mean an 
endless time. Eternity is what differentiates God (the whole) from other beings 
(the parts). Spinoza expresses this view in his explanation of the definition of 
eternity403 when he says that eternity canʼt be explained by duration and time, 
even if they are conceived without beginning or end. This marks the erroneous 
usage of the term eternity, as it is still used today when describing the ʻeternity of 
the worldʼ as meaning eternal duration in time. In the Cogitata Metaphysica,404 
Spinoza describes two defective uses of the term eternity:  
 
1) When we say that the world has existed from eternity. 
                                                                                                                                            
beginningless) and the world of sense (which has a beginning in creation). This constitutes one 
definition of eternity as the antithesis of time, and the complete exclusion of any kind of temporal 
relations. The other definition is found in Aristotle, where eternity simply means an endless time, 
but not necessarily the exclusion of temporal relations. The Platonic conception of eternity 
involves a permanence, unity, immutability, and indivisibility. “Time is the moving image of 
eternity.” (Timaeus 37d) 
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2) When we say things which do not exist are eternal, i.e. the pure essence 
of a thing. 
 
What Spinoza means by the second defective use is that when Descartes refers 
to axioms as eternal truths,405 this is not sufficient to be eternal in the same 
sense that God is. For, while eternal truths may be unchanging, which satisfies 
one aspect of eternity, they are not existence which necessarily follows from its 
own nature, essence involving existence. Eternity is only applicable to what 
Spinoza calls “real beings”, and only to the first being, who is causeless and 
infinite as undetermined. It is no surprise that later, when Spinoza outlines the 
three kinds of knowledge, or ways in which the existence of a thing may be 
known: 1) the way of perception, 2) the way of reason, 3) the way of intuition; it is 
only the latter kind of knowledge that is able to arrive at the existence of God as 
the only true eternal being. Spinoza thus says in Proposition XIX: “God is eternal, 
or all of Godʼs attributes are eternal.”406 Since Godʼs essence and existence are 
one and the same, Godʼs attributes are immutable.407 
 
 
 
XXXIII. Modes 
 
The next step in Spinozaʼs metaphysics is to explain how the modes follow from 
substance.408 I will begin with the preliminary question: why must substance 
produce modes at all? Spinoza gives a thorough answer to this in Proposition 
XVI, which we have already discussed in the section on God as the universal 
cause. In this proposition, Spinoza tells us that from the necessity of the divine 
nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many modes. Spinoza 
holds it to be evident that the greater something is, or, the more essence 
something has, the greater the number of properties which follow from its 
essence. Only a finite number of properties can follow from a finite essence. 
Since Godʼs essence is the greatest, the greatest number of properties must 
necessarily follow from his essence. This is why Spinoza says that infinitely many 
modes follow from Godʼs essence, since his essence is infinite. His argument is 
given as follows: 
 
This Proposition must be plain to anyone, provided he attends to 
the fact that the intellect infers from the given definition of any thing 
a number of properties that really do follow necessarily from it (i.e., 
from the very essence of the thing); and that it infers more 
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properties the more the definition of the thing expresses reality, i.e., 
the more reality the essence of the defined thing involves. But since 
the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by Def. VI), each 
of which also expresses an essence infinite in its own kind, from its 
necessity there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many 
modes (i.e., everything which can fall under an infinite intellect), 
q.e.d.409 
 
Spinoza endorses a principle of ontological plenitude,410 according to which the 
maximal number of compossible objects actually exists.411 I think Samuel 
Newlands is absolutely correct when he says that Spinozaʼs motivation for the 
principle of ontological plenitude derives from the principle of sufficient reason 
itself, “since if the actual world were sub-maximal, non-existing but intrinsically 
possible, objects would have no reason for not existing, a brute fact.”412 It simply 
follows from the principle of sufficient reason that if there is any “ontological 
space to be filled, it must be filled.”413 The medieval appeals to the will of God414 
arenʼt a sufficient explanation, for “it canʼt simply be that God decided, ab initio415 
and without further explanation, to make a less than full world.”416 Spinozaʼs 
world is the best of all possible worlds, not merely because it is the only possible 
world, but because it is a world that lacks nothing, since it encompasses the 
fullness of Being. 
 
 
 
XXXIV. Immediate Infinite Modes 
 
For Spinoza, the modes have different relations to substance. The modes which 
follow directly from substance are the immediate infinite modes,417 and the 
modes which follow directly from the immediate infinite modes are the mediate 
infinite modes.418 The finite modes, on the other hand, do not follow directly from 
substance. The infinite immediate modes are those “fixed and eternal things,” 
following directly from Godʼs nature, that are the “proximate causes of all 
things.”419 Spinoza is clearly describing the immediate infinite modes when he 
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says that “God is the proximate cause of those things that are infinite and 
immutable, and which we say that he has created immediately.”420 The 
immediate infinite modes are what Spinoza calls Natura naturata. In the Short 
Treatise, he tells us that motion is the immediate infinite mode of extension, and 
intellect, the immediate infinite mode of thought: 
 
Turning now to universal Natura naturata, or those modes or 
creatures which immediately depend on, or have been created by 
God—we know only two of these: Motion in matter, and Intellect in 
the thinking thing. We say, then, that these have been from all 
eternity, and will remain to all eternity, immutable, a work truly as 
great as the greatness of the workman.421 
 
While Spinoza holds that motion is an essential aspect of extension, it is a 
controversial topic in interpretation. In that same chapter in the Short Treatise, 
Spinoza says of motion that “it belongs more properly to a treatise on Natural 
science than here.”422 A mysterious footnote423 indicates that Spinoza wished to 
revise his account of motion. Near the end of Spinoza life, Tschirnhaus requested 
a clarification of motion. His epistle reads: “If time and opportunity permit, I 
humbly beg you to let me have the true definition of motion, together with its 
explanation.”424 Unfortunately, Spinozaʼs reply isnʼt helpful: “As for your other 
questions, namely, concerning motion, and those which concern method, since 
my views on these are not written out in due order, I reserve them for another 
occasion.”425 These are Spinozaʼs words just over two years before his death, 
and during that time, his health seriously declined due to either tuberculosis or 
silicosis. 
While it may be the case that Spinoza never revised his views on motion, he 
holds that under the attribute of extension, “motion and rest”426 is the immediate 
infinite mode. We might take this to mean that mobility is entailed by the nature of 
extension, and thus extended things are necessarily mobile. But this is a weaker 
version than Spinozaʼs statement in the Short Treatise that motion itself is the 
infinite immediate mode of extension.427 This means that motion-and-rest follow 
from the nature of extension. When Spinoza discusses the nature of extension in 
the second part of the Ethics, he asserts that from the fact that “all bodies agree 
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in certain things,”428 by which he means that they “involve the concept of one and 
the same attribute”429 it follows that “now they move, now they are at rest.”430 
This is quite the opposite of the Cartesian account of motion. For Descartes 
had said that it is the case that extension can be put into motion, motion itself 
doesnʼt follow from the nature of extension. An external source is needed to put 
extension into motion, which is why Descartes says that “God is the primary 
cause of motion; and he always preserves the same quantity of motion in the 
universe.”431 Spinoza is quite aware of his departure from Descartes,432 for he 
holds that extension is the cause of motion. To support this view, we must 
consider what Spinoza calls Natura naturans. In the Short Treatise, he says: 
 
By Natura naturans we understand a being that we conceive clearly 
and distinctly through itself, without needing anything other than 
itself (like all the attributes which we have so far described), i.e., 
God. The Thomists have also understood God by this phrase, but 
their Natura naturans was a being (as they called it) beyond all 
substances.433 
 
In the Ethics he describes Natura naturans as “what is in itself and conceived 
through itself, or such attributes of substance as express an eternal and infinite 
essence, i.e. God, insofar as he is considered as a free cause.”434 Recall, that a 
free cause is that which is determined to act by itself alone, and exists from the 
necessity of its nature alone.435 Substance as Natura naturans has an intrinsic 
active power. This position is justified by Proposition XXXIV, where Spinoza 
claims that Godʼs power is his essence itself: “For from the necessity alone of 
Godʼs essence it follows that God is the cause of himself and of all things. 
Therefore, Godʼs power, by which he and all things are and act, is his essence 
itself.”436 Spinozaʼs God is substance and isnʼt an efficient cause external to finite 
substance, as Descartes held. Since the attributes constitute Godʼs essence, 
Godʼs power to act belongs to substance and the attributes. In the attribute of 
extension, Godʼs power is expressed immediately as motion. 437 
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XXXV. Joachim on Motion in Spinozaʼs System 
 
As Joachim notes, Spinozaʼs theory of the intelligible structure and constitution of 
the physical world, and its derivation from the attribute of extension was never set 
out “systematically and in final form.”438 The significance of what Spinoza has to 
say on this is, says Joachim, is made sufficiently clear by comparing and 
contrasting it with the Cartesian theory. According to Descartes, God created 
matter as something extended in three dimensions. At the same time God 
created, and implanted in matter, a definite quantity of motion-and-rest, which is 
maintained per solum suum concursum ordinarium.439 For Descartes, since the 
physical world is nothing but three-dimensional space, which is substantiated into 
matter, and divided and articulated by motion, it must be, says Joachim, 
explained in accordance with the principles of geometry and kinetics. It is 
impossible for this to be the case for Spinoza, for there is only one substance. No 
constituent part of matter is substantial in the way Descartes holds that it is, nor 
is matter as a whole. For Spinoza, there is no inert matter. The substance 
underlying extension is “God or Nature—i.e., the Absolute Individual which 
eternally creates and, in creating, sustains the created as modes or affections of 
itself.”440 According to Joachim, Descartesʼ assumption of a physical substratum 
compelled him to invoke a separate creative act to introduce motion into matter 
ab extra to overcome the inherent inertia of the supposed corporeal substance. 
Thus, Spinozaʼs correction of the Cartesian conception of matter leads him to 
also correct the Cartesian conception of motion.441 
Both Spinoza and Descartes hold that the total quantity of motion-and-rest in 
the physical world is eternally the same. The infinite and eternal mode, what 
Joachim calls “the eternal constant,”442 flows inevitably as the immediate intrinsic 
effect of the attribute of extension.443 From the deduction in the eternal descent of 
modes which it exhibits, the first and ʻmost immediateʼ mode is motion-and-rest, 
which Spinoza describes in the second appendix of the Short Treatise as “that 
                                                
438 Joachim, Spinozaʼs Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione: A Commentary, 67. 
439 “Merely by his regular concurrence.” Descartes, Principles, II, 36. CSM I.240. 
440 Joachim, Spinozaʼs Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione: A Commentary, 68. Note that the 
usage of the term created here is used in the same sense as above, pg. ? 
441 More particularly, Joachim argues that Spinoza “assigns to motion a different and more 
fundamental role than Descartes had given to it in the constitution of the physical world and its 
contents.” Cf. Epistle LXXXI, LXXXIII. 
442 Joachim, Spinozaʼs Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione: A Commentary, 68. 
443 Joachim explains how knowledge fits into this picture: “The clear and adequate knowledge, 
which we have or can obtain of the physical world, would, therefore, in Spinozaʼs view, take the 
form of a systematic philosophical (i.e., ʻmathematicalʼ) ʻdeductionʼ. Starting from the intuitive 
conception of Natura Naturans qua extension, the deductive movement would proceed to 
demonstrate the necessary logical sequence of stage after stage in its eternal self-fulfillment—in 
its self-explication, or self-evolution, as Natura Naturata qua extended. In the end, therefore, the 
deductive movement would reach and comprehend the ultimate individuations of substance under 
the attribute of extension—i.e., the finite eternal modes, which are the ʻessencesʼ of the 
perceptible or phenomenal bodies, would be ʻdeducedʼ and known in their mutual relations and in 
their derivation from, and dependence upon, the First Cause.” Ibid., 68. 
  81 
which, in order to exist, needs no other mode in the same attribute.”444 Joachim 
states:  
 
Spinoza conceived it both as the eternally constant whole, and as 
the originative source, of all movements and rests in the physical 
world. It is the whole, of which they are all parts; the universal, of 
which they are the dependent and derivative particulars. And, being 
thus a genuine or concrete universal (prior to, and the system of, its 
particulars), it is—Spinoza maintains—a genuine, eternal, singular 
or individual.445 
 
Motion-and-rest is what Spinoza describes in the Tractatus de Intellectus 
Emendatione as one of the fixed and eternal things.446 Using Aristotelian 
terminology, Joachim tells us that motion-and-rest us first in the modal system of 
extension both really and logically, for “it must be if anything is to be, and it must 
be known if anything is to be known, in the physical world.”447 There are a 
number of objections that have been raised against Spinozaʼs theory of motion-
and rest,448 but a full discussion of these would be a large digression away from 
Spinozaʼs metaphysics into Spinozaʼs physics. Now that I have presented the 
objections, I pass them on. Joachim concludes his account of Spinozaʼs account 
of motion-and-rest with some further difficulties: 
 
In Spinozaʼs theory of the physical world, then, motion (i.e., ʻmotion-
and-restʼ) is fundamental and primary—not, as in the Cartesian 
doctrine, co-ordinate with, or secondary to, matter or mass. He 
seems in fact to be feeling after—to have projected and in part to 
have worked out—a physics, or philosophy, of the corporeal world, 
which would reduce everything to, and explain everything in terms 
of, motion-and-rest, including matter or mass or mathematical 
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solidity itself.449 And yet, if this was indeed the main trend of 
Spinozaʼs thought, he never entirely freed himself from 
reminiscences of the Cartesian doctrine. Throughout his writings, 
the conception of matter or body or three-dimensional extension 
(Quantitas) survives, quite inconsistently, side by side, with the 
conception of motion-and-rest. It is not merely that the modes of 
extension are constantly referred to as ʻbodies,ʼ or that Spinoza 
speaks, e.g., of this or that body ʻbeing in,ʼ or ʻhaving and 
maintaining,ʼ its proportion of motion to rest.450 Such language is 
natural and could be justified on the grounds of convenience and 
clarity of exposition. But Spinoza, in spite of his criticism of 
Descartes, still thinks of the intelligible structure of the physical 
world as woven (so to speak) out of two distinct sets of principles—
the laws of extension and the laws of motion; and even in the Ethics 
he still appears to postulate certain minimal corpuscles, certain 
atomic solids, as the bearers of, and not themselves reducible to, 
motion and rest.451 
 
 
 
XXXVI. Wolf on the Dynamic Character of Reality and Motion 
 
Abraham Wolf draws attention to Spinozaʼs dynamic character of the universe, 
which is made evident when his conception of extension is compared with the 
Cartesian theory. It is a common assumption, says Wolf, that because both 
Descartes and Spinoza both use the same term, extension, that they both mean 
the same thing. Wolf stresses that this is a grave mistake. On the Cartesian 
conception, matter is nothing else but extension, and it is by nature inert. The 
result of this view is that Descartes had to invoke a deus ex machina in order to 
create matter, to maintain its existence, to impart motion-and-rest to it, and to 
keep the quantity of motion-and-rest constant. “Altogether, the Cartesian 
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philosophy not only treats God like an outsider, but works Him terribly hard in 
keeping this sorry scheme of things together.”452 
Spinozaʼs universe is one which is self-sufficient, autonomous, perfectly 
rational, free from external interference, and free from arbitrariness or caprice.453 
Spinoza is thus strongly opposed to the Cartesian theory of matter as merely 
extension and inert, for the physical universe could not be the result of such a 
conception of matter. In Spinozaʼs correspondence, Tschirnhaus reminded him 
that Descartes maintained that he could not deduce the variety of things from 
ʻExtensionʼ “in any other way than by supposing that this was an effect produced 
in Extension by motion started by God.”454 But it is this assumption of miracles 
that Spinoza views as unphilosophical. According to Wolf, Spinoza has a 
dynamic conception of matter, a kind of: 
 
Physical Energy, which expresses itself in the infinite mode of 
motion and rest, which consequently need not be introduced 
miraculously from outside the material world…the dynamic 
interpretation of extension makes the relation of motion and rest (or 
energy of motion and energy of position) to extension 
intelligible…For how can motion be logically derived from 
extension? Motion implies extension; but extension does not imply 
motion. If therefore, Spinoza admitted only logico-mathematical 
relations, then motion should have been the attribute and extension 
itʼs mode…what he did say, already in the Short Treatise, was that 
extension is ʻthe power to produceʼ motion and rest (or kinetic and 
potential energy, as we might say).455 
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The problem of motion is one that a mind can easily get lost in, but what is 
evident is that Spinoza is not thinking of extension as Descartes had defined it. 
Spinoza clearly states in his epistle to Tschirnhaus that Descartes has a faulty 
definition of matter: 
 
With regard to your question as to whether the variety of things can 
be demonstrated a priori solely from the conception of Extension, I 
think I have already made it quite clear that this is impossible. That 
is why Descartes is wrong in defining matter through extension; it 
must necessarily be explicated through an attribute which 
expresses eternal and infinite essence.456 
 
What can be said is that Spinoza believes that a reasonable notion of matter and 
extension must be a notion of dynamic matter and extension. Dynamism in the 
extended realm is understood in terms of motion-and-rest such that motion and 
rest are ways (or modes) of being dynamically extended. In the mental realm, this 
same dynamism is reflected in representation and volition. In the end, this leaves 
little difference between extension and motion-and-rest.457 
 
 
 
XXXVII. The Absolutely Infinite Intellect 
 
Conversely, the immediate infinite mode of thought is what Spinoza calls in 
Epistle LXIV the “absolutely infinite intellect.”458 By this he means Godʼs actual 
thinking of everything. Steven Nadler interprets the absolutely infinite intellect as 
“the infinite and eternal set of adequate ideas composing Godʼs intellect. It is, in 
essence, a perfect knowledge of everything.”459 This is a very fruitful 
interpretation, considering what Spinoza says of the mode of thought which 
immediately depends on God in his discussion of Natura naturata in the Short 
Treatise: “As for Intellect in the thinking thing, this too is a Son, product or 
immediate creature of God, also created by him from all eternity, and remaining 
immutable to all eternity. Its sole property is to understand everything clearly and 
distinctly at all times.”460 Further, Spinoza calls this infinite immediate mode in 
Proposition XXI “Godʼs idea”461 and in one of the last propositions of the Ethics, 
Spinoza identifies “Godʼs eternal and infinite intellect”462 as a collection of eternal 
minds or ideas. This justifies Nadlerʼs claim that “the absolutely infinite intellect is 
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a collection of ideas constituted by Godʼs infinite thinking of the eternal essences 
of things.”463 
 
 
 
XXXVIII. Mediate Infinite Modes 
 
The mediate infinite modes are even more obscure. In Proposition XXII, Spinoza 
describes these modes by stating that these modes do not follow directly from 
the divine nature, but from “some attribute of God insofar as it is modified by a 
modification which, through the same attribute, exists necessarily and is 
infinite.”464 What is even more daunting for interpreters of Spinoza is the fact that 
he doesnʼt indicate what the mediate infinite modes of extension and thought are. 
We are all indebted to Tschirnhaus for asking Spinoza to clarify what these 
modes are, through his friend Georg Schuller. Spinoza was pressed to “have 
examples of those things produced by the mediation of some infinite 
modification.”465 While Spinoza had provided Tschirnhaus with the examples of 
the immediate infinite modes: motion-and-rest in extension, and the absolutely 
infinite intellect in thought, he only provides one example of a mediate infinite 
mode: facies totius universi.466 The facies totius universi, varies in infinite ways, 
yet always remains the same. Spinoza references the Scholium to Lemma VII in 
the second part of the Ethics, from which we can infer that the facies totius 
universi is likely an example of extension, since Spinoza does not directly tell us 
which attribute it belongs to. 
What exactly Spinoza means by facies totius universi is a controversial 
interpretive issue. Martial Gueroult seems to interpret this as the totality of all 
existing material things, the infinite and eternal series of the existing finite modes 
of extension. This is “the series of existing bodies that durationally realize the 
eternal essences of bodies that, as we saw, can be regarded as the contents of 
the immediate infinite mode in Extension.”467 On this view, which is expanded 
upon by Steven Nadler, the facies totius universi is the entirety of the contents of 
the physical universe, “all particular bodies and all their relations throughout all 
time—considered as an eternal, infinite set and as an individual in its own 
right.”468 This is what Spinoza means when he replies to Schuller and 
Tschirnhaus, that the facies totius universi, “although varying in infinite ways, yet 
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remains always the same.”469 On this account, the overall proportion of motion-
and-rest is always the same among the variations of “ever-changing material 
things.”470 The reference Spinoza gives to Schuller and Tschirnhaus from the 
second part of the Ethics discusses “how a composite Individual can be affected 
in many ways, and still preserve its nature.”471 A particular body which is 
composed of simpler parts preserves its identity “because its component parts 
nonetheless maintain a particular ratio of motion and rest among themselves.”472 
Spinoza was very aware of the Cartesian principle of the preservation of the 
proportion of motion-and-rest in the universe. Thus, Nadler says that by 
“proceeding upwards, through more composite individuals made up of such 
composite bodies, and so on, one finally reaches the material universe itself as 
the ultimate composite individual.”473 This is supported by Spinozaʼs statement of 
macrocosm and microcosm: “We shall easily conceive that the whole of nature is 
one Individual, whose parts, i.e., all bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any 
change of the whole Individual.”474 
There is a long history in philosophy of this conception of man as a small 
universe. Plato, in the Timaeus, describes the universe as a resembling “more 
closely than anything else that Living Thing of which all other living things are 
parts”475 and as a “single visible living thing, which contains within itself all the 
living things whose nature it is to share its kind.”476 Later in the Timaeus, he 
describes the structure of man as an imitation of the spherical form of the 
cosmos: “Copying the revolving shape of the universe, the gods bound the two 
divine orbits into a ball-shaped body, the part that we now call our head. This is 
the most divine part of us, and master of all our other parts.”477 In the Physics, 
Aristotle refers to animal life as a “small world.”478 The analogy of man as a small 
universe and the universe as a great man appears in Judah ha-Levi479 and 
Maimonides.480 While Spinoza follows these men in singling out man, his 
motivation differs from theirs, for he does not believe that man holds a special 
place in the universe. Wolfson describes Spinozaʼs position adequately, when he 
says: “In singling out man from the innumerable particular things in nature, 
Spinoza was not motivated by the belief that man occupies a place which is 
unique in nature, but rather was he motivated by the belief that man is a part of 
nature and that he epitomizes in himself, as it were, the whole of nature.”481 
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On Spinozaʼs view the whole of physical nature follows from the attribute of 
extension combined with the immediate infinite mode of motion-and-rest. As 
Nadler puts it, “take matter, add motion, and you get a world of particular 
individuals.”482 Thus, Nadlerʼs interpretation answers the problem of change in 
Spinoza, that is, the question of how it is that change exists in the modes while 
substance and its attributes are unchanging. While change exists on the level of 
particular physical individuals, the physical universe itself as the overall 
proportion of motion-and-rest is eternal and immutable. Thus, an infinite mode is 
also eternal and immutable. 
But how, one might wonder, do the infinite modes exist of necessity? Spinoza 
tells us that anything which follows from something that exists of necessity, 
necessarily exists itself.483 Since the immediate infinite modes follow from God, 
who necessarily exists, they exist of absolute necessity.484 Further, the mediate 
infinite modes must exist of absolute necessity, since they follow from the 
immediate infinite modes. Thus, Spinoza says in the demonstration of 
Proposition XXIII: 
 
Therefore, the mode, which exists necessarily and is infinite, has 
had to follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of God—
either immediately (see Proposition XXI) or by some mediating 
modification, which follows from its absolute nature, i.e. (by 
Proposition XXII), which exists necessarily and is infinite.485 
 
It is evident from this how Spinoza conceives of both kinds of infinite modes as 
necessary. Godʼs essence immediately gives rise to certain aspects of the world. 
Each of the infinite immediate modes is infinite through its cause, and has an 
infinity of parts that are inseparable. The mediate infinite mode encompasses all 
of the relations of motion-and-rest in extension and of the ideas in the realm of 
thought. Spinoza accounts for the rise of finite things by interposing infinite 
modes between God and finite modes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
482 Nadler, Spinozaʼs Ethics: An Introduction, 96. 
483 Ethics, I, Proposition XXI: “All the things which follow from the absolute nature of any of Godʼs 
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XXXIX. Finite Modes and Acosmism 
 
The last thing to account for in the realm of modes is the particular existents, the 
modes which are “determined by another to exist and to produce an effect in a 
certain and determinate manner.”486 While these finite modes follow from the 
infinite modes, there is yet another distinction. Finite modes include the individual 
eternal essences of particular things, found in the immediate infinite modes, and 
the actually existing particular things that instantiate those essences in time, 
found within the mediate infinite modes.487 
God is the efficient cause of all things, as we have said. Spinoza reminds us 
of this in Proposition XXV: “God is the efficient cause, not only of the existence of 
things, but also of their essence.”488 For, as Spinoza tells us, “if you deny this, 
then God is not the cause of the essence of things; and so (by Axiom IV) the 
essence of things can be conceived without God. But (by Proposition XV) this is 
absurd. Therefore God is also the cause of the essence of things.”489 It is this fact 
that brings to light the importance of God as an immanent cause. As we have 
seen, Spinoza demonstrates in Proposition XV that whatever is, is in God, and 
nothing can be or be conceived without God. It follows from this that “particular 
things are nothing but affections of Godʼs attributes, or modes by which Godʼs 
attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way.”490 Thus, the finite 
modes of the attribute of extension are particular bodies, and the finite modes of 
the attribute of thought are particular ideas or minds. It is the immanence of 
Godʼs causality that defines modes, for there is nothing outside of God, and 
everything that exists, must be in God. Nothing in Nature can be separated from 
its causal system, not even man. This is why Gilles Deleuze declares: 
 
A finite mode cannot be separated: 1. by its essence, from the 
infinity of other essences that all agree with one another in the 
infinite immediate mode; 2. by its existence, from the infinity of 
other existing modes that are causes of it under different relations 
implied in the mediate infinite mode; 3. or finally, from the infinity of 
extensive parts that each existing mode actually possesses under 
its own relation.491 
 
It might appear that there is a contradiction in Spinozaʼs reasoning, for how can 
the finite follow from the infinite? There has been a strange tendency in history to 
accuse Spinoza of acosmism, championed by Solomon Maimon and G. W. F. 
Hegel. Acosmism is the view that God is real, and the world, or cosmos, of finite 
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490 Ethics I, Proposition XXV, Corol. C I.431. 
491 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 92. 
  89 
things, is not real; the acosmist thus admits of only one ultimately real being, 
namely God. Consider Maimonʼs characterization of Spinoza: 
 
In this [Spinozaʼs] system unity is real, but diversity is merely ideal. 
In the atheistic system it is just the other way around. The diversity 
is real and grounded in the very nature of things, while the unity, 
which one observes in the order and regularity of nature, is 
consequently only coincidental; through this unity we determine our 
arbitrary system for the sake of our knowledge. It is inconceivable 
how one could make the Spinozistic system into atheism since 
these two systems are the exact opposites of each other. Atheism 
denies the existence of God, Spinozism denies the existence of the 
world. Rather, Spinozism should be called ʻacosmism.ʼ492 
 
While it may be tempting to place Spinoza in the category of acosmism, for he 
does hold that there is only one substantial reality, he clearly isnʼt an acosmist.493 
As Yitzhak Melamed points out, there are four key doctrines in Spinoza that 
conflict with the acosmist reading. While three of the four are doctrines from later 
parts in the Ethics, one of them is Spinozaʼs assertion in Proposition XVI that 
“from the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in 
infinitely many modes.”494 Melamed explains how this doctrine conflicts with an 
acosmist reading of Spinoza: 
 
Spinoza claims that the modes are just what follow necessarily from 
Godʼs nature or essence. Furthermore, in Proposition XXXVI 
(“Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow”) 
makes clear that everything, including Godʼs nature, must have 
some effects. But, if the modes (i.e., the effects of Godʼs nature) 
were illusory, then Godʼs nature would not really have any 
effects.495 
 
Melamedʼs account draws its strength from Spinozaʼs endorsement in 
Proposition XVI of the principle of ontological plenitude. The finite modes follow 
from the infinite because the series of finite modes itself is infinite. There are, in 
fact, an infinite number of finite modes within each series. The series of finite 
modes under an attribute is the infinite mode of that attribute, and follows from 
                                                
492 “Es ist unbegreiflich, wie man das spinozistische System zum atheistischen machen konnte, 
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causes that are infinite.496 As Denton Snider remarks of Spinozaʼs system: “The 
links of the chain are finite modes, but the total chain is the infinite mode.”497 
In Proposition XXVI Spinoza states: “A thing which has been determined to 
produce an effect has necessarily been determined in this way by God; and one 
which has not been determined by God cannot determine itself to produce an 
effect.”498 There is a parallel between the concept of a thing being determined to 
act and determined to exist, as Spinoza will soon bring out, that is, God 
determines things both to exist and to act. Since these finite modes are not the 
causes of themselves, they cannot act unless they are determined to do so. All 
modes, including human beings, can no more determine themselves to action 
than they can determine themselves to existence. This means that free will is an 
illusion. When Spinoza says in Proposition XXVII that “a thing which has been 
determined by God to produce an effect, cannot render itself undetermined,”499 
he means to tell us that we donʼt even have the freedom to do nothing. As he 
states later, “men are deceived in that they think themselves free, an opinion 
which consists only in this, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant 
of the causes by which they are determined.”500 
In Proposition XXVIII, Spinoza gives an account of finite causality that has 
been quite puzzling to interpreters: 
 
Every singular thing, or any thing which is finite and has a 
determinate existence, can neither exist nor be determined to 
produce an effect unless it is determined to exist and produce an 
effect by another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate 
existence; and again, this cause also can neither exist not be 
determined to produce an effect unless it is determined to exist and 
produce an effect by another, which is also finite and has a 
determinate existence, and so on, to infinity.501 
 
As Edwin Curley says of this proposition, “many commentators have wondered 
how the finite causality affirmed here could be consistent with the divine causality 
affirmed in Propositions XXVI and XXVII.”502 For in Proposition XXVI, Spinoza 
says that it is God who determines finite modes to action, whereas now in 
Proposition XXVIII, Spinoza says that finite modes are determined to act by other 
finite modes. Steven Nadler reconciles these two propositions, since finite things 
are modes of God: 
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Every causal relationship among finite things is a function both of 
those finite things themselves and of the infinite things (natures and 
laws) that govern the behavior of those finite things. Every event in 
nature stands at the intersection of the two causal nexuses: a 
ʻhorizontalʼ nexus within which a thing is temporally and causally 
related to (infinitely many) prior and posterior things; and a ʻverticalʼ 
nexus within which a thing and its relationship to other things is 
causally related to eternal principles, culminating in Natureʼs 
attributes. Proposition XXVIII refers to the first causal nexus and 
Proposition XXVI refers to the second one. As the finite thing is 
embedded in its horizontal relationship to infinitely many other finite 
things, the infinite series of causally related finite things (a mediate 
infinite mode) is in turn embedded in—and derives its necessity 
from—a vertical relationship to higher infinite modes and, ultimately, 
substance itself. The infinite chain of finite causes itself is brought 
into being by the infinite causes. Or, as one commentator so 
elegantly puts it, every finite mode is brought about by (or deducible 
from) an infinite series of other finite causes and a finite series of 
infinite causes.503 
 
On this account, God doesnʼt determine finite things directly, as he does the 
immediate infinite modes, but indirectly, insofar as God is modified both by the 
infinite modes and by other finite modes.504 As Spinoza says in the 
demonstration to Proposition XXVIII, every singular thing must “follow from, or be 
determined to exist and produce an effect by God or an attribute of God insofar 
as it is modified by a modification which is finite and has a determinate 
existence.”505 Because of this, everything ultimately depends on God, either 
immediately (immediate infinite modes), or mediately, through infinite things 
alone (mediate infinite modes), or through both infinite and finite things (finite 
modes). Spinoza concludes Proposition XXVIII by reminding us that “all things 
that are, are in God, and so depend on God that they can neither be nor be 
conceived without him.”506  
 
 
 
XL. Causality and Logic 
 
It is an axiom for Spinoza that “from a given determinate cause the effect follows 
necessarily; and conversely, if there is no determinate cause, it is impossible for 
                                                
503 Nadler, Spinozaʼs Ethics: An Introduction, 100-101. The commentator he references is Edwin 
Curley. See Curleyʼs Behind the Geometrical Method, 48. 
504 Ibid., pg. 101. 
505 Ethics I, Proposition XXVIII, Dem. C I.432. 
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an effect to follow.”507 By this axiom, causes necessitate their effects. Applied to 
God, who in an uncaused efficient cause of everything else, all things which exist 
are causally grounded in God. Things that exist either follow from God directly or 
indirectly (by more immediate effects of God). For “from the necessity of the 
divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many modes, 
(i.e., everything which can fall under an infinite intellect.)”508 
A problem here arises that must be dealt with, namely the charge that 
Spinoza assimilates the relation of causality to the relation of logical implication, 
and that he is not warranted in doing so. The proponent of this objection might 
say that there is a difference between an effect necessarily following from its 
cause and two things being logically connected. Further, the objector might say 
that logical necessity is what holds between propositions, as in geometry, and 
not between cause and effect. This objection is nothing new, as its underlying 
basis was made popular by the Scottish philosopher David Hume. A final 
Humean point to this objection is the following: the necessity of causal 
relationships is dependent upon a nomological necessity. This means that talk of 
one thing being the cause of another is an appeal to how the laws of nature 
happen to imply a relation between two things. The point is that while we hold it 
to be contrary to a law of nature that, for example, the speed of light is 670, 616, 
629 miles per hour, it does not follow without demonstrating that the laws of 
nature are themselves logically necessary that the speed of light couldnʼt have 
been different. While affirming a and denying a is a logical contradiction, on this 
view just because a causes b it does not follow that there is a logical 
contradiction in affirming a and denying b. 
Spinoza would not be willing to say that one thing can cause another without 
having the same necessity of logical propositions. Edwin Curley offers a 
discussion of this objection, where he first justifies that it makes sense to make 
this objection to Spinoza.509 He points out that Spinoza characterizes the 
relationship between substance and mode by saying that God is the cause of the 
things that are in him, that he has produced them or determined them, or that 
they follow from him. It is this following from which implies a relation of logical 
implication between substance and mode. Consider also the geometrical analogy 
given by Spinoza: 
 
I have shown clearly enough (see Proposition XVI) that from Godʼs 
supreme power, or infinite nature, infinitely many things in infinitely 
many modes, i.e., all things, have necessarily flowed, or always 
follow, by the same necessity and in the same way as from the 
nature of a triangle it follows, from eternity and to eternity, that its 
three angles are equal to two right angles.510 
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It is clear, as Curley notes, that Spinoza thinks the relation between God and 
modes is not merely a necessary relation, but a relation that is logically 
necessitated. 
Leibniz commented on this specific passage, objecting: “one cannot prove by 
any argument that things follow from God as properties follow from the triangle, 
nor is there an analogy between essences and existing things.”511 Leibniz seems 
to hint that the relation of logical implication obtains only between essences, and 
that it is absurd to talk of logical implication between existing things. Answers to 
these objections have been less than impressive. This is likely due to the fact 
that, as Curley points out, “if all things do follow from God in this way, then it 
ought to be possible, in principle, to deduce the existence of particular finite 
beings from the existence of the Infinite Being. Spinoza does not carry out any 
such deduction, which has been variously interpreted as a flaw in the system or 
as a natural defect of human knowledge.”512 Failure to present satisfactory and 
comprehensive responses to these objections arises from the lack of textual 
support.  
I believe that we can respond to this objection by saying that, for Spinoza, the 
relation of causal dependence isnʼt to be assimilated with logical implication, but 
instead that the relation of causal dependence is to be assimilated to a relation of 
conceptual dependence.513 On this view, to say that a causes b is to say that b is 
conceived through a, or that b conceptually depends on a. 
Be that as it may, Spinoza has no use for a distinction between things 
following from Godʼs essence and properties following from the essence or 
definition of a thing. For Spinoza, all things are necessary because the laws of 
nature are themselves necessary. 
 
A thing is called necessary either by reason of its essence or by 
reason of its cause. For a thingʼs existence follows necessarily 
either from its essence and definition or from a given efficient 
cause.514 
 
Though, as Steven Nadler has pointed out,515 it is false to read Spinoza 
distinguishing between two different kinds of necessity: logical or metaphysical 
vs. causal. Rather, Spinoza is informing us that there are two different ways that 
something is necessitated: internally and externally. There is no differentiation of 
two separate kinds of necessity, for internal and external necessity are both 
absolute necessity. When something is internally necessitated, it derives its 
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necessity from its essence.516 That which is externally necessitated derives its 
necessity from antecedent conditions. All such antecedent conditions depend on 
God as the efficient cause, whose existence is necessitated by his essence, i.e., 
from an internal necessity. Thus, whether something is determined by a 
conceptual or logical necessity or by a causal necessity doesnʼt make a 
difference. Thus, we can at least begin to respond to the critics of Spinoza. that 
he is justified in claiming that from Godʼs infinite nature all things “have 
necessarily flowed, or always follow, by the same necessity and in the same way 
as from the nature of a triangle it follows, from eternity and to eternity, that its 
three angles are equal to two right angles.”517 For in the Cogitata Metaphysica, 
Spinoza writes: “For if men understood clearly the whole order of Nature, they 
would find all things just as necessary as are all those treated in Mathematics.”518 
 
 
 
XLI. Necessitarianism 
 
Now that I have given an outline of causality and logic in relation to absolute 
necessity, I will turn to Spinozaʼs rejection of contingency and his argument for 
necessitarianism. Spinoza was content on removing the idea of contingency from 
metaphysics altogether. This was an extremely radical move, and one that 
gained him a great deal of attention. 
God is an infinite and eternal dynamic substance of which nothing is excluded 
from its nature. We have seen that there are two necessary and eternal effects of 
God: the immanent laws of nature, or infinite series of atemporal essences, and 
the world of existing things, which are mediated through the first effect of God. 
This modal world we know so well are merely instantiations of the eternal 
essences or laws of nature in time. All things are ultimately dependant on and 
determined by Godʼs nature or essence, and God depends no external 
substance. It follows that since God exists necessarily,519 nothing could have 
been otherwise than it is. 
We have already seen Spinozaʼs early views on contingency.520 In 
Proposition XXIX of the Ethics Spinoza boldly states: “In nature nothing is 
contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine 
nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way.”521 It is important to be 
clear about Spinozaʼs meaning of the term contingent, for he seems to employ 
the term in two different ways in the Ethics. He often uses the term to mean that 
which is causally undetermined. However, in the Fourth Part of the Ethics, he 
distinguishes between contingent and possible. 
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I call singular things contingent insofar as we find nothing, while we 
attend only to their essence, which necessarily posits their 
existence or which necessarily excludes it.522 
 
I call the same singular things possible, insofar as, while we attend 
to the causes from which they must be produced, we do not know 
whether those causes are determined to produce them.523 
 
In this second sense of contingency, something is contingent when it is a middle-
ground between necessary and impossible. It is not necessary by reason of its 
essence nor is it impossible because its essence involves a contradiction. 
However, something contingent in this sense is still necessitated by reason of its 
cause, but is not necessitated by reason of its essence. This sense of 
contingency exists in Spinozaʼs system, but this is not the same sense of 
contingency that Spinoza is referring to when he says: “I have shown more 
clearly than the noon light that there is absolutely nothing in things on account of 
which they can be called contingent.”524 Spinoza is attacking the first sense of 
contingency as that which is causally undetermined, that which he defines as 
possible in the Fourth Part of the Ethics. 
Spinozaʼs argument that nothing is contingent rests on his ability to 
demonstrate three things: that all things have been determined by God to exist, 
to exist in a certain way, and to produce effects in a certain way. He argues in 
Proposition XXIX that whatever is, is in God. However, God canʼt be called 
contingent, for God exists necessity. The modes also follow from God necessarily 
and not contingently, and God is the cause of modes in their existence and as 
they are considered to produce an effect. In the Short Treatise, Spinoza says: 
 
If the contingent thing is contingent because its cause is contingent 
[with respect to its existence], then that cause must also be 
contingent because the cause that produced it is also contingent 
[with respect to its existence,] and so on, to infinity. And because 
we have already proven that everything depends on one single 
cause, then that cause would also have to be contingent. And this 
is plainly false.525 
 
If God had not determined them, then it impossible, not contingent, that they 
should determine themselves. Since they have been determined by God, it is 
also impossible, not contingent, that they should render themselves 
undetermined. Consider Axiom III: “From a sgiven determinate cause the effect 
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follows necessarily; and conversely, if there is no determinate cause, it is 
impossible for an effect to follow.”526 
This leads Spinoza to assert: “Things could have been produced by God in no 
other way, and in no other order than they have been produced.”527 Since all 
things follow from Godʼs given nature, and have been determined by Godʼs 
nature to exist (in a certain way) and to produce effects in a certain way, it follows 
that if the order of Nature could be different, then Godʼs nature could be different, 
and therefore this other nature of God would necessarily have to exist. Thus, 
there would be two substances, which is absurd. It follows, says Spinoza, that 
things could have been produced in no other way or order. Spinoza describes 
that what we call contingency in the sense of being causally undetermined, is 
merely an inadequate conception of the order of Nature: 
 
A thing is called contingent only because of a defect in our 
knowledge. For if we do not know that the thingʼs essence involves 
a contradiction, or if we do know very well that its essence does not 
involve a contradiction, and nevertheless can affirm nothing 
certainly about its existence, because the order of causes is hidden 
from us, it can never seem to us either necessary or impossible. So 
we call it contingent or possible.528 
 
It is evident that Spinoza is going much further than the typical hard determinist 
thesis that everything is causally determined to its existence and to bring out the 
effects that it does. But for Spinoza, additional premise of the necessitarian 
position that this causal order couldnʼt have been otherwise seems to him much 
more consistent. Both the essences and laws of things and the world of existing 
things are an absolutely necessary effect of God. Whatever follows from the 
absolute nature of any of Godʼs attributes (or from some attribute of God insofar 
as it is modified by a modification) have always had to exist and be infinite, or 
are, through the same attribute, eternal and infinite.529 Substance and its 
attributes are logically necessary by reason of its essence, while the infinite 
modes have a logical necessity by reason of its cause. As Steven Nadler puts it: 
“These things (including ʻthe face of the whole universeʼ) could not possibly have 
been otherwise, but that is because they have been necessarily determined by 
something that, in and of itself, could not possibly have been otherwise.”530 Thus, 
the finite modes, as the constituents of a series that itself could not possibly have 
been otherwise, are also absolutely necessary.531 For Spinoza, we live in the 
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best of all possible worlds because we live in the only possible world, but one 
which is maximally ontologically rich. 
 
 
 
XLII. A Final Note: The Problem of Attributes532 
 
Spinozaʼs theory of attributes has left scholars with perplexing interpretive issues. 
Descartes had defined the attribute of a substance as its essence, and concludes 
that each substance has only one attribute. Spinoza gives us a different definition 
of an attribute as that which the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting 
its essence, hence not limiting substances to having only one attribute. The 
difficulty in interpretation is largely due to the translation of the Latin word 
tanquam. As countless interpreters of Spinoza have pointed out, the word can 
mean either “as if, but not in fact” or “as in fact.” Both Shirley and Curley translate 
Spinozaʼs definition of attribute as that which the intellect perceives of a 
substance “as constituting its essence.” The use of the term “intellect” in 
Spinozaʼs definition is likewise ambiguous, and it isnʼt immediately clear whether 
Spinoza is referring to the infinite intellect or a finite intellect. How we interpret 
what Spinoza means by both of these terms is necessarily tied up with how we 
conceive the reality of the attributes. Spinoza claims that there is one substance 
with multiple attributes. Scholars are at odds at how to make sense of this based 
on Spinozaʼs definition of attribute. For if an attribute is that which constitutes the 
essence of substance, then it seems to follow that Spinozaʼs substance has 
multiple essences. On the other hand, if an attribute does not constitute the 
essence of substance, then it follows that Spinoza is claiming that the attributes 
only appear to us “as if” they constitute its essence. Some scholars have taken 
the subjectivist side, which claims that the attributes do not really constitute the 
essence of substance, but only appear to. Other scholars take the objectivist side 
in this argument, and claim that each attribute pertains to the essence of 
substance. 
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XLIII. Subjectivism 
 
Wolfson gives the most famous argument for a subjectivist interpretation of the 
attributes.533 According to Wolfson, Spinoza holds that the two attributes are in 
reality one essence, and merely appear to us to be distinct. Wolfson points to the 
subjective language in which Spinoza continually describes attributes, which he 
holds isnʼt accidental. Wolfsonʼs Spinoza considers universals, with the exception 
of one universal, namely, substance, as subjective concepts.534 He points to 
Spinozaʼs claim in the Cogitata Metaphysica that attributes are distinguished by 
reason.535 To Wolfson, the subjective interpretation disposes of the difficulty that 
accompanies the objective interpretation: “How can that essence be one and 
self-identical, while its constituents are many, heterogeneous, and unrelated, is a 
question which is hopeless of solution.”536 Wolfson points to Proposition X to seal 
his argument: “Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself.”537 
The Scholium to this says: 
 
It is evident that although two attributes may be conceived to be 
really distinct (i.e., one may be conceived without the aid of the 
other), we still can not infer from that that they constitute two 
beings, or two different substances. For it is of the nature of a 
substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself, 
since all the attributes it has have always been in it together, and 
one could not be produced by another, but each expresses the 
reality, or being of substance.538 
 
Wolfson says: writes that this passage implies that the two attributes appear to 
the mind as being distinct from each other, however, in reality, they are one. This 
is so, argues Wolfson, because Proposition X tells us that attributes, like 
substance, are summa genera (conceived through itself). Therefore he argues 
that the two attributes must thus be one and identical with substance. Further, 
Wolfson notes that the attributes are not conceived by the mind one after the 
other or deduced from the other, and have always been in substance together, 
being conceived by us simultaneously. Thus, he urges, the attributes are only 
different words that express the same reality and being of substance.539 Wolfson 
holds that Spinoza follows the traditional conception of attributes found in 
medieval Jewish rationalism.540 In other words, Spinozaʼs theory of attributes 
reflects the following statement made by Joseph Albo: 
                                                
533 Wolfson, I, 142-157. “Relation of Attribute to Substance.” 
534 Ibid. 152-153. 
535 Ibid. 153. CM, I, 3. 
536 Ibid. 153. 
537 Ethics, I, Proposition X. C I.416. 
538 Ethics, I, Proposition X, Schol. C I.416. 
539 Wolfson, I, 156. 
540 Wolfson, I, 142. 
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When I awaken from my reflections upon the plurality of attributes I 
begin to realize that all the attributes are nothing but intellectual 
conceptions of those perfections which must needs exist in Thy 
essence but which in reality are nothing but Thy essence.541 
 
 
 
XLIV. Objectivism 
 
While the subjectivist account might be appealing, it has serious flaws. Spinoza is 
no Kantian, and the subjectivist reading presents him along very Kantian lines. 
The most striking problem with the subjectivist account is that it conflicts with a 
number of passages in the Ethics that indicate that attributes have real and 
objective existence. The subjectivist account undermines the passages in the 
Ethics that support the claims that the attributes are really distinct and that they 
really do constitute the essence of substance. Consider the following passage: 
 
God (by Proposition XIX) and all of his attributes are eternal, i.e. (by 
Definition VIII), each of his attributes expresses existence. 
Therefore, the same attributes of God which (by Definition IV) 
explain Godʼs eternal essence at the same time explain his eternal 
existence, i.e., that itself which constitutes Godʼs essence at the 
same time constitutes his existence. So his existence and his 
essence are one and the same, q.e.d.542 
 
The most persuasive argument that the attributes are really distinct is based on 
Spinozaʼs demonstration of Proposition X, that each attribute of a substance 
must be conceived through itself: 
 
For an attribute is what the intellect perceives concerning a 
substance, as constituting its essence (by Definition IV); so (by 
Definition III) it must be conceived through itself, q.e.d.543 
 
Since it is the case that all intellects conceive of the attributes as really distinct, it 
follows that the infinite intellect of God must also conceive of the attributes as 
really distinct. Since the infinite intellect understands everything truly, it must be 
the case that the attributes are really distinct. But what support is there for the 
claim that the attributes constitute the essence of substance? In Proposition III of 
the second part of the Ethics, Spinoza says: 
                                                
541 Ikkarim, II, 25 
542 Ethics, I, Proposition XX, Demonstration. C I.428. Consider also Ethics, I, Proposition IX, XXI, 
XXII, XXIII, and Ethics, II, Proposition I and II. 
543 Ethics, I, Proposition X, Demonstration. C I.416. 
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In God there is necessarily an idea, both of his essence and of 
everything that necessarily follows from his essence.544 
 
If the subjectivist reading were correct it would follow that God misunderstands 
his own essence, which clearly contradicts the preceding proposition. It appears 
that the objectivist position has solved out problems. But, this solution generates 
a new problem: How can one substance have a multitude of distinct essences? 
Spinoza claims in the Scholium to Proposition X that “it is far from absurd to 
attribute many attributes to one substance.”545 This problem is notoriously 
complicated, and attempting to solve the many issues that arise from the problem 
of attributes would require a study devoted to this problem alone. 
                                                
544 Ethics, II, Proposition III. C I.449 
545 Ethics, I, Proposition X, Scholium. C I.416 
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